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Report of the Standing Advisory Committee 
On the Rules of Professional Conduct 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 The Court has asked this Committee1 to examine the current Massachusetts Rules of 
Professional Conduct (Mass.R.Prof.C.) in light of changes to the American Bar Association's 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in the fifteen years since the Court adopted the 
Massachusetts Rules. During that time, the Model Rules have undergone two major revisions. 
First, in 2002, the ABA adopted comprehensive amendments proposed by the ABA Ethics 2000 
Commission that responded to changes in the profession since the Model Rules’ adoption in 
1983. Second, in 2012 and early 2013, the ABA adopted significant, but more targeted, 
amendments proposed by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 that responded to changes in 
law practice resulting from globalization and the profession’s increased use of technology. 
 The Court has already acted on the Committee’s recommended changes to selected 
portions of the Massachusetts Rules, particularly Rules 1.5, 1.13, 1.14, 6.5, and 8.5. In this 
Report, we address the remaining portions of the Massachusetts Rules, summarizing and 
explaining the rationale for our recommendations.  The Committee’s recommended revisions to 
the rules accompany this Report, together with copies of the Committee’s recommended 
revisions marked to show changes from the current Massachusetts rules, and to show changes 
from the Model Rules.  
 We recommend adoption of many changes proposed by the Ethics 2000 and Ethics 20/20 
Commissions. Most of our recommendations are meant to clarify existing law, to improve format 
or style (e.g., the adoption of Model Rule titles), and to promote consistency with the rules of 
other jurisdictions that follow the Model Rules. This Report discusses only changes of 
substantive importance. We do not address provisions of the current Massachusetts Rules and 
Comments that we propose to leave unchanged, except to explain why we rejected language of 
the Model Rules that would have altered the substance of our current Rules in an important 
fashion.  
 We call the Court’s attention specifically to a few issues of particular importance, all of 
which are described in more detail in the body of this Report.  
• We recommend adoption of Model Comments 6 and 7 to Model Rule 1.1 and 
Model Comments 1–4 to Model Rule 5.3, which give detailed guidance for 
                                                 
1 The Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court appoint the members of the Standing Advisory Committee on the Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  The Committee is chaired by John L. Whitlock, Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP.  The 
other members are Carol Beck, Committee for Public Counsel Services; Professor R. Michael Cassidy, Boston 
College Law School; Timothy J. Dacey, Goulston & Storrs, P.C.; Henry C. Dinger, Goodwin Procter LLP; Erin K. 
Higgins, Conn Kavanaugh Rosenthal Peisch & Ford, LLP; Professor Andrew L. Kaufman, Harvard Law School; 
Elizabeth Mulvey, Crowe & Mulvey LLP; Professor Andrew M. Perlman, Suffolk University Law School; James B. 
Re, Sally & Fitch LLP; Regina E. Roman, Sugarman, Rogers, Barshak & Cohen, PC; Professor Constance Rudnick, 
Massachusetts School of Law; and Massachusetts Bar Counsel Constance V. Vecchione, Office of Bar Counsel.  
The Committee acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of Barbara Berenson, who acted as liaison to the Court. 
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safeguarding client interests when outsourcing work relating to client 
representation.  
• We recommend amending Rule 1.6 concerning the obligation to safeguard 
confidential information to conform our Rules and Comments more closely to the 
ABA Model Rules. Our recommendations include the adoption of a variation of 
Model Rules 1.6(b)(2) and 1.6(b)(3), which relate to prevention or rectification of 
injuries from criminal or fraudulent conduct; Model Rule 1.6(b)(7), which 
establishes guidelines for discussions between a law firm and a prospective hire to 
identify potential conflicts of interest; and Model Rule 1.6(b)(4), which confirms 
that a lawyer may reveal confidential information to secure legal advice about the 
lawyer’s own ethical obligations.  Expansions of exceptions to the prohibition on 
disclosure of confidential information have been controversial in the past, and 
several members of the committee have dissented from certain aspects of the 
committee’s recommendations.  Separate statements addressing the committee’s 
majority views and minority dissents are attached in the appendix to this report.  
• We recommend adopting the term “informed consent” as the standard to be met in 
Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.9 and elsewhere in the Rules instead of the current “consent after 
consultation” standard.  The ABA reporter’s notes state, and the Committee 
agrees, that “consultation” does not adequately convey the requirement that the 
client receive full disclosure of the nature and implications of a lawyer’s conflict 
of interest. 
• We recommend adopting the requirement that conflicts waivers permitted by 
Rules 1.7, 1.9, 1.11, and 1.12 be confirmed in writing. 
• We recommend maintaining (with some clarification) the approach of current 
Massachusetts Rule 1.10 with respect to screening of lawyers who change firms 
instead of adopting the greater latitude for screening that the recently amended 
Model Rule would permit. On this point the Committee was divided and the 
arguments for and against this decision are set forth in separate majority and 
dissenting statements in the appendix to this report. 
• We recommend adoption of Model Rule 1.18, which in substance codifies case 
law relating to the confidentiality obligations of lawyers to prospective clients.  
Currently, Massachusetts has no counterpart to Model Rule 1.18.  Separate 
statements addressing the committee’s majority views and minority dissent are 
attached in the appendix to this report.  
• We recommend adoption of most of the changes made by the ABA to clarify and 
strengthen the text and Comments to Model Rule 3.3. While each of the 
recommended changes is small and many of them merely make explicit what was 
implicit in the former version, taken together they change the face of Rule 3.3 and 
deserve a close look. 
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• We highlight for the Court’s attention alternate proposals for Rule 3.5 dealing 
with communication with jurors; the first proposal, unanimously supported by the 
Committee, recommends the adoption of Model Rule 3.5. 
• We recommend a number of changes in Rule 3.8 regarding the obligations of a 
prosecutor, including a prohibition against threatening to prosecute a charge not 
supported by probable cause, and reformulation of prosecutors’ post-conviction 
responsibilities with respect to newly-discovered exculpatory information. The 
Committee, although divided, recommends retaining our nonstandard provision 
requiring prior judicial approval before subpoenaing a lawyer to present evidence 
in a criminal proceeding about a present or past client.  Separate statements of the 
majority and minority dissenting views are attached in the appendix to this report. 
• We recommend adopting Model Rule 4.4(b) and Comment 3 to that Rule, both of 
which deal with material inadvertently sent to an opponent. A lawyer’s obligation 
in dealing with such material is a new topic in our Rules.  Some members of the 
Committee opposed the adoption of Comment 3 only; separate statements of the 
majority and minority dissenting view are attached in the appendix. 
• In our recommendations with respect to Rules 5.1 and 5.3, we have followed the 
practice of New York and New Jersey to impose disciplinary responsibility on 
law firms as well as individual firm lawyers with respect to observance of the 
Mass.R.Prof.C. in particular cases. 
• We recommend a number of changes in the Rules dealing with advertising and 
solicitation that are designed to deal with the changes in technology that have 
occurred since the Court last dealt with these provisions. There is also a 
substantial change involved in our recommendation that the Court adopt the 
Model Rules definition of what constitutes a claim of specialization in Rule 
7.4(a).  Several members of the Committee have dissented from the decision to 
adopt the Model Rules deletion from Rule 7.2(b) of any requirement to maintain 
copies of advertising materials.  Their dissenting statement is attached in the 
appendix to this report. 
• Finally, there are a few additional recommendations dealing with Rules 1.8(b), 
1.9(c)(1), and 8.4(h), that have generated dissenting statements from a few 
individual members of the Committee that are included, along with statements in 




EXPLANATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES TO THE 
MASSACHUSETTS RULES AND COMMENTS 
 This report discusses proposed changes of substantive importance.  To review all 
proposed changes, please see the document titled Standing Advisory Committee's Proposed 
Draft of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. 
Rule 1.0: Terminology 
 The current Rule 9.1 contains definitions applicable to the Massachusetts Rules. The 
Committee recommends that these definitions be moved to the beginning of the Rules, 
renumbered as Rule 1.0, and retitled “Terminology” in order to be consistent with the placement 
and title of the definitions in the Model Rules. 
 Rule 1.0(a)–(r). The Committee recommends the adoption of each of the definitions 
contained in Model Rule 1.0, with the exception of the definition of “screening” in Model Rule 
1.0(k). The Committee recommends keeping the Massachusetts nonstandard definition of 
screening in Rule 1.10, where it is currently found. For purposes of clarity, the Committee also 
recommends some non-substantive stylistic changes to the Model Rule definitions of the terms 
“firm,” “fraud,” and “tribunal.”   
 The Committee’s proposal includes adopting the Model Rule definitions of several terms 
not presently defined in the Massachusetts Rule, including “confirmed in writing” [Rule 1.0(c)], 
“informed consent” [Rule 1.0(f)], and “writing” [Rule 1.0(q)]. These new terms are used in the 
Committee’s proposed revisions to other Massachusetts Rules, including Rules 1.6, 1.7, 1.8 and 
1.9. Because the Committee proposes replacing the general concept of client “consent after 
consultation” with the requirement of “informed consent” throughout the Rules, there is no 
longer a need to define “consult” and “consultation,” and the Committee recommends 
eliminating these definitions. 
 Finally, the Committee recommends retaining several useful definitions presently found 
in Mass.R.Prof.C. 9.1 that have no counterparts in Model Rule 1.0. These are definitions for the 
terms “Bar association” [Rule 1.0(a)], “Person” [Rule 1.0(i)], “Qualified Legal Assistance 
Organization” [Rule 1.0(j)], and “State” [Rule 1.0(n)]. 
Comments to Rule 1.0 
 Comments 1–2.  The Committee recommends the elimination of current Comments 1 and 
2 as either outmoded or as discussing terms that are now dealt with in subsequent specific Rules 
and Comments rather than in this Rule. In their place, the Committee recommends adoption of 
Model Code Comments 1–7 as helpful explanations. 
 Comment 8. The Committee recommends that current Comment 3, explaining the non-
standard Massachusetts term “Qualified Legal Assistance Organization,” be renumbered 
Comment 8, with an additional sentence clarifying that an award of attorneys’ fees that leads to 
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an operating gain in a fiscal year will not create a “profit” for determining the existence of a 
Qualified Legal Assistance Organization. 
Rule 1.1: Competence 
The Committee recommends no change in the text of the Rule. 
Comments to Rule 1.1 
 Comment 5. The Committee recommends revising the Comment to conform to the 
corresponding Model Comment. A new sentence has been added recognizing that lawyers may 
enter into agreements with clients that limit the matters for which the lawyer is responsible, and a 
new cross-reference directs lawyers to Rule 1.2(c) where such agreements are explained in more 
detail. 
 Comments 6 and 7. The Committee recommends the adoption of these Model Comments 
dealing with the responsibilities of lawyers in contracting with other lawyers outside the firm and 
in coordinating with other lawyers who are providing services to a client in a particular matter. 
These Comments provide useful guidance on matters not previously covered in our Rules.  
 Comment 8. The Committee recommends amending our current Comment to reflect 
language recently added to the Model Comment. The new language emphasizes that a lawyer’s 
duty of competence requires the lawyer to keep abreast of current developments, including the 
risks and benefits of new technology. The Committee also recommends eliminating the reference 
to the informal use of peer review since Massachusetts has not yet established any such system. 
Rule 1.2: Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer 
 Rule 1.2(c).  The Committee recommends adopting the provision of the Model Rules that 
makes clear that a client must not only consent to any limitation on the scope of a representation, 
but also that the limitation must be reasonable under the circumstances.   
 Rule 1.2(e).  Rule 1.2(e) currently deals with the lawyer’s obligation to consult with a 
client when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules. 
Following the lead of the Model Rules, the Committee recommends moving the substance of this 
provision to Rule 1.4 dealing with communication between lawyer and client. 
Comments to Rule 1.2 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends the substitution of Model Comments 1–3 for 
current Comment 1. The Model Comments address the allocation of authority between client and 
lawyer more thoroughly and completely than current Comment 1. 
Comment 2. The Committee recommends that current Comment 2 be renumbered 
Comment 4 and that the reference to “mental disability” be changed to “diminished capacity,” 
the term currently used in Rule 1.14. 
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Comment 3. The Committee recommends that current Comment 3 be renumbered 
Comment 5. 
Comment 4. The Committee recommends that current Comment 4 be renumbered 
Comment 6 and modestly revised to conform to the Model Rules. 
Comment 5. The Committee recommends that current Comment 5 be deleted and that 
Model Rules Comments 7 and 8 be adopted in its place. The Model Comments give lawyers 
clearer and more helpful guidance concerning agreements to limit the scope of representation. In 
new Comment 8, the Committee has added a cross-reference to Rule 1.5(b) to remind lawyers of 
their obligation to confirm the scope of a new engagement in writing. 
Comments 6 and 7. The Committee recommends that current Comments 6 and 7 dealing 
with criminal and fraudulent actions by a client be renumbered Comments 9 and 10 and that 
these Comments be amended to conform to the Model Rules. The Committee has added a cross-
reference to our nonstandard Rule 3.3(e) (which details a special course of action for lawyers in 
criminal cases) to new Comment 10. In addition, the reference to disaffirming opinions upon 
withdrawal that formerly appeared in the Comments to Rule 1.6 has been moved to new 
Comment 10. 
Comment 8. The Committee recommends that current Comment 8 be renumbered 
Comment 11. 
Comment 9. The Committee recommends renumbering current Comment 9 as Comment 
12 and amending the Comment to make it clear that lawyers must not participate in transactions 
to effectuate criminal or fraudulent tax avoidance.  
The Committee also recommends adoption of a new Comment 13 discussing the lawyer’s 
obligation to consult with a client when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance that 
the lawyer is not legally permitted to give. 
Rule 1.3:  Diligence 
 The Committee does not recommend any change to Rule 1.3, which includes a sentence 
concerning zealous representation not contained in the Model Rule. 
Comments to Rule 1.3 
 Comments 1–4. The Committee recommends revising these Comments so that they are 
nearly identical to the language found in the Comments to Model Rule 1.3. The Model 
Comments add a little more detail to the text of the Rule and to the text of the current 
Massachusetts Comments. 
 Comment 5. The Committee recommends adoption of this new Model Comment. It deals 
with the obligations of a sole practitioner to do some advance planning to protect clients in the 
event of the lawyer’s death or disability. 
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Rule 1.4: Communication 
 Rule 1.4(a). The Committee recommends accepting the new Model Rule subparagraphs 
(a)(1), (2), and (5) which spell out the basic communication obligations in greater detail than the 
current Rule.  
Comments to Rule 1.4  
 Comments 1 and 2. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comments 1–5 to 
replace portions of current Comments 1 and 2 since the Model Comments explain in more detail 
the communication obligations prescribed by the text of the Rule while retaining the substance of 
the current Comments. The Committee also recommends deletion of the last sentence of Model 
Comment 5, which the Committee considered unnecessarily confusing. 
 Comments 3–5. The Committee recommends renumbering these Comments as 
Comments 6–8 and adopting the small changes made in Model Comments 6 and 7.   
Rule 1.6: Confidentiality of Information 
 The paragraphs below highlight the recommendations of the majority of the Committee.  
However, a number of members of the Committee oppose certain aspects of the Committee’s 
recommendations, particularly as to the expansion of exceptions to confidentiality.  The 
arguments pro and con are set forth in the appendix to this report. 
Rule 1.6(a). The Committee recommends retaining the Massachusetts formulation of the 
obligation as protecting “confidential” information relating to the representation of a client 
instead of the overbroad Model Rule formulation that leaves out the word “confidential.” It also 
recommends small changes in the current Rule to reflect the substitution of the concept of 
“informed consent” for the previous formulation of “consent after consultation.”  
 Rule 1.6(b)(1). When the Court adopted the Massachusetts Rules in 1998, Massachusetts 
permitted disclosure of client confidences to prevent or rectify client crime or fraud more broadly 
than the corresponding Model Rule. In its 2002 revision to the Model Rules, the ABA followed 
Massachusetts’ lead in many respects and even broadened the exceptions somewhat.  Model 
Rule 1.6(b)(1) authorizes disclosure of client confidences to the extent reasonably necessary “to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm” from an act by anyone, not just the 
client, without the current Massachusetts condition that the danger must result from a criminal or 
fraudulent act. The Committee recommends acceptance of the Model Rule formulation, which 
permits disclosure to prevent serious physical harm to another whether or not the harm will result 
from a crime or fraud. The Committee also recommends retaining the exception currently 
recognized in the Massachusetts Rules to disclose confidential information “to prevent the 
wrongful execution or incarceration of another.”  
 Rule 1.6(b)(2). Both current Rule 1.6(b)(1) and Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) permit disclosures 
to the extent reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of a crime or fraud that the lawyer 
reasonably believes is likely to result in “substantial injury to the financial interests or property 
of another.” The Committee recommends that the exception apply as to crimes or frauds that will 
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substantially injure any legally protectable interests, not just “financial” interests.  The law 
protects many important interests — rights to privacy, to vote, to be free from invidious 
discrimination, etc. — that are not strictly speaking financial interests.  The Committee believes 
the rationale for this exception applies to justify the prevention of criminal or fraudulent activity 
that would substantially harm these other important interests, as explained in proposed new 
comment 8A. Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), unlike current Rule 1.6(b)(1), permits disclosure only to 
prevent a crime or fraud by the client. The Committee believes that the Model Rule is too 
restrictive in preventing substantial harm to innocent third parties and recommends retaining the 
current Massachusetts Rule that permits disclosure to prevent the commission of a crime or fraud 
by anyone. 
 Rule 1.6(b)(3). Current Rule 1.6 permits disclosure of client confidences to the extent 
necessary to rectify client fraud in which the lawyer’s services have been used (subject to special 
rules applicable in criminal cases set forth in Massachusetts Rule 3.3(e)). The 2000 revision to 
Model Rule 1.6(b)(3) would expand that exception “to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has 
resulted from” a client’s crime or fraud in which the client has used the lawyer’s services (italics 
added).  The Committee recommends acceptance of the Model Rule version without the 
limitation to “financial” interests. 
 Rule 1.6(b)(4). The Model Rules add a new exception to permit a lawyer to disclose 
client confidences to the extent reasonably necessary to secure advice about the lawyer’s 
compliance with the rules of professional conduct.  While the Committee believes that such an 
exception is implicit in our current Rules, we agree with the Model Rule formulation that makes 
the exception explicit and recommend its adoption. 
 Rule 1.6(b)(5). Both the current Massachusetts Rule and the Model Rules recognize the 
ability of a lawyer to disclose client confidences to the extent reasonably necessary to establish a 
claim or defense in a dispute with the client or to defend against charges of misconduct. The 
Committee recommends no change.  
 Rule 1.6(b)(6). The Committee proposes no change in the current Rule, which permits 
disclosure when permitted by the Rules or required by law or court order.  While the current 
Rule is facially broader than Model Rule 1.6(b)(6), the Committee believes the current rule 
merely makes explicit what is implicit in the Model Rule. 
 Rule 1.6(b)(7). The Committee recommends adoption of this exception recently proposed 
by the ABA’s 20/20 Commission and adopted by the ABA. It deals with the very practical 
problem of the need of a firm to identify potential conflict of interest problems when taking on a 
new partner or associate. It permits a limited disclosure of confidential information but only if 
the revealed information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise 
prejudice the client. 
Rule 1.6(c). The Committee recommends adoption of this provision of the Model Rules, 
which imposes, in general terms, an obligation on a lawyer to make reasonable efforts to prevent 
inadvertent disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, a client’s confidential information. The Rule 
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thus makes explicit what would otherwise be implicit in the general obligation of competence in 
maintaining client confidences. 
Comments to Rule 1.6 
The Comments to ABA Model Rule 1.6 were considerably revised in 2002, including the 
addition of many entirely new Comments. The Committee recommends that most of the ABA’s 
revised Comments be adopted, replacing or substantially revising the current Comments, except 
to the extent that the current Comments address nonstandard provisions in our Rule, or the 
Model Comments address provisions that the Committee does not recommend. The Committee 
also proposes several additional Comments that either serve to explain the rationale for the 
differences between the Model Rules and the recommended Massachusetts Rules or to provide 
more detailed guidance to practitioners in the application of the Rules than is found in the Model 
Comments. These additions, and the new Comments that reflect substantive changes from 
current Massachusetts Comments, are summarized below (referring in each instance to the 
current Massachusetts Comments): 
Comments 1–3. The Committee recommends that these Comments be deleted and 
replaced with a new introductory Comment 1. 
Comments 4 and 5. The Committee recommends that these Comments dealing with the 
fundamental nature of the confidentiality principle and its difference from the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product doctrine be renumbered Comments 2 and 3, with the additional 
language of the Model Comment. 
Comments 5A and 5B. The Committee recommends that these Comments be renumbered 
Comments 3A and 3B. These nonstandard Comments set forth the rationale for the limitation of 
the basic obligation to “confidential” information. The language has been refined from the 
current Comment, in part because advances in technology have changed our view about the 
general availability of information and they give examples of information relating to a 
representation that would not constitute confidential information.  These examples include 
general knowledge about the law or about the structure and operation of an industry in which the 
client does business. The Comment also clarifies that even information that is a matter of public 
record — e.g., a client’s criminal conviction in a different state long ago — would still be 
“confidential” if not “generally known” and that there are instances where information may need 
to be treated as “confidential” even if “generally known.”  
Comment 6. The Committee recommends deletion of current Comment 6 and adoption of 
Model Comment 4 as new Comment 4. This recommended Comment interprets the text of the 
Rules as permitting a lawyer to discuss issues relating to a representation by the use of 
hypotheticals, so long as there is no reasonable likelihood that the listener will be able to identify 
the situation.  
Comments 7 and 8. The Committee recommends adoption of these current Comments, 
which deal with authorized disclosures of confidential information, with minor modifications to 
conform to the Model Comments, as new Comment 5.  
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Comment 9. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 6 as a new 
Comment 6, substantially replacing our current Comment 9, to begin the explanation of the 
limited situations in which disclosure of confidential information may be permitted. In particular, 
the Comment deals with the exceptions to the confidentiality duty that turn on certain harms 
being “reasonably certain.”  It explains what that term means, and gives an example of a 
situation in which substantial physical harm is “reasonably certain.” 
Comment 9A. The Committee recommends renumbering this nonstandard Comment as 
Comment 6A. It attempts to provide guidance to lawyers in deciding whether harm or injury that 
disclosure of client confidences is meant to prevent or rectify is “substantial.” It clarifies that a 
situation may present a risk of substantial physical harm even though there may be no physical 
injury, giving the example of statutory rape.   
Comments 10–17. The Committee recommends deletion of these current Comments as 
covering material dealt with in new Model Comments explaining details relating to the 
exceptions to the confidentiality rule. The Committee recommends adoption as Comment 7 of 
Model Rule Comment 7, modified to adapt its explanation to the changes the Committee is 
recommending in Rule 1.6(b)(2), which deals with the prevention of future crime or fraud.  The 
Committee also recommends adoption as Comment 8 of Model Comment 8 setting forth the 
operation of Rule 1.6(b)(3) where the lawyer learns of the client’s crime or fraud after it has been 
committed. It recommends the adoption of a nonstandard Comment 8A, which gives the 
rationale for not limiting the exceptions in Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3) to “financial” injuries, and 
gives examples of non-financial injuries that would justify the disclosure of client confidences 
without client consent. The Committee recommends the adoption as Comment 9 of Model 
Comment 9, which states that the confidentiality rules do not bar a lawyer from seeking 
professional advice to help in complying with the Massachusetts Rules.  
Comment 18. The Committee recommends renumbering this Comment as Comment 10 
and adopting the Model Rule changes to this Comment, which explains that the confidentiality 
rules do not bar a lawyer from defending against charges of misconduct. 
Comment 19. The Committee recommends renumbering this as Comment 11, deleting 
the first two sentences and the last sentence of the current Comment because these subjects are 
covered elsewhere. The Committee also recommends the adoption of Model Comments 12–19 as 
Massachusetts Comments 12–19. 
Model Comment 12 discusses the lawyer’s obligations when “other law” may require 
disclosure of client confidences.  It stresses the obligation to consult with the client as to how, if 
at all, to assert legal arguments against any required disclosure of client confidences.  In 
particular, it clarifies that if such arguments are unsuccessful, the lawyer must consult with the 
client as to an appeal, but may make the disclosure if review is not sought. 
Model Comments 13 and 14 discuss the ramifications of recommended Rule 1.6(b)(7).  
Model Comment 15 states more elaborately than current Comment 20 the obligations of a 
lawyer when ordered to reveal confidential information. 
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Model Comment 16 cautions lawyers given permission by paragraph (b) to reveal 
confidential information about the limits of that permission. 
Model Comment 17 identifies factors that lawyers may consider in exercising the 
discretion given to them by Rule 1.6 to disclose client confidences under the various exceptions 
set forth in Rule 1.6(b). The Committee also recommends moving into this Comment most of the 
nonstandard language of current Comment 21 that emphasizes that other Rules and other 
provisions of law permit or require disclosure of confidential information. 
Comment 17A. The Committee recommends retaining current Comment 19A with one 
slight change in language and renumbering it Comment 17A. 
Model Comments 18 and 19 discuss the practical steps that lawyers must take to provide 
reasonable assurances that confidential information is not inadvertently disclosed, including 
whether “special security precautions” need to be taken. In general, so long as a method of 
communication (e.g., email) “affords a reasonable expectation of privacy,” special security 
measures are unnecessary, although communication of exceptionally sensitive information or the 
client’s own directives may warrant a higher degree of security.   
Comment 20. The Committee recommends retaining the current Comment 22 as 
renumbered Comment 20, with the Model Comment addition of relevant references.   
Rule 1.7: Conflicts of Interest: Current Clients  
Rule 1.7, in its current form, follows the former Model Rule format by addressing direct 
adversity between clients in Rule 1.7(a) and other concurrent conflicts of interest, including 
those caused by third parties and the lawyer’s own interests, in Rule 1.7(b).  The ABA’s 2002 
revisions include all of these conflicts under Rule 1.7(a), with direct adversity as subparagraph 
(1) and other conflicts as subparagraph (2).  The consent provisions applicable to all concurrent 
conflicts are moved to Rule 1.7(b).  The Committee recommends adopting the revised ABA 
format. 
As part of the Model Rule revisions, Rule 1.7(a)(2) (concurrent conflicts other than direct 
adversity) is now prefaced by the requirement that there be a “significant risk” that the lawyer’s 
representation will be affected. The ABA reporter’s notes indicate that no substantive change in 
the standard was intended. 
The Committee recommends that the standard of “informed consent” used in the Model 
Rules replace “consent after consultation” throughout the Massachusetts Rules. The ABA 
reporter’s notes state, and the Committee agrees, that “consultation” does not adequately convey 
the requirement that the client receive full disclosure of the nature and implications of a lawyer’s 
conflict of interest.  The Committee also recommends that the court adopt the further 
requirement in Model Rule 1.7(b)(4) that the consent be confirmed in writing. 
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Comments to Rule 1.7 
The Comments to Model Rule 1.7 were considerably revised in 2002, including the 
addition of many entirely new Comments.  The Committee is recommending that all but one of 
the ABA’s revisions be adopted, albeit with a few other substantive or stylistic changes.   
The result of conforming to the ABA’s revisions of the Comments to Rule 1.7 is that 
many of the existing Comments to our current Rule 1.7, or the principles embodied in these 
Comments, have been moved or incorporated into different Comments with new numbering.  For 
example, the ABA has adopted, as Model Comments 29–33, the substance of special 
Massachusetts Comments 12A through 12F.  Under the Committee’s recommendation, so few of 
the current Comments would remain that it does not seem sensible to proceed through the current 
Comments to note what changes have been made. Rather this Report points out the principal 
ways in which the Committee’s recommended exceptions differ from the Model Comments. 
Comment 12 on intimate personal relationships with clients.  The Model Comment is 
premised on Model Rule 1.8(j), which the Committee does not recommend for adoption. The 
Committee therefore recommends a nonstandard Comment that points out the dangers that may 
exist when a lawyer has a sexual relationship with a client. 
Comment 16 on conflicts that are nonconsentable because prohibited by law.  The 
Committee recommends substituting a specific citation to Chapter 268A of the General Laws 
(our statutory conflict of interest law) for the ABA’s general reference to law in “some states.” 
Comment 23 on conflicts in litigation.  The Committee recommends retaining language 
unique to Massachusetts from our current Comment 7 that warns against representing “more than 
one person under investigation by law enforcement authorities for the same transaction or series 
of transactions, including any investigation by a grand jury.”  Both the Model Comment and our 
current Comment also advise that “ordinarily” a lawyer should not represent multiple criminal 
defendants in a case.   
The Committee also recommends that two other Comments unique to Massachusetts, 8A 
and 14A, be deleted. Our special Comment 8A concerns representation of conflicting interests by 
government lawyers.  The Committee recommends that the Comment be replaced with a cross-
reference in Comment 34 to section 4 of the Scope section of the Rules, the substance of which 
is to the same effect as current Comment 8A. Our current Comment 14A deals with conflicts 
among subclasses in class action lawsuits.  Proposed new Comment 25 deals generally with 
conflicts with unnamed class members.  
Rule 1.8: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules    
Rule 1.8(a). The Committee recommends conforming the language of Rule 1.8(a) in 
almost all respects to the Model Rule. As a result, a client would need to be advised in writing of 
the desirability of seeking the advice of independent counsel concerning a business transaction 
with the lawyer, and the client’s informed consent to the transaction would have to be confirmed 
in writing.   
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Rule 1.8(b). The Committee recommends conforming the language of Rule 1.8(b) to the 
Model Rule, except that a lawyer would be prohibited from disclosing only “confidential” 
information relating to representation of a client. The Committee believes the Model Rule’s 
unmodified reference to “information” is too broad, and could preclude an attorney from 
representing multiple clients in the same industry. A majority of the Committee also believes that 
the prohibitions in our current Rule 1.8(b) against a lawyer using confidential information for his 
own benefit, or for the benefit of a third party, were unnecessary and perhaps overly restrictive, 
and recommends that the Rule and Comment make it clear that a lawyer cannot use confidential 
information to the disadvantage of a client, regardless of who benefits. Arguments for and 
against this proposed change are contained in the appendix to this report. Nothing in the Rule 
affects the obligations imposed on lawyers by other laws, such as the restrictions on securities 
trading by those in possession of material non-public information. 
Rule 1.8(c). The Committee recommends conforming the language of Rule 1.8(c) in 
almost all respects to the Model Rule, so that the Rule would prohibit not only the preparation of 
instruments bestowing substantial gifts but also the solicitation of such a gift.  The recommended 
Rule would prohibit only those solicitations made for the benefit of the lawyer or a close family 
member and contains an exception when the lawyer or other donee is closely related to the client. 
The recommended Rule also would limit the definition of “closely related” to the list of 
identified relationships, as opposed to the Model Rule’s more elastic definition.   
Rules 1.8(d)–(i). The Committee recommends conforming paragraphs 1.8(d) through 
1.8(i) to the Model Rule. This would not effect any substantial change from the current Rule.  A 
lawyer would be required to obtain the client’s informed consent before accepting compensation 
from a third party under Rule 1.8(f), and obtain the client’s informed consent, confirmed in 
writing, before entering into an aggregate settlement under Rule 1.8(g).  These changes are 
consistent with the recommended changes to other Rules substituting “informed consent” for the 
current Rules’ “consent after consultation.” The Committee also recommends deleting the 
language in our current subparagraph 1.8(i) that prohibits a lawyer in one firm from representing 
a client adverse to a client represented by a close family member in another firm, and its related 
comment. This language does not appear in Model Rule 1.8, and the subject matter is covered in 
our recommended Comment 11 to Rule 1.7, which takes a less restrictive approach.   
Rule 1.8(j). The Committee recommends against adopting Model Rule 1.8(j), which 
attempts to define when a lawyer may engage in a consensual sexual relationship with a client. 
The subject matter is referred to in recommended Comment 12 to Rule 1.7. 
Rule 1.8(k). The Committee recommends adopting Model Rule 1.8(k), which imputes the 
prohibitions in subparagraphs (a) through (i) to other lawyers in a firm.      
Comments to Rule 1.8 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends replacing this Comment with the more 
elaborate discussions about business transactions between lawyer and client in Model Comments 
1 through 5. 
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Comment 1A. The Committee recommends deletion of nonstandard Comment 1A 
because the Committee recommends modifying our current Rule 1.8(b) to eliminate the ethical 
prohibition against a lawyer’s use of a client’s confidential information that does not 
disadvantage the client. 
Comment 2. The Committee recommends replacing current Comment 2 concerning gifts 
to lawyers with the more elaborate discussion in Model Comments 6 and 7. Comment 7 is 
rewritten to conform to the language of recommended Rule 1.8(c). The Committee also 
recommends adopting a modified version of Model Comment 8, which is new to Massachusetts. 
The Committee believes the Model Rule version of this Comment unduly encourages lawyers to 
solicit fiduciary appointments.   
Comment 3. The Committee recommends renumbering this Comment as Comment 9 and 
adopting the minor addition to the text of our current Comment. The Committee recommends the 
adoption of Model Comment 10 explaining the prohibition against a lawyer financing a lawsuit 
but authorizing the lawyer to advance court costs and litigation expenses. 
Comment 4. The Committee recommends replacing this Comment with the more 
expansive discussion of the payment of legal fees by a third party found in Model Comments 11 
and 12.  The Committee also recommends adopting Model Comment 13, which is new, with one 
small stylistic modification. The Comment provides useful guidance to lawyers in resolving 
issues that may arise in representing multiple clients in connection with negotiating an aggregate 
settlement of a matter. 
Comment 5. The Committee recommends deleting current Comment 5 and replacing it 
with Model Comments 14 and 15. The Committee also recommends adding a phrase to Model 
Comment 14 that makes it clear that a fee agreement provision requiring arbitration of a legal 
malpractice claim must comply with applicable provisions of Rule 1.5(f). 
Comment 6. The Committee recommends deleting current Comment 6, the subject matter 
of which is now dealt with in Comment 11 to Rule 1.7. 
Comment 7. The Committee recommends renumbering this Comment as Comment 16. It 
also recommends adopting the additional language of Model Comment 16, which explains the 
prohibition against a lawyer acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation and the exceptions to the 
Rule, and also describes the new recommended language in subsection (i) of the Rule.  
The Committee recommends reserving Comments 17–19, as they relate only to Model 
Rule 1.8(j) which the Committee has recommended that the Court not adopt.  The Committee 
recommends adopting Model Comment 20 as our Comment 20, with the deletion of the 
reference to Model Rule 1.8(j). 
Rule 1.9: Duties to Former Clients 
The Committee recommends conforming the language of current Rule 1.9 to the Model 
Rule, with the following modifications.  
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Rule 1.9(c)(1) and (c)(2). The Committee recommends retaining the word “confidential” 
before “information,” consistent with the Committee’s recommendation regarding retaining the 
current language of Rule 1.6, so that a lawyer is prohibited from disclosing only confidential 
information relating to the representation of the former client. The Committee also recommends 
omitting the Model Rule’s exception for information that has become “generally known,” 
because the Committee believes there are circumstances in which confidential information 
should not be disclosed even if an attorney reasonably could conclude that it is “generally 
known,” such as by its availability through the internet. The Committee has also, with some 
disagreement, recommended limiting the prohibition in Rule 1.9(c)(1) against use of confidential 
information to use “to the disadvantage of the former client,” as provided in the Model Rule.  It 
would eliminate the prohibition of use “to the lawyer’s advantage or to the advantage of a third 
person” that is contained in the current Massachusetts Rules but not in the Model Rules. The 
same issue exists with respect to the Committee’s recommendation regarding Rule 1.8(b). The 
issue is discussed in greater detail in the appendix to this report. 
Comments to Rule 1.9 
Comments 1 and 2. The Committee recommends conforming these Comments to the 
Model Comments and adopting Model Comment 3 discussing the meaning of “substantially 
related” in the Rule as a new Comment 3. 
Comment 3. The Committee recommends renumbering our current Comment, which is 
identical to the Model Comment, as Comment 4. 
Comments 4 and 5. The Committee recommends deletion of these current Comments as 
either redundant or unhelpful. 
Comments 6 and 7. The Committee recommends adopting Model Comment 6, which 
combines the language from current Comments 6 and 7, and numbering the Comment as our 
Comment 6.   
Comment 8. The Committee recommends renumbering this current Comment as 
Comment 5, with one slight reference change. Our Comment would then be identical to Model 
Comment 5. 
Comment 9. The Committee recommends renumbering this Comment as Comment 7. It 
is identical to Model Comment 7. 
Comment 10. The Committee recommends deleting current Comment 10. The subject 
matter is covered elsewhere. 
Comment 11. The Committee recommends renumbering this Comment as Comment 8 
and adopting the changes inserted into Model Comment 8, except that the Committee 
recommends inserting the word “confidential” before the word “information,” to conform to our 
recommended change to Rule 1.9(c). 
Comments 12 and 13. The Committee recommends renumbering these Comments as 
Comment 9 and adopting the changes that Model Comment 9 inserted into these two Comments. 
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Rule 1.10: Imputed Disqualification: General Rule 
In 1998 the Supreme Judicial Court adopted a form of Rule 1.10 that provided for a very 
limited form of screening in the situation where a lawyer moved to a new firm that had or took 
on a matter that was substantially related to a matter in which the lawyer’s former firm 
represented a client whose interests were materially adverse. The new firm was prohibited from 
the adverse representation unless the new lawyer had no material confidential information, or 
unless the new lawyer had neither substantial involvement nor substantial material information 
relating to the matter, was appropriately screened from the matter, and was not apportioned any 
part of the fee. In so doing the Supreme Judicial Court rejected a dissenting view on its Advisory 
Committee that urged adoption of a much broader screening provision.  
At the time, the American Bar Association’s Model Rules did not contain a screening 
provision with respect to the lateral movement of lawyers. In 2009, the ABA House of Delegates 
(after having several times considered but declined to recommend adoption of a much broader 
screening provision than that contained in our Rule 1.10) by a close vote adopted the current 
Model Rule 1.10. This Rule removes the prohibition with respect to representation adverse to a 
client of the migrating lawyer’s former firm in a substantially-related matter so long as the new 
firm complies with specified screening requirements. It does not matter that the migrating lawyer 
possesses relevant confidential information of the former client.  The ABA’s revision has 
continued to be controversial. A number of states have adopted the new Rule or something 
similar to it; a number of others have rejected it by permitting either no screening or a very 
limited form of screening in the lateral movement situation. A number of states have taken no 
action. 
This Committee is divided on whether the ABA’s approach to lateral screening should be 
adopted. A majority recommends retaining essentially the current Massachusetts version. The 
arguments pro and con are set forth in the appendix attached to this report. The Committee, 
however, was unanimous in concluding that if the limited approach of the current version of Rule 
1.10 is retained, it could be improved by making clarifying changes in the wording of the Rule. 
Rule 1.10(a). The Committee recommends adopting the Model Rules formulation in 
removing the imputation of a lawyer’s disqualification to the whole firm when “the prohibition is 
based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not present a significant risk of 
materially limiting the representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.” An 
obvious illustration would be that a whole firm should not be prohibited from representing a 
client when an individual firm lawyer would be prohibited from representation because of lack of 
competence in a particular field of law. 
Rule 1.10(d). The most important recommended change involves refining the test of the 
conditions under which the screening will prevent imputed disqualification to focus more 
precisely on the reason for allowing, or not allowing, the screening. Currently, screening is 
permitted if the personally disqualified lawyer had neither “substantial involvement nor 
substantial material information relating to the matter.” The Committee’s recommended change 
would permit screening if the personally disqualified lawyer “had neither involvement nor 
information relating to the matter sufficient to provide a substantial benefit to the new firm’s 
client.” 
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Rule 1.10(f). The Committee recommends adding this paragraph from the Model Rules to 
clarify that it is Rule 1.11 that governs disqualification of a firm associated with current or 
former government lawyers.  
Comments to Rule 1.10 
The Committee recommends retaining the substance and numbering of the current 
Comments, with minor clarifying changes.  New Comment 6A, which deals with personal 
interest conflicts, is taken from the first two sentences of Model Comment 3. 
Rule 1.11: Special Conflicts of Interest For Former and Current Government Officers and 
Employees 
The recommended changes to this Rule are made to conform the Massachusetts Rule to 
the Model Rule.  Thus, with very few exceptions, the proposed Massachusetts Rule and 
Comments would now follow the Model Rule and Comments. Most provisions of the current 
Massachusetts Rule are included in the Model Rule, but we recommend reorganizing our Rule to 
conform to the Model Rule’s structure. 
Rule 1.11(a). The Committee recommends adoption of the Model Rules language. The 
important addition is the explicit statement clarifying that former government employees are 
subject to the restrictions relating to confidential information contained in Rule 1.9(c).  
Rule 1.11(b). The Committee recommends the deletion of current paragraph (b) and 
adoption of the Model Rule language covering imputed disqualification, much of which appears 
in our current Rule 1.11(a), in order to eliminate the possibility that firms will erroneously rely 
on imputed disqualification provisions in Rule 1.9 or 1.10.  
Rule 1.11(c). The Committee recommends the adoption of the new Model Rule 
paragraph (c) dealing with “confidential government information.” The first and third sentences 
of the paragraph are identical to the first and third sentences of our current Rule 1.11(b) and the 
second sentence moves the definition of “confidential government information” from former 
Rule 1.11(e). Substantively, the language remains the same. 
Rule 1.11(d). The Committee recommends the Model Rule modifications that explicitly 
subject government lawyers to Rules 1.7 and 1.9 and require the waiver of conflict by a 
government agency to be confirmed in writing. 
Comments to Rule 1.11 
Comment 1.  The Committee recommends the adoption of Model Comment 1, which 
makes clear that the relevant rules of professional conduct, including Rule 1.7, apply to both 
present and former government lawyers, including lawyers in private practice retained by the 
government to represent its interests.  
Comments 2–10. The Committee also recommends adoption of Model Comments 2–10, 
replacing or modifying and renumbering our current Comments with essentially the same 
language as the Model Comments.  In large part, these Comments elaborate the language of the 
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revised Rule by clarifying that conflicts of interest involving present or former government 
lawyers are governed by this Rule and not by Rule 1.10. 
Rule 1.12: Former Judge, Arbitrator, Mediator Or Other Third-Party Neutral 
This Rule covers the conduct of former judges and other individuals engaged in methods 
of alternative dispute resolution. 
Rule 1.12(a). The Committee recommends adoption of the additional coverage in the 
Model Rule of third-party neutrals other than arbitrators and mediators.  The Committee also 
recommends that the requirement of “consent after consultation” be replaced here, similar to the 
replacement elsewhere in the Rules, with “informed consent, confirmed in writing.” 
Rule 1.12(c). The Committee recommends minor changes in subparagraphs (1) and (2) to 
strengthen the screening provision in Rule 1.12(c). 
Comments to Rule 1.12 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends revising the last sentence of the current 
Comment to reflect Canon 6(A)(2) of our Code of Judicial Conduct concerning the professional 
activities of a retired judge recalled to active service. 
Comments 2–5. The Committee recommends adoption of these new Model Comments 
that elaborate the purpose and language of the text of the Rule.  
Comment 6. The Committee recommends adding a sentence to current Comment 2 to 
make clear that judicial interns (unpaid lawyers or law students performing similar duties to law 
clerks) are also included within the term “law clerks.”  
Rule 1.15: Safekeeping Property 
The Court approved comprehensive revisions to this Rule, effective July 1, 2004. The 
Committee has not conducted an elaborate review of this Rule. It does, however, recommend 
three small revisions as follows. 
Rule 1.15(b)(1) and (3). The Committee recommends deleting the permission in Rule 
1.15(b)(1) to deposit costs and advances in a business account and further recommends the 
addition of a new Rule 1.15(b)(3) requiring advance payment of both legal fees and expenses in 
a trust account to be withdrawn as earned or expended. 
Rule 1.15(b)(4). The Committee recommends redrafting the former Rule 1.15(b)(3) to 
read:  “All trust property shall be appropriately safeguarded.  Trust property other than funds 
shall be identified as such.”  This change makes it clear that not only the client’s funds but also 
all the client’s personal property are covered by the Rule.  
Rule 1.15(e). The Committee recommends amending the Rule by adding a new paragraph 
1.15(e)(3), requiring a lawyer opening a new account to give notice to a bank or other depository 
that an account will hold trust funds.  This revision is made in response to footnote 8 of Go-Best 
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Assets Limited v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 463 Mass. 50 (2012).  The Committee 
recommends that the second sentence of 1.15(e)(2) be deleted as unnecessary given the specific 
procedure set forth in paragraph 1.15(e)(3).  The existing subparagraphs (3) through (6) would be 
renumbered (4) through (7). 
Rule 1.15 (f)(4). The Committee recommends the addition of a new paragraph requiring 
partners in a law firm, upon dissolution, to make reasonable efforts to ensure the maintenance of 
client trust records. 
Comments to Rule 1.15 
Comment 2A. The Committee recommends this new Comment to elaborate the 
recommended changes in the text of Rule 1.15(b). The Comment also deals with the effect of its 
recommended change in the text on the deposit of flat fees received by lawyers and defines that 
term. 
Comment 6A. The Committee recommends the adoption of this new Comment to make 
clear that lawyers who represent themselves as fiduciaries must comply with Rule 1.15(d)(2)’s 
requirement of preparation of contemporaneous bills or accountings to justify payments to 
themselves.  
Comment 7. The Committee recommends the adoption of a new Comment 7 explaining 
the written notice required by recommended Rule 1.15(e)(3) to be provided to a bank or other 
depositary whenever a lawyer opens a trust account, whether the account is an individual trust 
account or an IOLTA account, and directs lawyers to the Board of Bar Overseers website for the 
necessary form. If this recommendation is adopted, subsequent Comments will be renumbered.  
Comment 13. The Committee recommends this new Comment relating to Rules 1.15(f) 
and 1.17(e) to clarify the responsibility of individual partners of a dissolved or sold law firm with 
respect to maintenance of client trust records.   
Rule 1.16: Declining or Terminating Representation 
Rule 1.16(b)(4). The Committee recommends adopting the Model Rule’s clarifying 
language that permits withdrawal when the client insists upon “taking action that the lawyer 
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.” The current 
language permits withdrawal when the client insists upon “pursuing an objective that the lawyer 
considers repugnant or imprudent.” The Committee believes that focusing on a client’s insistence 
on “taking action” is better than focusing on a client’s insistence upon “pursuing an objective” 
and it also believes that it appropriately sets a higher barrier to withdrawal by focusing on action 
“with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement” as opposed to action that the lawyer 
considers “imprudent.”  
Rule 1.16(d). The Committee recommends a small revision to require lawyers to return 
advances for expenses not incurred as well as fees not earned when withdrawing from 
representation. 
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Rule 1.16(e)(3). The Committee recommends that subparagraph (e)(3) be amended to 
read “all investigatory or discovery documents for which the client has paid the lawyer’s out-of-
pocket costs for which the client is responsible under the fee agreement….” (recommended 
language in italics). Such a change would make it clear that a client is not responsible for out-of-
pocket costs where a fee agreement provides otherwise. 
Comments to Rule 1.16 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adding a second sentence from Model 
Comment 1, which defines when a representation concludes. The presence of the word 
“ordinarily” in this sentence adequately covers the exceptions the Committee thought could 
arise. 
Comment 2.  The Committee recommends eliminating the last sentence from current 
Comment 2 since it simply explains that the source of our Rule 1.16(c) is our former DR 2-
110(a)(1).  
Comment 3. The Committee recommends adding the final five sentences, which are  
taken from Model Comment 3 with one modification. The Committee recommends modifying 
the sixth sentence by adding the italicized language and striking the bracketed language as 
follows: “If a lawyer’s withdrawal is mandatory under these rules, the lawyer’s statement [that 
professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily should] to that 
effect should ordinarily be accepted as sufficient.” 
This Comment addresses the sensitive subject of how much information a lawyer must 
disclose to the court when the withdrawal is occasioned by a client’s demand that the lawyer 
engage in unprofessional conduct. There was some concern that such language (relating to what 
a court should or should not require) was outside the scope of the Rules, but the Committee 
concluded that some standard that gave guidance to the lawyer for disciplinary purposes should 
be included and that the endorsement of that language by the Supreme Judicial Court would 
discourage trial judges from requiring further disclosure in most cases. 
Comment 5. The Committee recommends retaining current Comment 5 because it finds it 
to be clearer than the corresponding Model Comment. 
Comment 6. The Committee recommends replacing the language referring to 
incompetency with language reflecting diminished capacity, in line with changes previously 
made by the Court in Rule 1.14. It also recommends including a reference to “reasonably 
necessary protective action” in the last sentence of the Comment to reflect the language used in 
Rule 1.14.  
Comment 7.  The Committee recommends revising the final sentence of the Comment to 
reflect the change it recommends with respect to the text of subparagraph (b)(4).  
Comment 9. The Committee recommends deleting the second sentence of the Comment, 
which raises a substantive law question that is beyond the scope of the Rules. It also 
recommends not adopting the second sentence of the Model Comment, which refers to the 
substantive law question of a lawyer’s lien on a client’s papers.  
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Comment 10 refers to the nonstandard provision in paragraph (e) that details the 
obligations of a lawyer to make materials available to a client or former client. 
Rule 1.17: Sale of Law Practice  
The Committee recommends changes in the opening paragraph adding “law firms” to the 
entities permitted to sell a law practice and removing the reference to “legal representative”  
from both the Rule and Comment 13 as a non-lawyer is not subject to these disciplinary Rules.  
Rule 1.17(a) and (b). The Committee recommends that these provisions of the Model 
Rules, which are currently “reserved,” continue to be “reserved.” They would require the seller 
to cease practice as a condition of the sale, and sell the entire practice or an entire area of 
practice. The Committee concluded that they were unnecessary and undesirable restrictions.  
Rule 1.17(c). The Committee recommends restructuring  the format of the Rule to 
conform to that of the Model Rule. In addition, the Committee recommends the addition of a 
phrase to the introduction to paragraph (c) to permit a law firm as well as a lawyer to sell a law 
practice under the provisions of the Rule. The Committee also recommends retention of the non-
standard Massachusetts language “transfer of the representation” rather than transfer of a client’s 
files. The Committee believes that this more accurately describes the covered conduct. 
Rules 1.17(c)(2) and 1.17(d). The Committee recommends deletion of the first part of 
current Rule 1.17(c)(2), covering obligations with respect to existing fee agreements, and 
retention of a slightly modified nonstandard 1.17(d), which includes language that permits the 
purchaser to decline to purchase any particular representation unless that client agrees to pay a 
fee in excess of that charged by the seller, so long as it does not exceed the purchaser’s standard 
rate for similar representations. The Committee believes that a purchaser of some or all of a law 
practice should have this flexibility. 
Rule 1.17(e). The Committee recommends adoption of this nonstandard provision 
requiring the seller to observe the requirements of Rule 1.15 regarding maintenance of property 
and records. 
Comments to Rule 1.17 
Comments 2–6. The Committee recommends that these Comments should remain 
reserved, as the Committee is not recommending adoption of 1.17(a) or (b). 
Comments 7–10. The Committee recommends renumbering current Comments 6–9 to 
coincide with the Model Comments numbers, with small language changes to reflect the changes 
in the text of the Rule. The Committee recommends altering the grammar of the last sentence in 
Comment 8 to make clear that the Rule is intended to give guidance to lawyers, not judges, 
concerning the procedure to be followed. 
Comments 11–19. The Committee recommends a few changes in these current 
nonstandard Comments to reflect changes in the text of the Rule. The changes clarify and explain 
that in Massachusetts sale of a practice or part of a practice is not limited to the entire practice or 
an entire substantive area of practice. 
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Comment 20. The Committee recommends this new nonstandard Comment to explain the 
new Rule 1.17(e) relating to the requirement of preservation of trust account records. 
Rule 1.18: Duties to Prospective Client 
Rule 1.18(a)–(d) and Comments 1–9. The Committee recommends the adoption of the 
entire Model Rule and its Comments. The current Massachusetts Rules do not cover the subject 
of the responsibility of a lawyer who learns confidential information of a prospective client when 
an attorney-client relationship does not result from the initial discussions. Court decisions in the 
Commonwealth, however, make it clear that obligations of confidentiality are imposed upon a 
lawyer who engages in such a discussion. The Model Rule, whose adoption the majority 
recommends, provides guidance to lawyers who receive such information of their obligations to 
the prospective client with respect to such confidential information and provides protection by 
means of screening for the firm when the disqualified lawyer took appropriate measures to avoid 
receiving more confidential information than necessary to the representation decision. 
Rule 2.1: Advisor   
Rule 2.1. The Committee recommends no change in the text of the Rule.  
Comments to Rule 2.1 
The Committee recommends only one substantive change in the Comments. The 
Committee recommends amending Comment 5 by adding a reference to the possible need to 
inform a client about alternate dispute resolution possibilities when a matter is likely to involve 
litigation.   
Rule 2.3: Evaluation for Use by Third Persons  
The Committee recommends retaining the substance of current Massachusetts Rules 
2.3(a) and (b) governing the evaluation for a third party of a matter affecting a client.  In Rule 
2.3(a), the Committee recommends replacing the current “consent after consultation” language 
with  “informed consent” and adopting the “impliedly authorized to carry out the 
representations” standard used elsewhere in the Rules. Current Rule 2.3(b) has been redesignated 
Rule 2.3(c) to conform to the Model Rules.  The Committee also recommends minor stylistic 
changes in Rule 2.3.  The Committee also recommends reserving paragraph (b).  Model Rule 
paragraph (b) requires consent of the client only when the lawyer knows that the proposed 
opinion will harm the client. The Committee believes that its recommended version of Rule 
2.3(a) provides greater protection for the rights of the client and better guidance for the attorney. 
Comments to Rule 2.3 
Comment 1A. The Committee recommends the adoption of this new nonstandard 
Comment in place of Model Comment 5. The recommended Comment explains that this Rule 
does not govern the propriety of providing an evaluation regarding one client for another client. 
Under those circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs the overall relationship and Rule 1.6 governs the 
use of confidential information. 
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Comment 2. The Committee recommends deleting current Comment 2, which deals with 
giving advice to government agencies about the legality of contemplated government action. The 
relationship between government lawyers and particular agencies involves matters of substantive 
law beyond the scope of these Rules.  
Comment 5. The Committee recommends adding to our current Comment 5 (to be 
renumbered Comment 4) a last sentence from the Model Comment cautioning lawyers that 
restrictions on making false statements are governed by Rule 4.1. 
Rule 2.4: Lawyer Serving as Third-Party Neutral 
The Committee recommends retaining the Rule and Comments in their current form, 
except for small stylistic changes.  
Rule 3.1: Meritorious Claims and Contentions 
Rule 3.1. The Committee recommends adding the Model Rule language that the assertion 
of a claim must have a basis “in law and fact.” 
Comments to Rule 3.1  
Comment 2. The Committee recommends adoption of the second sentence of Model  
Comment 2, which describes the steps a lawyer must take to comply with Rule 3.1.   
Comment 3. The Committee recommends modifying current Comment 3 by adding the 
first sentence of the Model Comment, which provides additional guidance about the relationship 
between the lawyer’s obligations under Rule 3.1 and the constitutional rights of a defendant in a 
criminal matter. 
Comment 4. The Committee recommends transferring the last two sentences of current 
Comment 3 to a new Comment 4 to conform to the Model Rules format.   
Rule 3.2: Expediting Litigation 
The Committee recommends no changes in the text of Rule 3.2. 
Comments to Rule 3.2 
Comment 1. The Model Comment recognizes that a lawyer may sometimes seek a 
postponement for personal reasons without running afoul of the Rule.  The Committee 
recommends adding this clarifying language to the Massachusetts Comment. 
Rule 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal 
In 2002, the ABA revised and reorganized Rule 3.3 to clarify and strengthen the lawyer’s 
duty of candor in presenting evidence and legal argument to a tribunal. The Committee 
recommends adopting the ABA’s changes to the text of Rule 3.3. With respect to false testimony 
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by a criminal defendant, however, the Committee recommends retaining the distinctive 
Massachusetts policy set forth in the current version of Rule 3.3(e). 
Rule 3.3(a)(1). The current Massachusetts Rule prohibits a lawyer from knowingly 
making false statements of material fact or law to a tribunal. The Committee recommends 
adopting the Model Rule formulation prohibiting any knowingly false statement of fact or law. 
In addition, revised subparagraph (a)(1) makes it clear that a lawyer must correct false statements 
previously made to a tribunal if they are material. 
Rule 3.3(a)(2). The Committee recommends eliminating the present provision regarding 
disclosures necessary to avoid assisting a client’s criminal or fraudulent acts in favor of a broader 
provision to be incorporated in a new paragraph (b). Subparagraph (a)(3) concerning disclosure 
of legal authority has been renumbered (a)(2). 
Rule 3.3(a)(3). Current Massachusetts Rule 3.3(a)(4), which deals with presenting false 
evidence to a tribunal and the lawyer’s obligation to remedy false evidence, has been 
renumbered (a)(3). The Committee recommends revising this subparagraph to state explicitly 
that remedial measures may, if necessary, include disclosure to the tribunal. We also recommend 
moving the permission to refuse to offer evidence that a lawyer believes but does not know is 
false, now contained in Rule 3.3(c), to this subparagraph.  A phrase has been added to make it 
clear that such permission does not apply to the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter. 
Rule 3.3(b). This paragraph replaces the current subparagraph (a)(2). The current 
subparagraph (a)(2) focuses on remedial measures necessary to avoid assisting the client in a 
criminal or fraudulent act. Model Rule paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to take remedial 
measures whenever the lawyer knows that any person is engaged, has engaged, or intends to 
engage in criminal or fraudulent acts relating to a proceeding in which the lawyer is representing 
a client.  Under this subparagraph, a lawyer would be required to take remedial measures if the 
lawyer discovers that a person other than the lawyer’s client is, for example, bribing witnesses or 
tampering with a jury. 
Rule 3.3(c). Current Rule 3.3(b), relating to the duration of the lawyer’s duty to take 
remedial action, has been renumbered 3.3(c). The Committee recommends adding a reference to 
the duties imposed by new subparagraph (b).  
Rule 3.3(d). The Committee recommends one minor stylistic change to Rule 3.3(d), 
which deals with the lawyer’s duty in ex parte proceedings. 
Rule 3.3(e). Rule 3.3(e), which deals with the duties of criminal defense attorneys, has no 
counterpart in the Model Rules.  The Committee recommends retaining the substance of this 
paragraph, with minor stylistic changes intended to clarify the lawyer’s obligations at different 
stages of a criminal proceeding. 
Comments to Rule 3.3 
As part of its 2002 revisions, the ABA also extensively rewrote and reorganized the 
Comments to Model Rule 3.3. The Committee recommends adoption of most of these revisions, 
with the exceptions noted below.  Because of the extent of the 2002 revisions, the discussion 
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below follows the number of the Committee’s recommended Comments rather than the 
numbering of the current Comments. 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adoption of this new Comment, which makes it 
explicit that the duty of candor applies not only in appearances before a tribunal but also in 
depositions. 
Comment 2. The Committee recommends the adoption of this new Comment, which 
corresponds to Comment 1 in the current Massachusetts Rules. The Comment has been 
extensively revised for clarity. 
Comment 2A. Comment 2A in the current Massachusetts Rule explains what it means to 
assist a client in committing crime or fraud on a tribunal.  Since the reference to assisting a 
client’s crime or fraud has been eliminated from Rule 3.3 in favor of the broader provisions of 
Rule 3.3(b), the Committee recommends deleting Comment 2A. 
Comment 3. Comment 3 is current Comment 2.  
Comment 4. Comment 4 is current Comment 3, with two minor changes.   
Comment 5. The Committee recommends adoption of the Model Rules version of this 
Comment, which expands on Comment 4 in the current Massachusetts Rule. The revised 
Comment makes it clear that a lawyer does not violate Rule 3.3 by offering false evidence for the 
purpose of demonstrating its falsity, such as when a lawyer calls the opposing party for the 
purpose of discrediting the opponent’s testimony.  The Committee has added a cross-reference to 
paragraph (e) regarding the duties of criminal defense lawyers. 
Comment 6. The Committee recommends retaining Comment 5 to the current 
Massachusetts Rule and renumbering it Comment 6. The Committee does not recommend 
adoption of Model Rules Comment 6 because in describing what a lawyer must do if the client 
intends to or has testified falsely, the Model Comment does not distinguish between a lawyer in a 
civil matter and a lawyer representing the accused in a criminal proceeding. Massachusetts Rule 
3.3(e) imposes separate duties on criminal defense lawyers. 
Comment 7. The Committee recommends reserving this Comment since the duties of 
defense counsel in a criminal case are dealt with in Rule 3.3(e) and nonstandard Comments 11A–
11E.   
Comments 8–10. The Committee recommends adoption of these new Comments, which 
elaborate on the lawyer’s duties with respect to evidence that the lawyer knows or reasonably 
believes to be false. The Committee has added cross-references to Massachusetts Rule 3.3(e) and 
to the Comments dealing with 3.3(e). 
Comment 11. The Committee recommends the adoption of this Model Comment, which 
incorporates the substance of current Comment 6. 
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Comment 11A. This Comment, dealing with obligations of criminal defense counsel 
under Massachusetts Rule 3.3(e), is virtually the same as Comment 7 to the current 
Massachusetts Rule. 
Comment 11B. This new Comment incorporates the discussion of the Supreme Judicial 
Court in Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 438 Mass. 535 (2003), concerning when a criminal defense 
lawyer knows that the accused intends to give false testimony for purposes of Rule 3.3(e). 
Comment 11C. This Comment contains the substance of current Comment 8. 
Comments 11D and 11E. These Comments are virtually identical to current Comments 9 
and 10. 
Comment 12. The Committee recommends adoption of this new Model Comment, which 
explains the lawyer’s obligations under the new Rule 3.3(b) when the lawyer knows that the 
lawyer’s client or any other person is or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to 
a proceeding.  The Comment also gives examples of the types of conduct that require remedial 
action by the lawyer. 
Comment 13. The Committee recommends incorporating the Model Rule modifications 
of current Comment 13 regarding when a lawyer’s remedial obligations terminate. New language 
has been added to define when a proceeding has concluded and to recognize that obligation to 
take remedial action applies to false statements by the lawyer as well as false evidence.  
Comments 14 and 14A. The Committee recommends no changes in these Comments, 
which are identical to current Comments 15 and 16. 
Comment 15. The Committee recommends adoption of this new Model Comment, which 
explains the relationship between a lawyer’s duty of candor to a tribunal under Rule 3.3 and a 
lawyer’s obligation to withdraw from a representation under Rule 1.16. 
Rule 3.4: Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel 
The Committee recommends no changes in Rules 3.4(a)–3.4(d). 
Rule 3.4(e). The Massachusetts Rules currently contain two sets of provisions relating to 
unfair litigation tactics such as alluding to inadmissible evidence and asserting a personal 
opinion about the credibility of a witness:  Rule 3.4(e), which applies to all lawyers, but only 
when the lawyer is “in trial”; and Rule 3.8(h)–(i), which apply to prosecutors at all stages of a 
criminal proceeding. The Committee believes that such tactics are offensive at all stages of a 
proceeding before a tribunal and that there should be a single standard governing all lawyers.  
The Committee therefore recommends that the phrase “in trial” in Rule 3.4(e) be changed to 
“before a tribunal” and that Rule 3.8(h)–(i) be eliminated. 
Rule 3.4(f). The Committee recommends no change in Rule 3.4(f). 
Rule 3.4(g). Massachusetts Rule 3.4(g), which provides guidance regarding 
compensation of witnesses, is based on the former Disciplinary Rules and has no counterpart in 
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the text of the Model Rules. The Committee recommends that Rule 3.4(g) be retained. In 
addition, since preparing to testify sometimes consumes as much or more time and effort than 
testifying at trial, the Committee recommends that subparagraphs (g)(1) and (2) be amended to 
recognize explicitly that a lawyer may pay reasonable compensation to a witness for time lost 
and expenses incurred in preparing to testify. 
Rule 3.4(h) and (i). Current Massachusetts Rules 3.4(h), concerning the use of criminal or 
disciplinary proceedings to gain an advantage in a civil proceeding, and 3.4(i), concerning 
manifestations of bias before a tribunal, also have no counterparts in the Model Rules.  The 
Committee recommends that both provisions be retained.  
Comments to Rule 3.4 
Comment 2. The Comment recommends the addition of the final two sentences of the 
Model Comment in order to provide guidance concerning a lawyer’s possession of physical 
evidence of client crimes. 
Comment 3. The Committee recommends adopting a simple cross-reference to the text of 
Rule 3.4(g) to cover the subject of witness compensation. 
Comment 5. The Committee recommends adding a brief reference to the recommended 
amendment to Rule 3.4(g) clarifying that a witness may be compensated for time lost and 
expenses incurred in preparing to testify. The Committee also recommends deleting the reference 
to the former Disciplinary Rules in this Comment. Since the current Rules have been in effect for 
more than a decade, such cross-references are no longer necessary or helpful. 
Comments 6 and 7. The Committee also recommends deleting the cross-references to the 
former Disciplinary Rules in these Comments.  
Rule 3.5: Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal 
The Committee has presented two alternatives for the Court’s consideration. 
The Committee recommends, as it did in 2009, that the Massachusetts Rules be amended 
to conform to the ABA Model Rules, which were amended in 2002 to distinguish between 
communications during a proceeding and communications after conclusion of a proceeding.  The 
Model Rule focuses on the content of post-verdict juror communications, and prohibits three 
types of communications, irrespective of whether they are initiated by the lawyer or initiated by 
the juror.  The current Massachusetts Rule, by contrast, prohibits all lawyer-initiated post-verdict 
contact with jurors unless authorized by court order. Where leave of court is granted, the current 
Massachusetts Rule further prohibits communications that are intended to harass or embarrass 
the juror, communications that inquire into the content of juror deliberations, and 
communications intended to discourage future juror deliberations.  While the present 
Massachusetts Rule embodies existing case law in Massachusetts, see Commonwealth v. Solis, 
407 Mass. 398 (1990); Commonwealth v. Fidler, 377 Mass. 192 (1979), there is a concern that a 
complete prohibition of non–judicially approved lawyer initiated communications with jurors 
after a verdict may violate the First Amendment and prevent lawyers from receiving useful 
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feedback.  See Rapp v. Disciplinary Board of the Hawaii Supreme Court, 916 F. Supp. 1525 (D. 
Haw. 1996). 
In the event that the Court wishes to retain the Massachusetts distinction between lawyer 
initiated and non–lawyer initiated post-verdict communications with jurors, the Committee 
recommends restructuring paragraph (d) to clarify that an inquiry into the deliberative process is 
not prohibited when communication on that specific topic is authorized by the court.  The 
Committee also recommends deleting the words “for good cause shown” in paragraph (d) 
(presently paragraph (c)) because such a minimal threshold is implicit in any concept of judicial 
approval. 
Rule 3.6: Trial Publicity 
Rule 3.6(a). The Committee recommends that paragraph (a) of the current Massachusetts 
Rule be amended to conform to paragraph (a) in the Model Rule. While these paragraphs are 
now substantially similar, the Model Rule is clearer. Paragraph (a) in the Massachusetts Rule 
presently refers to both a reasonable person (with respect to knowledge of the likely 
dissemination of the communication) and what a lawyer reasonably should know (with respect to 
the likely impact of the communication). This discrepancy is confusing and unnecessary; the 
Committee recommends that both clauses of the paragraph be preceded by the single standard “a 
lawyer knows or reasonably should know.” 
Rule 3.6(e). The Committee recommends retaining paragraph (e), which has no 
counterpart in the Model Rule.  This provision allows a lawyer to respond to charges of 
misconduct publicly made against him.  This paragraph may be invoked, for example, where a 
lawyer is publicly accused of filing a frivolous claim or action.   
Comments to Rule 3.6 
Comment 7A. The Committee recommends adding this new Comment, which explains 
that in making statements permitted by Rule 3.6(e), the lawyer must at all times safeguard 
confidential client information in accordance with Rule 1.6. 
Comment 8. The Committee recommends adding this Model Comment, cross-referencing 
Rule 8(f), which describes the special responsibility of a prosecutor not to make media 
comments designed to heighten public condemnation of the accused. 
Rule 3.7: Lawyer as Witness  
The Committee recommends retaining the present Massachusetts attorney-witness rule, 
which is identical to the Model Rule, except for one minor stylistic change. 
Comments to Rule 3.7  
The Committee recommends substantial changes in the Comments to the Massachusetts 
Rule, to track the Model Comments more closely. Some of these changes are recommended for 
reasons of grammar and syntax.  Others are recommended because the Committee believes that 
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the Model Comments more clearly and forcefully highlight the twin dangers of a lawyer 
testifying as a witness in a proceeding in which the lawyer is also the attorney of record: 
confusing the finder of fact and prejudicing the opposing party.   
Comment 3. The Committee recommends adding a sentence clarifying that attorneys 
representing themselves pro se may also testify on their own behalf.  This example illustrates one 
particular circumstance in which disqualification would “work substantial hardship on the client” 
within the meaning of Rule 3.7(a)(3).  
Comments 5–7. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comments 5–7 because 
they explain the interrelationship between the attorney-witness rule and the conflict of interest 
rules more precisely than the current Comments.   
Rule 3.8: Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor 
Rule 3.8(a). The Committee recommends that the current Rule be amended to add a 
prohibition against “threatening to prosecute” a criminal charge that the prosecutor knows is not 
supported by probable cause to the current prohibition against “prosecuting” such a charge. A 
similar prohibition is found in Texas Rule of Professional Conduct 3.09(a).  The Committee is of 
the view that a prosecutor who seeks to obtain leverage on a defendant (e.g., to obtain a 
confession or cooperation against others) by threatening to charge a crime that the prosecutor 
knows is not supported by probable cause is engaging in a form of misrepresentation.   
Rule 3.8(e). The Committee recommends deleting the current subparagraph and moving 
its content into Rule 3.8(f), where it more properly belongs. 
Rule 3.8(e)(2). The Committee recommends that the court retain Rule 3.8(f)(2) (now 
renumbered), the Massachusetts version of the “attorney subpoena” rule that requires judicial 
approval before a prosecutor may subpoena an attorney to the grand jury or trial for the purpose 
of providing evidence about a present or former client.  In 1995, the ABA amended 
subparagraph (2) of Model Rule 3.8(f) to delete its judicial approval requirement, citing in its 
accompanying report the litigation in federal courts over this controversial restriction.  See, e.g., 
Baylson v. Disciplinary Board of the State of Pennsylvania, 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992); Stern v. 
U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 214 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2000).  Although many 
states have abandoned their judicial approval requirement following the 1995 amendment to the 
ABA Model Rule, Massachusetts and Rhode Island have retained this provision.  See R.I. Rules 
of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.8(f). A closely-divided Committee recommends that the Court retain 
Massachusetts Rule 3.8(f)(2) as presently written. 
Rule 3.8(h) and (i). The Committee recommends that the current subparagraphs of the 
Massachusetts rule be deleted, as assertions of personal knowledge or opinion by an attorney are 
already addressed by Rule 3.4.  The Committee was unable to perceive any principled reason 
why prosecutors should be held to a heightened standard of conduct in this regard. Moreover, as 
mentioned above, the Committee recommends that Rule 3.4(e) should be amended to delete the 
words “in trial” and substitute the words “before a tribunal,” to make clear that the prohibition 
against making statements of personal knowledge of fact or opinion as to the justness of a cause 
or the credibility of a witness applies at all stages of litigation. 
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The Committee further recommends that the Court adopt Model Rule 3.8(h) and (i) 
which deal with a prosecutor’s post-trial responsibility with respect to the disclosure of newly 
discovered exculpatory evidence. These amendments were prompted by the Innocence Project 
and the increasing capacity of scientific evidence to expose wrongful convictions.  The 
Committee believes that the ABA’s approach to a prosecutor’s post-conviction responsibilities 
appropriately balances the state’s interests in the finality of judgments and the prosecutor’s 
professional obligation to guard against wrongful convictions. 
Comments to Rule 3.8 
Comments 6–9. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 6, which 
spells out the prosecutor’s responsibilities with respect to subordinates, especially with respect to 
extrajudicial statements, and adoption of Model Comments 7–9, which elaborate the prosecutor’s 
responsibility with respect to newly-discovered evidence. 
Rule 3.9: Advocate in Nonadjudicative Proceedings 
Rule 3.9.  The Committee recommends that the Massachusetts Rule regarding candor to 
the fact finder and fairness to opposing counsel in appearing before non-judicial government 
boards be amended to track the language of the Model Rule by striking the word “tribunal” after 
the words “legislative and administrative” and inserting the words “body” and “agency,” 
respectively, in order to more accurately reflect the work of the legislative and executive 
branches of government.  Otherwise the substance of the rule is not changed.   
Model Rule 3.9 requires lawyers appearing before non-judicial governmental boards to 
comply with Rule 3.5, without specifying the particular subsections of Rule 3.5 that apply.  The 
Committee recommends retaining specific cross-references to the applicable provisions of Rule 
3.5; the cross-references will correspond to the version of Rule 3.5 adopted by the Court.   
Comments to Rule 3.9 
Comment 1.  The Committee recommends modifying Comment 1 by replacing "should" 
with "must," which conforms to the Model Comment.   
Comment 3.  The Committee recommends adopting Model Comment 3 which clarifies 
the circumstances when Rule 3.9 applies.   
Rule 4.1: Truthfulness in Statements to Others 
Rule 4.1. The Committee does not recommend any change to the text of the Rule.  
Comments to Rule 4.1 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adopting the Model Comment clarification to 
provide additional guidance concerning what types of statements or half-truths violate the Rule 
and to refer to the additional prohibitions of dishonest conduct in Rule 8.4.   
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Comment 2. The Committee recommends adopting the Model Comment’s final sentence, 
which reminds lawyers of legal obligations that extend beyond the Massachusetts Rules.    
Comment 3. The Committee recommends adding the first sentence of the Model 
Comment to our current Comment. The added language describes the interplay between Rule 
1.2(d) and Rule 4.1(b). The Committee recommends deleting the last sentence of the current 
Comment because it has recommended deleting the special definition of “assisting” in Comment 
2A to Rule 3.3. 
Comment 4. The Committee recommends adopting this new nonstandard Comment, 
which explains the relationship between Rule 4.1(b) and Rule 1.6, to which Rule 4.1(b) alludes. 
Rule 4.2: Communication with Person Represented By Counsel 
Rule 4.2. The Committee recommends making a single minor clarification to the current 
Rule in order to conform it to the Model Rule. 
Comments to Rule 4.2 
The Committee recommends adopting the Model Comment numbering. 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adopting this new Comment, which explains 
the purpose of the Rule. 
Comment 2. This Comment is Comment 3 of the current Comment, and the Committee 
recommends retaining it with the deletion of a few unnecessary words to conform to the Model 
Comment. 
Comment 3. The Committee recommends adopting this new Model Comment, which 
elaborates the scope of the Rule. 
Comment 4. The Committee recommends adopting the Model Comment’s additions to 
current Comment 1, including its reference to the ability of parties to communicate with one 
another and a lawyer’s ability to advise a client in connection with such communication, subject 
to the prohibition in Rule 8.4(a) that would prohibit a lawyer from making a communication 
forbidden by this Rule through the actions of another. The Committee recommends a 
reorganization of the sentences of the Model Comment for the sake of clarity and retention of 
current Comment 1’s reference to the permissibility of sending demands and notices required by 
laws such as Chapter 93A of the General Laws.  
Comment 5. The Committee recommends adoption of the Model Comment’s elaboration 
of current Comment 2, which deals with communications to and by government lawyers. 
Comment 6. The Committee recommends the adoption of the Model Comment, which 
points out the possibility of seeking a court order in certain situations of uncertainty and the 
deletion of current Comment 7, which deals with the same subject matter.  
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Comment 7. Current Comment 4 is a codification of Massachusetts case law relating to 
communication with employees of an organization in connection with litigation. The Committee 
recommends its retention as Comment 7 with elaboration to state explicitly that the prohibition 
does not extend to former employees of the organization. 
Comment 8. The Committee recommends adoption of the Model Comment modification 
of current Comment 5, dealing with the lawyer’s knowledge that a person is represented by 
counsel.  
Rule 4.3: Dealing with Unrepresented Person 
Rule 4.3. The Committee recommends adoption, for the sake of uniformity, of the 
stylistic changes contained in the Model Rule, including the melding of our current 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) into a single paragraph.  
Comments to Rule 4.3 
Comments 1 and 2. The Committee recommends adopting most of both Model 
Comments. The proposed revisions would move the substance of all but the first sentence of 
present Massachusetts Comment 1 to a new Comment 2, and would add to Comment 1 two 
additional sentences that provide practical guidance to lawyers about how they might avoid a 
misunderstanding with an unrepresented person concerning the lawyer’s role. The Committee 
recommends that the Court not adopt the third sentence of Model Comment 2 because it seems 
more confusing than helpful in providing guidance for lawyers. 
Rule 4.4: Respect for Rights of Third Persons 
Rule 4.4(b). The Committee recommends the adoption of this paragraph, not currently in 
the Massachusetts Rules. It requires that a lawyer notify the sender of any document or any 
“electronically stored information” relating to the lawyer’s representation of a client that appears 
to have been sent to the lawyer inadvertently.  The issue of what should happen to information 
inadvertently sent to an opposing party has been hotly contested. This provision only requires 
that the receiving lawyer notify the sending lawyer of the receipt of the information and treats the 
ultimate fate of the information as a matter of substantive law to be resolved elsewhere. 
Comments to Rule 4.4(b) 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends the adoption of the last example of the Model 
Comment as an additional illustration. 
Comment 2. The Committee recommends adoption of the Model Comment, which 
discusses the obligations imposed by new paragraph (b) of the Rule. 
Comment 3. The Committee recommends the adoption of Model Comment 3, which 
states that in the exercise of professional judgment reserved to lawyers by Rules 1.2 and 1.4, a 
lawyer permissibly may choose to return unread a document that was sent to the lawyer 
inadvertently, or may delete unread electronically stored information that was inadvertently sent. 
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This Comment rejects the notion that the obligation of competence requires a lawyer to read the 
item before returning or deleting it and that the obligation of communication with the client 
requires discussion with the client before taking any such action. 
Rule 5.1: Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers 
Rule 5.1(a)–(c). The Committee recommends a few, small explanatory suggestions from 
the Model Rules, which do not involve substantive changes. 
Rule 5.1(d). The Committee recommends the addition of this nonstandard subparagraph, 
which for the first time in Massachusetts would impose disciplinary responsibility on a law firm 
by requiring it to make “reasonable efforts” to put reasonable supervisory mechanisms in place 
to ensure that the firm’s lawyers comply with the Massachusetts Rules. The Committee has 
followed the concept embodied in the New York and New Jersey rules that the law firm itself, 
not just individual lawyers, has a responsibility to its clients and the public at large to make a 
reasonable effort to see that its lawyers comply with the Rules.   
Comments to Rule 5.1 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends the adoption of the Model Comment’s changes 
in this Comment to reflect the explanatory changes in the text of the Rule. 
Comment 2. The Committee recommends the adoption of this Model Comment, which 
identifies the kinds of firm policies and procedures that may be required to comply with the 
Rule. 
Comments 3–5. The Committee recommends the adoption of the modifications made by 
Model Comments in the language of the current Comments to reflect changes in the text of the 
Rule. 
Comment 6. The Committee recommends the adoption of this new Comment, which 
deals with the relationship between paragraphs (b) and (c) of the Rule. 
Comment 8. The Committee recommends the adoption of this new Model Comment, 
which makes clear that the imposition of duties on managing and supervising lawyers does not 
alter the duty of all lawyers in a firm to abide by the Rules. 
Comment 9. The Committee recommends the adoption of this new Comment, which 
makes clear that the obligation placed on the law firm by paragraph (d) is in addition to the 
obligation placed on individual lawyers in the firm.  
Rule 5.2: Responsibilities of a Subordinate Lawyer  
There are no recommended substantive changes. 
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Rule 5.3: Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistance  
Rule 5.3(d). The Committee recommends the same addition recommended with respect 
to Rule 5.1: that the law firm itself as well as its individual lawyers has a responsibility to make 
reasonable efforts to see that its nonlawyer assistants, both inside and outside of the firm, are 
adequately supervised with respect to the ethical components of their work.  
Comments to Rule 5.3 
Comments 1-4. The Committee recommends the adoption of these Model Comments to 
spell out the responsibilities of lawyers and law firms with respect to their supervision of 
nonlawyers in the same fashion as these responsibilities are spelled out for lawyers in Rule 5.1.  
Comment 5.  The Committee recommends the adoption of this new Comment, which 
makes clear that the obligation placed on the law firm by paragraph (d) is in addition to the 
obligation placed on individual lawyers in the firm.  
Rule 5.4: Professional Independence of a Lawyer  
Explanatory and clarifying material taken from the Model Rule and Comments are the 
only recommended changes. 
Rule 5.5: Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijurisdictional Practice of Law 
Rule 5.5.  The Committee recommends adopting the Model Rule language in Rule 5.5(d) 
clarifying that this paragraph, which lists two situations in which lawyers not admitted in this 
jurisdiction may engage in practice here, applies to lawyers who maintain an office or other 
systematic and continuous presence in Massachusetts and not to lawyers practicing here on a 
temporary basis. That latter situation is dealt with in paragraph (c).  
Comments to Rule 5.5.  The only substantive changes in the Comments are those 
recommended to reflect the recommended changes in the text of the Rule itself.   
Rule 5.6: Restrictions on Right to Practice 
Rule 5.6.  The Committee recommends adopting the Model Rule language that expands 
the entities to which the prohibitions on restricting a lawyer’s right to practice apply beyond the 
traditional partnership model.  
Comments to Rule 5.6.  The only substantive changes in the Comments are those 
recommended to reflect the recommended changes in the text of the Rule itself. 
Rule 5.7: Responsibilities Regarding Law-Related Services 
Rule 5.7.  The Committee recommends adoption of the changes in the Model Rule 
addressing the performance of law-related services within the same entity that renders legal 
services, but adds a requirement that written notice be given to the client that various services are 
not legal services and hence that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not apply.  
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Comments to Rule 5.7.  The only substantive changes in the Comments are those 
recommended to reflect the recommended changes in the text of the Rule itself. 
Rule 6.1: Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service 
Rule 6.1. The Committee recommends no change in the text of the Rule. 
Comments to Rule 6.1 
The only recommended change of substance is the addition of Model Comment 11 
stating that law firms should help firm lawyers fulfill their pro bono responsibilities under the 
Rules.  
Rule 6.2: Accepting Appointments 
The Committee recommends no change in the text of the Rule. 
Comments to Rule 6.2 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 1, which includes 
a sentence stating that lawyers should accept their fair share of appointments involving indigent 
clients and unpopular causes. 
Rules 6.3 and 6.4. The Committee is not recommending any changes to the Rules or Comments. 
Rule 7.1: Communications Concerning a Lawyer’s Services 
Rule 7.1.  The Committee recommends no change in the text of the Rule. 
Comments to Rule 7.1 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 1, but 
recommends changing "must" to "should."   
Comment 2. The Committee recommends adopting Model Comment 2.  It adopts a 
“substantial likelihood” test for determining whether a lawyer’s truthful statement is misleading.  
According to the reporter’s notes, the standard was intended to “strike[] the proper balance 
between the lawyer’s free-speech interest and the need for consumer protection.”   
Comment 3. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 3. The ABA has 
deleted the issues of raising unjustified expectations or making unsubstantiated comparisons 
from its former text of Rule 7.1 and moved those concerns to this Comment. The Comment now 
only warns that such statements may be misleading, a view consistent with current Comment 1 
of our Rule.  The Committee does recommend changing the words “prospective clients” at the 
end of the Model Comment to the word “public,” that is, an appropriate disclaimer may preclude 
a finding of misleading the public. 
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Comment 4. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 4. It provides a 
cross-reference to Rule 8.4(e), which prohibits lawyers from stating or implying an ability to 
improperly influence a government agency or official or that they can achieve results by means 
that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
Rule 7.2: Advertising 
Rule 7.2(a). The Committee recommends adoption of the Model Rule modifications, 
which omit specification of types of media in which lawyers may advertise and instead state 
generally that lawyers may advertise through written, recorded or electronic communication, 
including public media. This change is consistent with the need to recognize new technology. 
Rule 7.2(b). A majority of the Committee recommends adopting the Model Rule's 
deletion of the requirement in current Rule 7.2(b) that copies of advertisements be retained for 
two years.  It concurs with the observation in the ABA reporter’s notes that the obligation was 
burdensome and seldom used for disciplinary purposes, and certainly disproportionately 
burdensome to any benefit for disciplinary purposes.  The majority believes that with all the 
sources of information about advertisements available in the public sphere, disciplinary 
authorities should have sufficient sources of evidence to prosecute violations of the advertising 
rules without requiring thousands of lawyers to maintain such files.  The Committee is, however, 
divided on deleting the requirement that advertisements be retained, with a substantial minority 
recommending keeping the requirement with some fine-tuning for websites and other computer-
accessed communications.  The argument of the minority is set forth in the appendix to this 
report. 
Rule 7.2(c). This Rule has now been renumbered as 7.2(b). The Committee recommends 
adoption of the Model Rule modifications, albeit with some changes. Of note is new 
subparagraph (b)(4), providing for reciprocal referral arrangements with other lawyers or 
nonlawyer professionals on certain conditions.  The Committee recommends the following 
changes: 1) deletion of the definition of “qualified lawyer referral service” in subparagraph 
(b)(2), as the Committee is recommending it be a defined term in Rule 1.0, and 2) retention from 
our current Rule as new subparagraph (b)(5) the exception allowing the payment of referral fees 
permitted by Massachusetts Rules 1.5(e) and 5.4(a)(4). 
Rule 7.2(d). Our Rule 7.2(d) requires that a communication under this Rule include the 
name of the lawyer or law firm responsible for its content.  The Committee recommends that it 
now be renumbered as Rule 7.2(c) and retained in its existing form.  The Model Rule version 
differs slightly, primarily by requiring an address, as well as a name, for the lawyer or law firm.  
Comments to Rule 7.2 
The Committee recommends adopting most of the Model Comments to Rule 7.2.   
Comment 1. The Committee recommends that with one minor change, current Comment 
1 should be retained, thus omitting the additional language in the Model Comment not adopted 
when our Rules were revised in 1999.  The Committee does recommend adopting the recent 
Model Comment addition of the words “learning about and” to the introductory clause of the 
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first sentence, so that it now will read, “To assist the public in learning about and obtaining legal 
services…” 
Comment 3. The Committee recommends deletion of current Comment 3 because it is 
covered by more specific and helpful language in the Rule and other Comments. 
Comment 3A. The Committee recommends retention of the first two sentences of current 
nonstandard Comment 3A relating to electronic communications, deletion of the balance as 
relating to out-of-date technology, and addition of a new final sentence cross-referencing 
Comment 1 of Rule 7.3 as to the distinction between advertising and solicitation.  
Comment 5. The Committee recommends deletion of current Comment 5, consistent with 
the deletion from the Rule of current paragraph (b). Model Comment 5 expands on proposed 
subparagraph (b)(1) of the Rule relating to paying for advertising and communications.  We 
recommend adopting Model Comment 5 as Massachusetts Comment 5, with a reference added to 
our nonstandard subparagraph (b)(5) of the Committee’s proposed Rule.  The Committee 
recommends omitting the two sentences in the Model Comment relating to “lead generators,” as 
the substantive law in this area is still developing.  
Comment 6. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 6. It expands on 
paragraph (b)(2) of the Rule, which permits payment of the usual charges of a legal services plan 
or referral service.  We recommend deletion of the last two sentences, consistent with the 
Committee’s decision to make “qualified legal referral service” a defined term under Rule 1.0. 
Comment 7. The Committee recommends adoption of this Model Comment, which states 
that lawyers who accept assignments or referrals from legal service plans or lawyer referral 
services must act reasonably to ensure that the activities of the plan or service are compatible 
with their professional obligations. 
Comment 8. The Committee recommends adoption of this Model Comment relating to 
the reciprocal referral arrangements now permitted by paragraph (b)(3) of the Rule.  It 
recommends modification to clarify that such arrangements are governed by the conflict of 
interest rule, Rule 1.7, and therefore require the client’s informed consent in writing. 
Rule 7.3: Solicitation of Clients 
Rule 7.3(a). The Committee recommends a few nonsubstantive modifications in format 
and language to conform to the Model Rule provision but retains the nonstandard current 
exceptions to the prohibition of solicitation now contained in our Rules.   
Rule 7.3(b). The Committee recommends adoption of the modifications contained in the 
Model Rule, which do not make substantive changes in our current provision except to update 
technology references. 
Rule 7.3(c). The Committee recommends deletion of this current paragraph, consistent 
with its recommendation of the deletion of the two-year record retention requirement in the text 
of our current Rule. 
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Rule 7.3(d) and (e). The Committee recommends deletion of these current paragraphs as 
the substance of current Rule 7.3(d) and (e) is now part of Rule 7.3(a). 
Rule 7.3(f). The Committee recommends deletion of current Rule 7.3(f) and adoption of a 
new Rule 7.3(d), based on the Model Rule provision relating to referrals. The prohibition against 
payment for solicitation is now contained in Rule 7.2(b) and the remainder of current Rule 7.3(f) 
is dealt with in this new Rule 7.3(d). 
Comments to Rule 7.3 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends replacing the first part of current Comment 1 
with Model Comment 1, which sets out the difference between solicitation and advertising in 
more explicit, up-to-date language, and recommends renumbering the second part of current 
Comment 1 as a new Comment 2. 
Comment 2. The Committee recommends that this new Comment 2 be modified with 
Model Rule language updating some technology references and other stylistic changes. The 
Committee also recommends moving much of the current Comment 2, with a few stylistic 
changes, to a new Comment 3. 
Comment 3. The Committee recommends the deletion of current Comment 3, which 
relates to the current requirement that written solicitations be retained for two years.  
Comment 4. The Committee recommends renumbering current Comment 4 as Comment 
5 and the adoption of Model Comment 4, which explains the reasons for removal of the 
requirement for retaining documentary records for two years.  
Comments 5, 6, and 7: The Committee does not recommend adoption of Model 
Comments 5–9., but instead  recommends renumbering current Comments 4, 4A, and 5 as 
Comments 5–7 and making only small stylistic or nonsubstantive changes.  
Rule 7.4: Communication of Fields of Practice 
Rule 7.4(a). The Committee recommends the adoption of Model Rule 7.4(a) to replace 
current Rule 7.4(a). As revised, paragraph (a) would permit all lawyers to communicate the fact 
that they practice in particular fields of law without constituting a claim of specialization.   
Rule 7.4(b). The Committee recommends this new paragraph that incorporates the first 
sentence of current Rule 7.4(a)(1), which permits claims of specialization if not false or 
misleading, and retains the language of the second sentence of current Rule 7.4(a) that gives 
examples of the types of statements that constitute a claim of specialization.  In light of the 
recommended change to Rule 7.4(a) to permit lawyers to communicate that they practice in a 
given field, the Committee recommends that current Rules 7.4(a)(2) and (a)(3) be deleted. We 
also recommend that the language dealing with the idea that lawyers who hold themselves out as 
specialists be held to the standard of performance of specialists, now contained in current Rule 
7.4(c), be moved to the last sentence of this paragraph and that the remainder of current Rule 
7.4(c) be deleted. 
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Consistent with our existing Rule, the Committee does not recommend the adoption of 
Model Rule 7.4(b) or (c), which permit lawyers engaged in patent or admiralty practice to so 
designate themselves.  If not false or misleading, such claims are already permitted by 
current Rule 7.4. 
Rule 7.4(c). The Committee recommends the adoption of the substance of Model Rule 
7.4(d), which authorizes lawyers to claim certification as specialists by organizations approved 
by the ABA or state authorities.  This subject is currently addressed in Massachusetts 
Rule 7.4(b).  The Committee additionally recommends retaining in this paragraph the provision 
in the existing Massachusetts Rule that authorizes lawyers to claim certification as a specialist by 
a private organization if the communication states that the certifying organization is private and 
not regulated by a state authority or the ABA.  The principal practical difference between 
proposed paragraph (c) and current paragraph (b) is to exempt the ABA from this last 
requirement.   
Comments to Rule 7.4 
The Committee’s recommended changes to the Comments are consistent with its 
suggestions concerning the text.   
Comment 1. The Committee recommends the adoption of Model Comment 1, modified 
to account for the variations between Model Rule 7.4(a) and our recommended Rule 7.4(a) and 
(b).   
Comment 2. The Committee recommends the adoption, as Comment 2, of the substance, 
and most of the language, of Model Comment 3. 
Rule 7.5: Firm Names and Letterheads 
Rule 7.5(b). The Committee recommends that the current Rule be amended to conform to 
the Model Rule by adding the phrase “or other professional designation” in relation to the use by 
a law firm of the same name in offices in multiple jurisdictions.  
Comments to Rule 7.5 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adoption of Model Comment 1, in 
substantially similar language, but it recommends retaining the current Massachusetts 
Comment’s references to firm names that include retired, and not just deceased, members of the 
firm.   
Comment 2. The Committee recommends retaining current Massachusetts Comment 2 
concerning space sharing as more comprehensive than its Model Comment counterpart.  The 
Committee recommends that the current Comment be amended by addition of the phrase “or that 
they are practicing law together in a firm” to the end of the first sentence, i.e., that the 
denominations “Smith and Jones” or “Smith and Jones, A Professional Association” suggest 
partnership or that the attorneys are practicing together in a firm. 
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Comment 3. The Committee recommends retaining current Comment 3, which has no 
counterpart in the Model Rules and relates to restrictions imposed by Supreme Judicial Court 
Rule 3:06 on trade names for professional corporations, limited liability companies, or limited 
liability partnerships.  
Rule 7.6: Political Contributions to Obtain Government Legal Engagements or 
Appointments by Judges  
The Committee does not recommend adoption of this Model Rule. The trigger for the 
prohibition of such political contributions by a lawyer or law firm is that they be made “for the 
purpose” of obtaining such engagements or appointments. The Committee concludes that that 
test is much too nebulous to serve as a basis for discipline and believes that this subject matter is 
more appropriately left to substantive law.  
Rule 8.1: Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters 
Rule 8.1. The Committee recommends no change in the text of the Rule.  
Comments to Rule 8.1 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends the addition of Model Comment language 
requiring lawyers to correct any prior misstatements in admission matters. 
Comment 3. The Committee recommends addition of Model Comment language making 
clear that Rules 1.6 and 3.3 are applicable with respect to lawyer representation of clients in both 
admission and disciplinary matters.  
Rule 8.2: Judicial and Legal Officials 
Rule 8.2. The Committee recommends no change in the text of the Rule. 
Comment to Rule 8.2 
Comment 1. The Committee recommends adding a sentence at the end of Comment 1 
that summarizes the holding of Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452 (2005), to the effect that an 
intentionally false statement or a false statement made when the lawyer has no objective basis to 
support it violates the Rule.  
Comment 2. The Committee recommends deleting Comment 2 since the Massachusetts 
Rules do not explain all the instances when Massachusetts has chosen not to adopt the Model 
Rules.  
Rule 8.3: Reporting Professional Misconduct 
Rule 8.3. The Committee has recommended one stylistic change and the elimination of 
the final phrase in current Rule 8.3(c), since it duplicates the confidentiality protection set forth 
in Rule 1.6(c).  
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Comments to Rule 8.3 
Comment 5. The Committee recommends deletion of this Comment because of the 
recommendation that a portion of current Rule 8.3(c) be deleted. 
Rule 8.4: Misconduct 
Rule 8.4(e). The Committee recommends the adoption of the Model Rules proposal to 
add an additional prohibition to this paragraph that would forbid lawyers from stating or 
implying an ability to achieve results by means prohibited by the Massachusetts Rules or other 
law. The Committee’s recommendation reformulates the ABA proposal in order to clear up a 
grammatical ambiguity. 
Rule 8.4(h). The Committee recommends, with some dissent, that this paragraph, which 
was deleted by the ABA from its Model Rules, also be deleted from the Massachusetts Rule as 
too vague to serve as an independent basis for discipline. 
Comments to Rule 8.4 
Comment 1. The Committee also recommends the adoption of Model Comment 1, which 
repeats the substance of Comment 4 to Rule 4.2 that a lawyer is not prohibited from “advising a 
client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.” Current Comment 1 should be 
renumbered Comment 2.  
Comment 7. The Committee recommends deletion of Comment 7, consistent with its 
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RULE 1.6(b) 
Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposal 
 Over the past thirty years, the legal profession has vigorously debated whether and under 
what circumstances a lawyer may reveal confidential client information to prevent harm to third 
parties.  When Massachusetts adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct in 1998, the ABA 
Model Rules permitted such disclosure only to prevent a client from committing a crime that was 
likely to result in “imminent death or substantial bodily harm.”  Massachusetts rejected this 
standard as too narrow to protect the public interest and instead adopted our current Rule 
1.6(b)(1), which was based on the recommendations of the American Bar Association 
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (“Kutak Commission”) in 1983 and which 
permits a lawyer to reveal confidential information,  
“. . . to prevent the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer reasonably 
believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to 
the financial interests or property of another, or to prevent the wrongful incarceration of 
another.” 
Under this rule, a lawyer may disclose a client’s confidential information when the harm will be 
the result of actions by a third party as well as actions by a client.  See Comment 13A. 
 A majority of the Committee recommends retaining the substance of current Rule 
1.6(b)(1) but adopting the format of Model Rule 1.6, which deals with preventing bodily harm in 
subparagraph (b)(1) and preventing harm to financial interests in subparagraph (b)(2).  A 
majority also recommends eliminating the reference to “financial” in the second clause, so that 
lawyers have discretion to reveal confidential information to prevent substantial injury to “the 
interests or property of another.” 
1. Narrowing Current Rule 1.6(b)(1). 
 Three members of the Committee favor narrowing our current rule by adopting the 
current version of Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), which permits disclosure to prevent harm to financial 
interests only if it is the lawyer’s client who is threatening to commit a crime or fraud and only if 
the client has used the lawyer’s services in furtherance of the criminal or fraudulent act.  
Although our version of Rule 1.6(b)(1) has been in effect for fifteen years, the dissenting 
members offer no empirical evidence that the Rule’s permission to disclose confidential 
information has been abused or that attorney-client confidentiality has been eroded.  Rather, the 
dissenters, quoting the Comment to the Model Rules, argue that disclosure should be permitted 
only when there has been a “serious abuse of the client/lawyer relationship.”   
We believe that the dissenters put the emphasis in the wrong place.  In our view, the 
primary purpose of permitting disclosure of confidential information is to give lawyers the 
opportunity in appropriate cases to prevent serious harm to innocent third parties, regardless of 
whether the lawyer’s client is the culprit or the lawyer’s services have been used.  Indeed, 
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disclosing confidential information is more likely to harm the attorney-client relationship and to 
undermine confidence in the confidentiality principle when the disclosure indicates that the 
lawyer’s client is about to commit a crime or fraud than when the perpetrator is a third party.  
Blowing the whistle on a client may lead to the client’s indictment, see e.g. Purcell v. District 
Attorney, 424 Mass. 109 (1997), a result that undermines the lawyer/client relationship more 
gravely than disclosing information supplied by someone who is not directly involved in 
wrongdoing. 
The dissenters also argue that narrowing the permitted disclosure will promote uniformity 
with other states that follow the Model Rules. The Model Rule formulation, however, has not 
won universal acceptance.  In our own geographic area, for example, Vermont requires 
disclosure of client crimes or frauds to prevent substantial financial injury to others,  New 
Hampshire permits such disclosure but only if the client intends to commit a criminal act,  
Connecticut permits disclosure to prevent both criminal acts and civil frauds, while both Rhode 
Island and New York prohibit such disclosures.  Given this absence of uniformity, we believe we 
should focus not on counting noses but on achieving the right balance between preserving 
confidentiality and protecting the public from harm.  In our view, the current rule, which focuses 
on preventing harm to third parties from fraudulent schemes rather than the lawyer’s role in 
furthering the fraud, achieves that balance. 
2. Permitting Disclosure to Protect Non-Financial Interests 
Five members of the Committee dissent from the Committee’s recommendation to delete 
the qualifier “financial” from Rule 1.6(b)(2), and advocate the adoption of the language of Model 
Rule 1.6(b)(2), which permits disclosure only to prevent serious injury to financial interests. 
We recognize that crimes and frauds can cause financial harm, but they can also seriously 
injure other vital legal interests.  Proposed Comment 8A to Rule 1.6 provides some examples. A 
non-custodial parent can kidnap a child, injuring the interest of the other parent in maintaining 
custody or even contact with the child.  A criminal trespasser or wire-tapper can invade the 
privacy of another.  A criminal or fraudulent scheme can deprive some citizens of their right to 
vote or other civil rights. 
Under the version of Rule 1.6(b)(1) now in effect, it is not always clear whether a lawyer 
has discretion to reveal confidential information in order to prevent harm to such non-financial 
interests.  Some types of interests, such as the right to be free of intrusions into one’s home and 
the right to freedom from employment discrimination, might fall within the category of 
“property” interests protected by the current version of Rule 1.6(b)(1).   Other types of interests, 
such as the right to vote or the rights of a custodial parent, are harder to classify as property 
rights, but injury to such interests can be just as devastating as any financial loss.   
We believe that it is a mistake to permit disclosure to prevent harm to financial interests 
but not to other types of legally-protectable interests such as parental rights and civil rights.  As 
a profession, we are better off recognizing that civil rights are as important and deserve as much 
protection as economic interests.  The Due Process Clauses in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments would be less majestic – and would command less assent—if they protected life 
and property but not liberty. 
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The dissenters argue that uniformity would be achieved by adopting Model Rule 
1.6(b)(2) and also, somewhat inconsistently, that many jurisdictions do not permit as much 
disclosure of confidential information as the Model Rule.  They worry that eliminating the 
qualifier “financial” would seriously erode clients’ trust in lawyers.  We believe that their fears 
are misplaced, for two reasons.   
First, the dissenters overlook the varied history of exceptions to the confidentiality 
principle. The Disciplinary Rules in effect in Massachusetts prior to 1998 permitted a lawyer to 
reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime without regard to the seriousness of the 
crime or the extent of injury that the crime might cause.  The 1998 revisions to our Rules thus 
represented a substantial narrowing of the lawyer’s discretion to reveal confidential information.  
The Rules we adopted in 1998 nevertheless gave lawyers substantially more discretion than the 
ABA Model Rules which were then in effect and which had been adopted in many states.  It 
was not until 2002 that the ABA, under intense criticism, broadened the lawyer’s discretion to 
something approximating the current Massachusetts position.  We are not aware of any 
empirical evidence that these varied exceptions to the confidentiality rule in effect over the 
years have undermined the basic principle of lawyer-client confidentiality or eroded clients’ 
trust in lawyers. 
Second, the dissenters overlook other protections built into our recommended version of 
Rule 1.6(b)(2).  Under the proposed Rule, lawyers would have discretion to reveal information 
only to prevent the commission of a criminal or fraudulent act.  “Fraudulent” is defined in the 
Rules as “conduct that is fraudulent under substantive or procedural law and has a purpose to 
deceive.”  See Proposed Rule 1.0(e).  In addition, the lawyer must reasonably believe that the 
crime or fraud is likely to result in substantial injury to the interests or property of another.  And 
even when these criteria are satisfied, disclosure remains optional: the lawyer may still choose 
to remain silent.  Lawyers are steeped in an ethic of confidentiality.  Based on past experience, 
we believe that most lawyers are likely to consider revealing confidential information only 
when faced with clear evidence of serious threatened harm to third parties.  The elimination of 
the modifier “financial” is not likely to change this ingrained behavior.  It does, however, 
recognize that non-economic interests can be just as important and as worthy of protection as 
financial interests. 
_________________________ 
Dissent of Carol Beck, Elizabeth Mulvey, Andrew Perlman, Constance Rudnick, and 
Constance Vecchione to Committee’s Proposed Rule 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3) 
The dissenters respectfully dissent on one or more aspects of the Committee’s 
recommendations on Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(b)(2) and (b)(3). The discussion below sets out which 
of us is dissenting on which part of the rule. 
1. Overview of Recommended Changes to Rule 1.6(b)(1)-(2) 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.6(b)(1) currently combines three circumstances in which disclosures 
of confidential information are permitted: (1) to prevent the commission of criminal and 
fraudulent acts reasonably likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, (2) to prevent the 
commission of criminal and fraudulent acts reasonably likely to result in substantial injury to the 
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financial interests or property of another, and (3) to prevent the wrongful incarceration or 
execution of another.   
In contrast, ABA Model Rule 1.6(b) splits paragraph (b)(1) into subsections (b)(1) and 
(b)(2), with a different standard for disclosures to prevent death or substantial bodily harm than 
for disclosures to prevent a financial crime or fraud.  The Model Rule provides as follows: 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
     (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
     (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services… 
It is important to note that Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) (the "financial interests" provision) has a 
stricter triggering standard than the current Massachusetts Rule.  In particular, unlike the 
equivalent Massachusetts provision, Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) requires the client to be the wrongful 
actor and to have used (or be using) the lawyer’s services in furtherance of the crime or fraud.2 
The Committee now recommends that this Court adopt paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of 
the Model Rule, but with the following revisions: 
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud the commission of a criminal or 
fraudulent act that the lawyer is reasonably certain believes is likely to result in substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the client 
has used or is using the lawyer's services[.] 
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a 
crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; 
2. Committee’s deletion of the modifier “financial” in paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) 
All five dissenters oppose the deletion of the word "financial" in paragraphs (b)(2) and 
(b)(3).  According to the Committee's Report, the deletion of this word would allow the 
disclosure of confidential information to prevent or rectify any crime or fraud that is likely to 
“substantially injure any protectable interests, not just ‘financial’ interests[,]” including “rights to 
privacy, to vote, to be free from invidious discrimination, etc….”     
We do not find the Committee's reasoning to be persuasive.  The Committee points to no 
actual circumstance or case demonstrating a strong public interest in support of such a substantial 
erosion of a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.  In addition, if the concept of a protectable interest 
is not definable, we believe it does not provide adequate guidance to attorneys or adequate 
protection to clients' confidential information.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine a situation where a 
fraud or crime would not impinge on someone’s “interest,” because crimes and frauds by their 
very nature involve some kind of harm to one or more persons. 
                                                 
2 We do not dissent with regard to the Committee's recommendation that the Court adopt Model Rule 1.6(b)(1). 
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In light of these problems, it is not surprising to learn that no other jurisdiction has an 
exception allowing disclosures to prevent harm to the undefined “interests… of another.”  In 
fact, several jurisdictions have rejected Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) as it is, concluding that the more 
modest disclosure standard in the Rule is already too permissive.3   Admittedly, some 
jurisdictions permit (or even require) the disclosure of information to prevent the client from 
committing a crime without regard to the nature of the harm,4 but no jurisdiction permits such an 
open-ended disclosure in the context of "frauds," as the Committee's proposal would allow.  
If the word “financial” is retained in paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) to modify “interests,” 
Comment 7 would have to be modified accordingly, and Comment 8A would be stricken.  
Proposed Comment 8A purports to explain the types of non-financial interests that permit 
disclosure.   
In sum, we believe that clients' trust in lawyers would be eroded if they knew that their 
information could be used to prevent or remedy harm to some undefined legal interest resulting 
from the misconduct of a non-client and for which the lawyer was in no way responsible.  For 
these reasons, we encourage the Court to reject the recommended deletion of the word 
"financial" in paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3).   
3. Committee’s further revisions to Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) 
Constance Vecchione, Carol Beck, and Elizabeth Mulvey, but not Andrew Perlman or 
Constance Rudnick, recommend adopting the Model Rule (b)(2) exception that allows disclosure 
only to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud reasonably certain to result in 
substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another; Andrew Perlman and 
Constance Rudnick favor the Committee’s version in this respect.  
Constance Vecchione, Carol Beck, and Elizabeth Mulvey, but not Andrew Perlman or 
Constance Rudnick, further recommend adopting the Model Rule limitation to (b)(2) that permits 
disclosure of such crimes or frauds only in furtherance of which the client has used the 
lawyer’s services; Andrew Perlman and Constance Rudnick favor the Committee’s 
recommended deletion of this phrase.  The remainder of this section of the dissent therefore 
comes from Constance Vecchione, Carol Beck and Elizabeth Mulvey only.   
If paragraph (b)(2) is conformed to the ABA version of the paragraph in whole or in part, 
then Comment 7 should also be revised to match the model comment as applicable.  The model 
comment justifies the limited exception for disclosure of confidential information by noting that 
such disclosure prevents exploitation of the attorney-client relationship and furthers the goal of 
preventing or mitigating the consequences of the client’s fraud or crime.  The Committee’s 
proposed comment provides no explanation for the less stringent standard that it proposes.  In 
addition, the added nonstandard sentence providing that “[t]he lawyer should not ignore facts 
that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that disclosure is permissible” should be 
stricken; it is not appropriate to offer active encouragement for breaching confidentiality. 
One advantage to adopting the Model Rule is that many jurisdictions have adopted it.  
(Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Alabama, California, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, Rhode Island. 
4 See, e.g., Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Virginia, West Virginia, Wyoming. 
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Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont).  Idaho, North Carolina, Washington, and 
Wisconsin have adopted Model Rule 1.6(b)(3), which arguably covers the conduct in Rule 
1.6(b(2).  Other jurisdictions have adopted rules capturing the Model Rules exceptions without 
adopting the precise language (Connecticut, Hawaii, Nevada, New Jersey, and South Dakota).  
Given that multijurisdictional practice is common, it is beneficial to have the same or similar 
rules governing exceptions to the rule protecting confidential information. 
Departure from the Model Rule is warranted when there are substantial objections to the 
Model Rule formulation.  In this case, however, there is a strong policy reason for adopting the 
Model Rule limiting disclosure to prevent financial harm and to fraudulent or criminal acts 
committed by the client and furthered by the lawyer’s services.  A lawyer should maintain 
confidentiality except for the most compelling reasons.  A client abuses the lawyer-client 
relationship by making the lawyer the unwitting tool of the client’s crime or fraud, and a lawyer 
should be able to disclose information if the client has used the lawyer’s services to commit a 
crime or fraud that is reasonably likely to result in substantial harm to the financial interests or 
property of another.  In addition, the lawyer’s discretion to disclose may cause the client to 
decide not to commit the crime or fraud or to mitigate its harm.  See comment 7 to Model Rule 
1.6.  When the client is not the perpetrator of the crime or fraud or the lawyer’s services have not 
been used, the lawyer may not be in a position to advise the perpetrator.  Moreover, the client 
may have reasons for protecting the other person, or the client may wish not to be drawn into the 
controversy, or the client may simply have the entirely reasonable expectation of keeping the 
information confidential.  The client should have the authority to prohibit disclosure of his or her 
confidential information, and the lawyer should not be able to involve the client in preventing 
financial harm caused by another or when the lawyer’s services have not been used. 
RULE 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) 
Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposals 
The Committee has recommended adopting ABA Model Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1).  
These rules prohibit lawyers from using confidential information relating to the representation of 
a current or former client to the disadvantage of the client.  However, they do not contain the 
additional prohibitions in the current Massachusetts rules against using such information “for the 
lawyer’s advantage or the advantage of a third party.”  Certain Committee members object to the 
removal of these additional prohibitions on the ground that the removal will invite lawyers to 
breach their fiduciary duties to present and former clients and to disregard other legal 
obligations.   
We believe these objections are unpersuasive.  The current rule is not co-extensive with a 
lawyer’s fiduciary duty to present and former clients, but is in fact broader.  Indeed, the current 
rule calls into question practices that most lawyers would acknowledge are proper.  We believe 
that the Model Rules better reflect legitimate disciplinary concerns.  To the extent that the use of 
confidential information relating to the representation of a client violates the law even without 
harm to the client, there are other legal remedies available, including in many instances 
discipline under other professional conduct rules.   
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First, it is important to recognize that this dispute does not implicate the lawyer’s duty not 
to disclose the confidential information of present or former clients.  Rule 1.6 and 1.9(c)(2) 
establish that duty and the exceptions to it, and nothing in Massachusetts Rules 1.8(b) and 
1.9(c)(1) or the corresponding Model Rules affects that duty.  Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(2) address 
only a lawyer’s ability to use that information without disclosing it. 
Second, as to the use of confidential information, the fiduciary duty of an agent is 
narrower than the duty that the dissenters would impose on lawyers.  According to the 
Restatement (Third) of Agency, § 8.05, an agent is obliged “not to use or communicate 
confidential information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes, or those of a third party.”  
(Emphasis added.)  This obligation reflects the obligation of the agent not to use the principal’s 
property for his or her own benefit.  (Trade secrets are a form of property.)  By contrast, Rules 
1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(2) prohibit use of “confidential information relating to the representation” of 
the client.  Such information includes information constituting the property of the client, but is 
not limited to that information.  The Comment to Rule 1.6 states, “The confidentiality rule 
applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to virtually all 
information relating to the representation, whatever its source.”  Thus, in the course of 
representation, a lawyer may learn all manner of information that is not generally known but that 
is in no way the confidential information “of” the client.   
For example, the representation of a client frequently exposes a lawyer to information, 
some of it not generally known, about the industry in which the client does business, along with 
the players, common practices and recent happenings in that industry.  The knowledge that the 
lawyer acquires plainly increases the lawyer’s ability to attract other clients who will value the 
lawyer’s “experience.”  That knowledge will in turn lead to more business and higher billing 
rates for the lawyer, thus benefiting the lawyer.  While the information on which that knowledge 
is based is “related” to — indeed, derived from — client representation, it is generally not 
confidential information “of” the client that a lawyer as a fiduciary must refrain from using 
without the client’s consent.  A similar doctrine, familiar to employment and trade secret 
lawyers, is that a former employee may use the general skills, knowledge and “know-how” 
derived during employment for the benefit of a subsequent employer.  See Restatement of Unfair 
Competition Law § 42, cmt. d. 
Similarly, lawyers often learn information concerning a client’s adversary or third parties 
in the course of a representation.  To be sure, a lawyer’s subsequent use of such information for 
his or her own benefit may violate legal obligations such as those imposed by protective orders 
or the securities laws, but such use does not ordinarily breach any fiduciary obligation to the 
client.   The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers recognizes this by qualifying the duty 
imposed on lawyers to account to a client for any “pecuniary gain” made by the lawyer’s use of 
the client’s confidential information, by excluding the lawyer’s use of such information “in the 
practice of law.”  § 60(2).  The Restatement gives the following example: “[I]f otherwise 
permissible, a lawyer representing a plaintiff who has acquired extensive confidential 
information about the manner in which a defendant manufactured a product may employ that 
information for the benefit of another client with a claim against the same defendant arising out 
of a defect in the same product.”  Id. cmt. j.  The comment explicitly recognizes that such use 
may benefit the lawyer economically by increasing a contingent fee. 
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In both of these examples, a lawyer may use “confidential information relating to the 
representation” of a client, in some instances for the pecuniary benefit of the lawyer or some 
third party (e.g. a subsequent client).  Yet few would argue that by doing so, the lawyer breaches 
a fiduciary duty to any client. 
Third, Rules 1.8 and 1.9 are both directed to protecting clients from the misconduct of 
their attorneys.  The prohibition against using client confidential information to the disadvantage 
of the client obviously advances that interest.  The current rules’ further prohibition against any 
use of such information that advantages the lawyer or a third person without disadvantaging the 
client is not client-protective.  If such use should trigger professional discipline, it should only be 
because it breaches some other legal obligation.  For example, a lawyer who trades in securities 
with the benefit of material non-public information derived from the representation of a client 
violates the securities laws even if the client is in no way harmed by the trading.   
But it is not necessary to use Rules 1.8 and 1.9 to address the disciplinary consequences 
of a lawyer’s engaging in insider trading and similar forms of misconduct.  Rule 8.4 prohibits 
lawyers from committing crimes “that reflect adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, 
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects” (8.4(b)), and engaging in “conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation” (8.4(c)).  Moreover, clients whose confidential information is 
misused frequently have remedies for breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of trade secrets, 
and the like.  There is no need to preserve an additional, overbroad ethical obligation in Rules 1.8 
and 1.9, as the ABA has recognized in the most recent revisions of the Model Rules.   
Fourth, the dissenters suggest that by removing the overbroad provisions in the current 
rule, the Court would signal to lawyers that “it is perfectly permissible for a lawyer to use client 
and former client confidential information for personal advantage or for the advantage of a third 
party without client consent so long as the client or former client is not disadvantaged.” 
However, we doubt that there are any practicing lawyers who are unaware of the legal 
prohibitions against insider securities trading or the legal risks faced by anyone, including a 
lawyer, who conceals material confidential information in his or her business dealings.  It is 
frankly difficult to believe that any lawyer would view the amendment as giving an unambiguous 
green light to engage in conduct that most lawyers would warn their clients to avoid.  And if the 
Court were concerned about sending such a signal, adding a comment that reminds lawyers that 
other principles of law may prohibit self-advantaging use of client confidences can address that 
concern without preserving an overbroad prohibition in the rules themselves. 
Fifth, the dissenters also suggest that lawyers will not always anticipate when their 
undisclosed use of their client’s confidential information will in fact disadvantage their clients 
because they may not be fully informed about their clients’ plans and interests.  But the 
prohibitions of Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c) are not limited to “knowing” uses of confidential 
information in ways that disadvantage clients.  Lawyers who read the rules will therefore know 
that if they seek to profit from their clients’ confidential information on the mere assumption that 
the use will not harm the clients, they will remain at risk of professional discipline (not to 
mention possible civil and criminal liability) if their assumption proves incorrect.   Prudent 
lawyers will refrain from any use of such information unless they are quite confident that their 
clients will not be harmed and that the law does not otherwise prohibit such use. 
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The dissenters correctly remind the Court that the ABA Model Rules are not binding on 
this Court.  However, there are obvious advantages to uniformity in the absence of a strong 
reason for adopting a non-standard rule.  While this Committee has recommended departing 
from the Model Rules on several occasions, the majority of the Committee does not believe that 
there is a persuasive rationale for departing from the Model Rules in this situation. 
_______________________ 
Dissent of Andrew Kaufman, Elizabeth Mulvey and Constance Vecchione to 
Committee’s Proposed Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1) 
Rule 1.8(b) currently provides that, except where a client consents or where Rule 1.6 or 
Rule 3.3 would permit or require, a “lawyer shall not use confidential information relating to the 
representation of a client “to the disadvantage of the client or for the lawyer’s advantage or the 
advantage of a third party.”  Rule 1.9(c)(1) contains the same prohibitions with respect to former 
clients. When the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in 
1998, it adopted the recommendation of its Advisory Committee and carried over this tripartite 
prohibition from its former rules, which were based on the Model Code of Professional Conduct. 
In so doing, it explicitly rejected the language of the Model Rules that limited the prohibition 
simply to use of a client’s confidential information to the disadvantage of the client. The present 
Advisory Committee now recommends that this decision be reversed and that the last two 
portions of the prohibition be eliminated.  
 The clear message of the Committee’s recommendation is that it is perfectly permissible 
for a lawyer to use client and former client confidential information for personal advantage or for 
the advantage of a third party without client consent so long as the client or former client is not 
disadvantaged. The committee’s justification is that the additional prohibitions “were 
unnecessary and perhaps overly restrictive, where the Model Rule and Comment 5 to the Model 
Rule make it clear that a lawyer cannot use confidential information to the disadvantage of a 
client, regardless of who benefits.” We would retain the deleted prohibitions on the ground that 
their deletion sends the wrong message to both lawyers and clients.  
 The current tripartite prohibition in our view merely codifies substantive contract and 
fiduciary law principles. A client entrusts the lawyer with confidential information so that the 
lawyer may work for the client’s benefit, not for the benefit of the lawyer or some third party, 
and certainly not for those persons without its knowledge or consent. We believe that that notion 
is implied in every client-attorney contract as part of the fiduciary relationship between client 
and lawyer. It seems odd in the extreme to characterize prohibitions against use of a client’s 
confidential information by lawyers for their own benefit or for the benefit of a third party as 
“overly restrictive.” The exceptions that are carved out of Rule 1.6(a) in Rule 1.6(b) are justified 
on the basis of the public purpose they serve. Letting lawyers use client confidential information 
for their own, or for a third party’s, benefit hardly seems like a public benefit. It seems more like 
a private benefit for lawyers achieved at the expense of the confidentiality principle.   
 Indeed, this change in our rules may well be a trap for lawyers. If we are correct in 
thinking that the current tripartite prohibition is a codification of substantive contract and 
fiduciary law principles, acceptance by the court of the Committee’s recommendation that two 
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parts of the prohibition be removed from the disciplinary rule might be read as signaling a 
change in substantive contract and fiduciary law. Would a client, seeking to enjoin its lawyer 
from using confidential information for the benefit of a third party (or for malpractice after the 
fact), be met with the defense that the change in the disciplinary rule changed the substantive 
law? Or would the lawyer learn that a decision not to discipline did not connote a change in the 
substantive law? Lawyers do use the disciplinary rules as guides to conduct and if adoption of 
the Committee’s recommendation would not change the substantive law, the lawyers might well 
be misled into liability for taking advantage of the change in the Rules. 
 An example discussed by the Committee was that of the client who discusses with its 
lawyer five possible sites it has identified for expansion. With the lawyer’s help the client picks 
one and rejects the others. The Committee view is that the Rules ought not prohibit the lawyer 
from recommending one of the rejected sites for another client or picking it up for personal 
investment without discussing the matter with the client so long as the lawyer concluded that the 
client had no interest in the site. We conclude, however, that since the matter involves the 
client’s confidential information, the lawyer ought not proceed in any fashion with respect to the 
other sites without client consent. Even on the Committee’s version of the Rule, we are doubtful 
about its conclusion. Without discussion with the client, the lawyer’s opinion that his or her 
action will not disadvantage the client will always be made with incomplete information. For all 
the lawyer knows, the client may have an animus against the third party chosen by the lawyer to 
tell about the site or may wish to tell someone else about the rejected sites or may wish to leave 
them in their current state for future consideration for itself. Even if the Committee is correct that 
it has chosen an example that satisfies its recommendation, there will be other examples when 
use of a client’s confidential information will be even more problematic.  
 The very fact that the confidential information has come to the lawyer’s attention by 
reason of being hired by the client leads us to conclude that the client ought to have the last word 
with respect to disposition of its confidential information. Eliminating the prohibitions currently 
in our rules will simply tempt lawyers to make use of client confidential information without 
their consent and give ammunition to those who think that lawyers are looking out for 
themselves too much when they have sole charge of the rules governing the client-lawyer 
relationship. It is difficult to imagine that these prohibitions would be eliminated by a committee 
with a substantial client presence. 
 We should respond briefly to two points made in the memorandum in support of the 
Committee recommendation and in opposition to this dissent. The most important criticism is 
that this dissent misstates the fiduciary duty of an agent. In our view, lawyers are special kinds of 
agents, with special rights and obligations. The fiduciary duties of lawyers are the duties as they 
are spelled out in these Rules, and they change as these Rules change. It would be a mistake to 
apply only the general rules of agency to the client/lawyer relationship. The current Preamble to 
the Rules states, “A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a 
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.” The law of agency does not 
impose such responsibilities on ordinary agents. And the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct do more than just state disciplinary standards. As the Scope Note to the current Rules 
states, “The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for 
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies.” The Rules would be providing the wrong 
guidance if they are amended to tell lawyers that while other law may prohibit them from using 
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client’s confidential information for their own advantage or for the advantage of a third person, 
there is nothing in the rules governing lawyers that would prevent such use.  
 An additional point made in the Committee’s statement is that the dissent’s 
recommendation and hence that the current Rule is too broad in that it prohibits use of “all 
manner of information [that the lawyer has learned] that is not generally known in the course of 
representation that is in no way the confidential information ‘of’ the client.” One of the examples 
given is that a lawyer frequently learns “information, some of it not generally known, about the 
industry in which the client does business, along with the players, common practices and recent 
happenings in that industry.” But that criticism ignores the fact that the Committee has already 
excluded such information from the category of confidential information. Recommended 
Comment 3A to Rule 1.6 refers to the “common sense notion that not every piece of information 
that a lawyer obtains relating to a representation is protected confidential information.  Among 
the examples of such nonconfidential information given in that Comment is “factual information 
acquired about the structure and operation of an entire industry during the representation of one 
entity within the industry.”   
 The worry implicit in the Committee statement seems to be that the breadth of Rule 
1.6(a)’s protection of information relating to the representation makes the Rule 1.8(b) prohibition 
of lawyer “use” of such information too broad. The examples given in the Comments of 
information learned in the representation that is not “confidential” suggest that other situations 
mentioned in the Committee statement, such as information learned about the client’s adversary, 
would ordinarily not be confidential either. In any event, concern about information at the 
boundary of protected confidential information should not result in adoption of the current 
Committee recommendation to permit lawyers to use core confidential information for their own 
benefit. 
 The Committee statement presents the issue as one of departing from the Model Rules. 
The Court departed from the Model Rules when it retained its existing language in these Rules in 
1998. The issue today is whether the Court will depart from its existing Rule that prohibits the 
use of a client’s confidential information for the advantage of the lawyer or some other third 
party. The Preamble to the current Rules tells us that “[t]he profession has a responsibility to 
assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial 
or self-interested concerns of the bar.” We believe that that warning is relevant to the proposed 
amendment of Rules 1.8(b) and 1.9(c)(1). 
 The ABA Model Rules and Comments are simply recommendations of a private 
organization and in this Report the Committee has recommended rejecting various positions the 
ABA has taken. We recommend that the court reject the Model Rules versions of Rule 1.8(b) and 
Rule 1.9(c)(1) and retain the current wording of the prohibitions contained in those Rules. We 
agree that the other clarifying language recommendations of the Committee with respect to those 




Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposal 
One of the most contentious issues addressed by the Committee is whether and to what 
extent the Rules of Professional Conduct should countenance screening of personally 
disqualified lawyers without client consent as a cure to disqualification of a law firm under Rule 
1.10.  After extensive discussion, a majority of the Committee recommends retaining the current 
Massachusetts screening rule contained in Rule 1.10(d) and 1.10(e), with minor changes to 
clarify the scope of the Rule. 
The debate in the Committee has replicated to a large extent the debate in the Wilkins 
Committee, which recommended the current version of Rule 1.10 in 1997.5  The Wilkins 
Committee considered all the arguments pro and con and even published for comment a draft 
rule that, like the current Model Rules, would permit any laterally-moving lawyer to be screened 
from a matter over the client’s objection.  In the end, however, the Wilkins Committee 
recommended a narrower version that permitted screening only when there was little likelihood 
that the lawyer possessed significant confidential information.  
Under the current Massachusetts Rule, a firm can avoid disqualification by screening a 
lawyer who represented a client at another firm, but only if the lawyer “had neither substantial 
involvement nor substantial material information relating to the matter.” The Committee 
recommends making the requirements for screening more precise by permitting screening when 
the laterally-moving lawyer “had neither involvement nor information relating to the matter 
sufficient to provide a substantial benefit to the new firm’s client.” (New language is in italics.)6 
                                                 
5 When the Wilkins Committee considered the issue of screening, the Model Rules did not allow any form 
of screening when a lawyer moved to a firm representing a client whose interests were materially adverse 
to a client of his former firm. Under the then-existing Model Rules, the “new firm” would be disqualified 
from taking or continuing with the representation. Recognizing the hardship that might ensue to lawyers 
and clients, courts, through case law, sometimes refused to disqualify law firms if they had implemented 
screening mechanisms to keep the infected lawyer away from those in the new firm participating in the 
matter. Often these involved situations when the ethical violation did not affect the particular lawsuit or 
where the objecting party had waited too long to complain. See, e.g., Holcombe v. Quest Diagnostics, 
Inc., 675 F. Supp. 2d. 515, 519 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (factors to be considered in determining if firm employing 
screen should nonetheless be disqualified include: (1) whether and when notice to the former client was 
given; (2) the substantiality of the relationship between the attorney and the former client; (3) the time 
lapse between the matters in dispute; (4) the size of the firm and the number of disqualified attorneys; (5) 
the nature of the disqualified attorney’s involvement, and (6) the timing of the wall). See also Kafka v. 
Truck Ins. Exchange, 19 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1994) (delay in filing motion to disqualify will weigh 
against moving party); Morin v. Maine Educ. Ass’n, 993 A.2d 1097 (Me. 2010) (moving party must 
prove, inter alia, it has been prejudiced in order to disqualify firm). 
6 The dissenters find fault with the use of the word “substantial” in the current version of Rule 1.10 and 
presumably would object that the modified recommendation also uses the word “substantial.” They argue 
that the definition of “substantial” is subject to interpretation. This argument ignores the fact that words 
like “substantial,” as in the “substantial” relationship test, or, for that matter, “reasonable” are everywhere 
in the current Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as in statutes and common law decisions. As Justice 
Holmes put it, “I do not think we need trouble ourselves with the thought that my view depends upon 
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A majority of the Committee believes that our recommendation strikes the right balance 
between the ability of lawyers to obtain new employment and the reasonable apprehensions of 
clients about the loyalty of their lawyer and the safety of their confidential information when the 
lawyer moves to a firm representing an adversary. Clients have a right to expect that their 
lawyers, whether partners directing litigation or associates behind the scenes on significant 
issues,7 will not leave their firm and join the opposing law firm.  Most clients would rightly view 
this as a betrayal that raises grave concerns about the sanctity of their confidences,8 and this 
perception should not be ignored.  The current Massachusetts Rule protects such legitimate client 
expectations, while also providing a reasonable degree of lateral mobility.9  Our rule is also 
consistent with the position taken by the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 
124 (permitting screening only when the information possessed by the personally disqualified 
lawyer is unlikely to be significant in the subsequent matter).  
1. Screening Under the Model Rules 
When the Wilkins Committee made its recommendations in 1997, the Model Rules did 
not permit screening at all in matters covered by Rule 1.10.  In 2009, the ABA House of 
Delegates, having repeatedly rejected any form of screening, finally amended the Model Rules to 
include an extremely broad screening, but only after a bitter debate and a closely contested vote. 
Some have urged us to adopt the revised Model Rule for the sake of uniformity,10 but there is in 
fact no uniform, or even broad, support for the unlimited screening now permitted by the Model 
Rules.  For example, New York, which recently engaged in a wholesale revision of its rules of 
professional responsibility, has adopted a version of Rule 1.10 that does not provide for any 
screening at all, while the Litigation Section of the ABA (which dissented from the Ethics 
Committee’s recommendation) advocated for adoption of the Massachusetts language.11 The 
ABA’s adoption chart shows that as of July 25, 2012, 26 jurisdictions did not permit screening at 
all, 13 permitted limited screening similar to our current Rule, and only 14 states have adopted 
Model Rule 1.10 or something like it. This breakdown demonstrates that the majority of states 
                                                                                                                                                             
differences of degree. The whole law does so as soon as it is civilized.” LeRoy Fibre v. Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914). 
7 The dissent’s repeated references to the “lateral” lawyer seems to imply that the proposed relaxation of 
the screening rules applies only to low-level associates. In fact, numerous reported disqualification cases 
concern movement of a partner. See, e.g., Miroglio, s.p.a. v. Morgan Fabrics Corp., 340 F. Supp. 2d 510 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Ultradent Products, Inc. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (D. Utah 2004). 
The language of the ABA Model Rule whose adoption is advocated by the dissenters would permit 
involuntary screening even if the moving lawyer was a named partner in the former firm whose role in the 
case had been substantial and significant. 
8 Susan Martyn and Lawrence Fox, “Screening? Consider the Client,” 19 No. 4 Prac. Litigator 47, 48–49, 
n.9 (July 2008). These authors also raise the concern that a rational client might wonder for how long his 
or her lawyer has been “consorting with the enemy” in an attempt to land employment. Id. 
9 For a case in which our current rule permitted lateral movement, see Inverness Medical Switzerland 
GMBH v. Acon Laboratories, 2005 WL 1491233 (D. Mass. 2005), in which the law firm of one of the 
dissenting members of this Committee successfully demonstrated compliance with the other safe harbor 
in Rule 1.10(d) by demonstrating that it had no confidential information that was material to the matter. 
10 See, e.g., Erik Wittman, “A Discussion of Nonconsensual Screens as the ABA Votes to Amend Model 
Rule 1.10,” 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1211 (Summer 2009). 
11 Alternative Report 110, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics/screening.html. 
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have concluded that the broad screening provision adopted by the ABA is incompatible with a 
lawyer’s obligation to his or her clients.   
The most disturbing feature of the screening permitted by the Model Rule is its 
extraordinary breadth. Not only does the Model Rule dispense with the need to obtain a former 
client’s consent under any circumstances, but it permits any laterally-moving lawyer to be 
screened, regardless of the closeness of the lawyer’s relationship with the former client, the 
importance of the role the lawyer played in representing the former client, or the nature of the 
confidential information to which the lawyer had access. Under the Model Rule, lead counsel in 
a matter, who had been intimately involved in the planning and strategy for one client, could join 
the adversary’s firm in the middle of litigation without causing that firm to be disqualified, so 
long as an “adequate” screening mechanism was established.  As the Tennessee Supreme Court 
noted, such a rule would permit “switching teams in the middle of the game after learning the 
signals.”  Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3rd  177, 188 (2001).  Clients would rightly feel 
betrayed by such side-switching. 
Also disturbing is the interaction between the broad screening permitted by the Model 
Rules and the traditional understanding, now recognized explicitly in our recommended 
Comment 3A to Rule 1.6, that “the accumulation of legal knowledge that a lawyer gains through 
practice is ordinarily not confidential information protected by this Rule.” Under the dissenters’ 
proposal, a firm would be free to hire any opposing counsel in a matter, including the lead 
counsel for the opposing party, without disqualifying the firm.  Once hired, the lawyer would be 
screened as to confidential information of the lawyer’s former client but would be free to share 
accumulated legal knowledge with the new firm, even legal knowledge that can be used 
adversely to the lawyer’s former client in the very matter requiring screening.  While the 
screened-off lawyer must refrain from personally attacking work performed for the former client, 
other lawyers in the firm will undoubtedly become adept at taking advantage of the new hire’s 
general legal knowledge and skills without mentioning the matter that requires screening, 
justifying their conduct by the words of Comment 3A. 
The proponents of Model Rule 1.10 argue that opposing lawyers use the current version 
of the rule to seek disqualification of a law firm for tactical reasons, rather than because of a 
client’s genuine concern for the protection of confidential information. The fact that a rule or any 
other legal principle may be misused by overreaching lawyers does not justify changing or 
discarding the rule. If the rule protects an important principle, as Rule 1.10 does, the rule should 
be applied on a case-by-case basis by a court or other fact finder with knowledge of a particular 
situation. The whole field of conflict of interest law has received much needed attention in the 
past twenty-five years primarily because it became the subject of litigation, impelled at least in 
part by tactical motives. The fact that some firms or their clients may seek a tactical advantage 
from a disqualification motion is no excuse for countenancing violations of lawyers’ fiduciary 
obligations. 
2. The Dissent of Henry Dinger, James Re, and John Whitlock 
Five members of the Committee dissent from the Committee’s recommendation.  Three 
dissenters urge adoption of the approach to screening contained in Model Rule 1.10.  Two of the 
dissenters, John Whitlock and Henry Dinger, were also members of the Wilkins Committee and 
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in 1997 wrote a dissent to the present version of Rule 1.10. Then as now, the two dissenters 
urged the Court to adopt a Rule permitting unlimited involuntary screening.  Then as now, they 
argued that there was no basis for believing that lawyers moving from one private firm to another 
were less trustworthy than lawyers moving from government employment to a private firm, for 
whom screening is available under Rule 1.11. Interestingly, they also argued that the economic 
realities existing in 1997 justified screening. “The job (and partnership) security of lawyers in 
private practice,” they wrote, “has never been shakier. More and more lawyers find themselves 
seeking new jobs as a result of tougher partnership standards, law firm mergers and failures, and 
other economic factors.”12 The Committee and the Supreme Judicial Court rejected those 
arguments as inadequate justifications for weakening the protection of client loyalty and client 
confidences.  A majority of the Committee believes that the Court should reject them again. 
The dissenters contend the Committee’s concern about side-switching is “hyperbole” that 
has “no relation to reality.”  Unfortunately, such side-switching does occur.   For an example of 
lead counsel in a major firm negotiating to take on representation of an adversary behind a 
client’s back, see Maritrans v. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, 529 Pa. 241 (1992).  Other reported 
examples include Kala v. Aluminum Smelting Co., 688 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio 1998), a case in which 
the plaintiff’s counsel joined the defendant’s law firm while the case was on appeal, and Clinard 
v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177 (Tenn. 2001) and Towne Development of Chandler v. Superior 
Court, 842 P.2d 364 (Ariz. App. 1992), in both of which a partner who had represented the 
defendants in a matter moved to the firm representing the plaintiffs while the case was still 
pending. 
Likewise, we are skeptical of the dissenters’ claim that little damage will be done because 
laterally moving lawyers leave all their files behind.  Increasingly, information about an 
engagement is stored electronically.  Modern technology makes it possible to transfer  such 
information (secretly or in the open, intentionally or accidentally) with nothing more than a 
keystroke. Such transfers need not indicate wrongful intent. It is common practice for lawyers to 
take written work product with them when they change firms to use as writing samples or forms 
or simply as compilations of their own legal knowledge. Contrary to the dissenters’ assertion, 
even junior associates moving laterally can and do take a substantial amount of legal work 
product with them. And once the lawyer joins the new firm, file-sharing has never been easier.  
Even if client confidences are not deliberately shared, lawyers are fallible and mistakes 
happen.  Modern law practice puts a premium on sharing information quickly and efficiently 
within the firm.  The problem is compounded because groups of lawyers and sometimes whole 
departments move from one law firm to another.  In an environment of free information sharing 
within firms and frequent moves between firms, inadvertent disclosures can occur during casual  
discussions in hallways or lunchrooms, in department meetings, in strategy sessions about 
another case, or through the dissemination of emails and electronic documents to unintended 
recipients.13  
The dissenters argue that screening can eliminate the risks that lawyers moving between 
firms will violate their duties of loyalty and confidentiality, whether deliberately or 
                                                 
12 See http://masslawyersweekly.com/1996/06/24/proposed-rules-of-professional-conduct-introduction. 
13 For a similar argument, see Martyn and Fox, supra note 7, at 50–55. 
 A-16 
 
inadvertently.  While there is little empirical evidence about the efficacy of screening, we are 
doubtful that it provides a sovereign cure.  The type of screening advocated by the dissent 
requires substantial administrative overhead.  See Model Rules 1.0(k)(defining “screened”) and 
1.10(b)(setting forth procedures for screening).  Even well-established law firms sometimes 
experience  problems in implementing such screens in a timely way.  See e.g. Arista Records 
LLC. V. Lime Group LLC, 2011 WL 672254 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)(Wall Street firm recognized need 
for screen, but delayed in blocking access to documents and notifying other attorneys of the 
screen).  In addition, screens undertaken with the best of intentions sometimes break down in the 
day-to-day work of the firm.  See, for example, Steel v. General Motors, 912 F. Supp. 724 
(D.N.J. 1995) for a rare look behind the scenes at a screen that didn’t work.  Although some 
jurisdictions permit screens, recent cases make it clear that lawyers in these jurisdictions still 
violate the basic requirements of an effective screen.14 
Moreover, the dissenters’ picture of the ideal operation of one screen in a firm presents a 
false picture. In larger firms, the more accurate picture is of a complex spider web of dozens, 
perhaps hundreds of screens, operating in multiple offices throughout the country and in some 
cases throughout the world, all connected by a firm intranet. Keeping track of who may not be 
present when a matter is discussed or who may not have access to particular files and 
information is likely to be a nightmare even in the best managed firms.  As one commentator 
observed, “Screening becomes increasingly more difficult to control where ‘multiple lawyers in 
multiple office megafirms are being screened from multiple matters over a number of years, 
requiring an elaborate matrix, perhaps even a computer program, to sort out which lawyers are 
screened from what engagements.’”15  And when the inevitable slip-up occurs, how likely is it 
that the law firm will voluntarily tell the former client, especially when such disclosure might 
lead to disqualification of the firm in an on-going matter?   
In support of their argument for broadening the Rule, the dissenters cite O’Donnell v. 
Robert Half, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2009), which they claim shows that the current 
Rule permits disqualification “where the later[al] remembers nothing and even where the lateral 
did not work on the matter in question.” In fact, Magistrate Judge Collings found that the lateral 
had worked on the matter in question. Id. at 87. He concluded that her 7.2 hours billed 
constituted “involvement,” but not “substantial involvement.” The new firm was disqualified 
because Magistrate Judge Collings also found that the associate had received confidential 
information about the client’s legal strategy. This finding is consistent with our current Rule 
1.10, which focuses not only on the quantum of involvement but also on the quality of 
information received.  It is not hard to envision other cases like O’Donnell, where the moving 
lawyer billed only a modest amount of time to the case but had been exposed to sensitive factual, 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., Shaw v. London Carrier, 2009 WL 4261168 (W.D. Mich., November 24, 2009) (Michigan’s 
Rule 1.10 requires prompt notification to the court where an attorney involved in litigation changes sides; 
defendant’s firm failed to do so; defendant’s firm disqualified). See also Faith Baptist Church v. 
Waterford Twp., 2009 WL 3756891 (E.D. Mich., November 6, 2009); HealthNet, Inc. v. Health Net, Inc., 
289 F. Supp. 2d, 755 S.D. W.Va. (2003) (inadequacy of timing of screen resulted in disqualification). 
15 Memorandum to A.L.I. Council Regarding Adoption of § 204, at 9, quoted in Lee A. Pizzimenti, 
“Screen Verité: Do Rules About Ethical Screens Reflect the Truth About Real-Life Law Firm Practice?,” 
52 U. Miami L. Rev. 305, 318 (1997). 
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tactical or strategic information that would make screening inappropriate.16  It is true that the 
lawyer in O’Donnell testified she did not remember the sensitive information to which she had 
been exposed, but a rule intended to protect a client’s confidences would be nugatory if the 
migrating attorney could demonstrate compliance simply by testifying that he or she  
“remembered nothing.”17 
In an effort to persuade this Court to adopt the wide-open Model Rule, the dissenters 
offer a hypothetical in which sensitive confidential information learned by a laterally moving 
lawyer does not disqualify the new firm from appearing against the former client because the 
firm’s representation adverse to the former client is not in a substantially related matter – in the 
example given, a patent lawyer moves to a firm adverse to the lawyer’s former client in product 
liability litigation.18  Similar hypotheticals testing the outer limits of the Rules’ coverage could 
be conjured up with respect to most of the Rules of Professional Conduct, but the argument that 
Rule 1.10(d) (and Rule 1.9) could be drafted so as to encompass even more situations hardly 
seems to support an argument that it should not cover as much as it does.  The Committee 
believes that the Rule as drafted covers the most common and most dangerous situations—where 
the migrating attorney has worked on a related matter and, as a result, possesses information 
likely to cause significant damage to the former client in the hands of the adversary’s attorney.  
The dissenters also argue that wide-open screening should be permitted because the need 
of the new firm’s current client to retain the law firm of its choice must be weighed against the 
fears of the former client of the laterally-moving lawyer. That is a false choice. The needs of the 
new firm’s client become an issue only because the firm is putting its own economic needs over 
its client’s needs by hiring its opponent’s lawyer. The new firm wants it both ways, or really 
three ways. It wants to hire a new lawyer for itself, deprive its opponent of a lawyer, and still 
represent its current client. A trifecta. And if the former client complains, the new firm will 
accuse it of making a motion for tactical reasons. 
The dissenters point to Rule 1.11, which deals with the obligations of former government 
lawyers, as support for their position, arguing that lawyers moving from one private practice to 
another are just as responsible and ethical as lawyers moving from government service to private 
practice.  But a difference in trustworthiness is not the basis for the difference between current 
Rule 1.11 and current Rule 1.10.  Under Rule 1.11, government lawyers moving to private 
                                                 
16 Much of the impetus to expand the scope of involuntary screening comes from the perception of the 
dissenters that O’Donnell was wrongly decided. The Committee did not formally address the correctness 
of the result but many members of the Committee believe that the court in O’Donnell reached the proper 
result. 
17 Indeed, some courts have held that where there is proof that the migrating lawyer received confidential 
information in the course of the prior representation, an assertion, even under oath, that the attorney has 
no present recollection of the information s/he received will not suffice. See, e.g., Gaton v. Health 
Coalition, Inc., 745 So. 2d 510 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). 
18 Drawing the line at similar cases makes perfect sense and furthers the purpose and policy of both Rule 
1.9 and Rule 1.10. Where the information learned in the prior client’s case is relevant to that of the new 
client, lawyers will be understandingly tempted to use that information for the benefit of the new client. If 
the matters are not related, the information is presumably not so relevant and temptation is not as great. 
The drafters and this Court have concluded that the prohibition against using confidential information set 
forth in 1.9(b) is sufficient deterrent in those situations. 
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practice, unlike private lawyers moving between firms, are prohibited from representing the 
same side in a matter as well as the opposite side.  The breadth of this prohibition creates an 
important public policy issue, as Comment 3 to our current Rule 1.11 points out: 
The government has a legitimate need to attract qualified lawyers as well as to maintain 
high ethical standards. The provisions for screening and waiver are necessary to prevent 
the disqualification rule from imposing too severe a deterrent against entering public 
service. 
There is no such public policy argument for modifying current Rule 1.10. The current rule has 
not created any large-scale deterrence against lawyers’ lateral movement between private firms, 
even if it does prevent some lawyers from moving to a particular law firm of their choice.19  We 
note also that the public character of government work means that the confidential information 
protected by Rule 1.11 is different and in many circumstances narrower than the very wide 
coverage of Rule 1.6.20 
More generally, the dissenters contend that our current rule is based on the “offensive 
assumption” that “lawyers in general are not to be trusted.”  We make no such assumption about 
lawyers in general.  It is, however, a fact of life that some lawyers will succumb to temptation if 
the stakes are high enough.  The case of Maritrans v. Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, 529 Pa. 241 
(1992), discussed above, provides a striking example.  More importantly, lawyers, like most 
people, are fallible and reluctant to recognize and admit their mistakes.  The wide-open 
involuntary screening advocated by the dissenters permits a lawyer who has learned confidential 
information critical to a client’s case to move to a firm representing the client’s adversary, then 
relies on the new firm to detect and report failures in the firm’s screening procedures, even if 
such reporting could lead to the firm’s disqualification in an on-going matter.   As one 
commentator has observed, “Even a person trying very hard to do the right thing would be 
inclined to minimize the importance of a disclosure that otherwise could result in disqualification 
of the firm . . . .”21  And if we could make and enforce rules of conduct on the assumption that all 
lawyers were honorable and to be trusted even when their self-interest was strongly engaged, we 
would not need an Office of Bar Counsel and we would not have 26 volumes of the 
Massachusetts Attorney Discipline Reports.  The rule we recommend minimizes the risks and 
temptations of self-reporting by drawing the line when the laterally moving lawyer has 
involvement or information that would be of substantial benefit to the new firm’s client.  
3. The dissent of Michael Cassidy and Andrew Perlman 
Two dissenters, Andrew Perlman and Michael Cassidy, have suggested an approach to 
Rule 1.10 based on the notion that Rule 1.10 should address only the question of discipline. They 
would permit broad involuntary screening, putting the burden on the former client to take 
judicial action seeking disqualification in order to protect its confidential information and 
                                                 
19 Notably, the dissent cites no evidence to demonstrate that the current Rule 1.10 has unduly restricted 
the movement of lawyers from one firm to another; indeed, a cursory glance at the professional 
announcements in Lawyers Weekly would suggest otherwise. At most, the current Rule 1.10 may prevent 
some lawyers from moving to some firms. 
20 See, e.g., General Electric Co. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 429 Mass. 798 (1999). 
21 Pizzimenti, supra n. 11, 52 U. Miami L. Rev. at 331. 
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enforce the loyalty obligations of its former counsel. The proposal is based on what we believe to 
be a theoretical false premise – that discipline is the main thrust of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct and that Bar Counsel is the main enforcer. Given the large number of lawyers in 
Massachusetts and the limited resources of Bar Counsel, that Office deals with a relatively small 
portion of the ethics issues that face lawyers daily in Massachusetts. The principal enforcers of 
the Rules are lawyers themselves, and one of the major sources of guidance for lawyers seeking 
to “do the right thing” is the language of the Rules and Comments.  
Nor is it appropriate for the Rules of Professional Conduct to abdicate to reviewing courts 
the responsibility to identify and police conflicts through disqualification motions. A court ruling 
on a disqualification motion quite appropriately considers a broad range of factors, such as 
timing of the motion, prejudice or hardship to one or both clients, and the effect on the 
administration of justice if a substitution of counsel is required. Thus, depending on the factual 
scenario, even a clear conflict of interest may not be grounds for disqualification.22 The Rules of 
Professional Conduct, however, serve larger interests, which include enforcing ethical standards 
even in the absence of proven harm to the client, instilling confidence in the profession, and 
providing anticipatory guidance for lawyers seeking to avoid conflicts in both litigation and 
transactional work.  If a law firm is trying to determine whether to hire Lawyer X, both the 
current Massachusetts version of Rule 1.10 and our proposed amended version give a roadmap 
for proceeding.  A Rule that says, “You can screen, but when the other side moves to disqualify, 
you’re on your own” is no help at all. 
 We also believe that the Perlman and Cassidy proposal would place the same impossible 
burden on clients that we discuss in connection with the proposal of the principal dissenters.  
While clients will know of the existence of a screen, they will have no way to know in most 
cases of its breach.  In addition, in a transactional matter, the former client will have the burden 
and cost of having to institute a new lawsuit if it fears that the confidentiality and loyalty 
obligations of its former lawyer have been compromised. 
 *  *  *  *  *  *  *   *  *  *  *  *  *  *   *  *  *  *  *  *  *   *  *  *  *  *    
 The current Massachusetts rule rests on the principle that lawyers’ fiduciary obligations 
to clients are compromised when the lawyers’ conduct creates a reasonable fear that client 
confidences may be revealed either intentionally or unintentionally.  Allowing screens to be 
imposed only where the affected lawyer has neither “involvement nor information relating to the 
matter sufficient to provide a substantial benefit to the new firm’s client” permits lawyers 
substantial freedom to change employers, while at the same time respecting reasonable client 
fears that confidences are at risk.   We believe now, as the Wilkins Committee did in 1997, that 
the Massachusetts version of Rule 1.10 strikes a comfortable balance between competing 
interests and should be retained. 
_________________________ 
                                                 
22 See cases cited in note 6, supra. 
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Dissent of Henry Dinger, James Re and John Whitlock in Support of the 
Adoption of ABA Model Rule 1.10(a) 
The undersigned, present and former chairs and a member of the Standing Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Committee”), submit this statement in 
support of their proposal that the Supreme Judicial Court adopt the approach to screening set 
forth in ABA Model Rule 1.10(a).  We disagree with the views of the majority of the Committee 
that law firms should not be able to avoid imputed disqualification by screening a personally 
disqualified lateral attorney except under the very limited circumstances set forth in current 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.10(d).  The approach taken by Model Rule 1.10(a), adopted by the ABA’s 
Board of Delegates in 2009, permits law firms to screen lateral attorneys, subject to the 
obligation to notify the lateral attorney’s former client and subject further to the power of courts 
to scrutinize the effectiveness of particular screens.  In our view, this approach strikes a better 
balance among the interests of clients (present and former) and attorneys than the current rule 
does.  Attached to this statement is a proposed form of Rule 1.10 that reflects the approach we 
recommend to the Court. 
ABA Model Rule 1.10(a) provides: 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a 
client when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 
1.7 or 1.9, unless 
(1) the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the disqualified 
lawyer and does not present a significant risk of materially limiting the 
representation of the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm; or 
(2) the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and arises out of 
the disqualified lawyer’s association with a prior firm, and 
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any 
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; 
(ii) written notice is promptly given to any affected former 
client to enable the former client to ascertain compliance with the 
provisions of this Rule, which shall include a description of the screening 
procedures employed; a statement of the firm's and of the screened 
lawyer's compliance with these Rules; a statement that review may be 
available before a tribunal; and an agreement by the firm to respond 
promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the former client about 
the screening procedures; and 
(iii) certifications of compliance with these Rules and with the 
screening procedures are provided to the former client by the screened 
lawyer and by a partner of the firm, at reasonable intervals upon the 
former client's written request and upon termination of the screening 
procedures.   
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Model Rule 1.10(a)(1) is not controversial and the Committee unanimously supports it.   
Model Rule 1.10(a)(2), which permits a law firm to avoid imputed disqualification by 
screening personally disqualified lateral attorneys without the consent of the lateral’s former 
client (“non-consensual screening”) under specified circumstances is controversial and has 
divided the Committee.  While all members of the Committee accept the view that screening can 
avoid the full rigors of the imputed disqualification rule in some circumstances involving lateral 
attorneys, they disagree as to what those circumstances are. 
Model Rule 1.10(a) would permit non-consensual screening as an alternative to imputed 
disqualification where the firm (i) promptly notifies the former client of the screen, (ii) describes 
the screening protocol, (iii) agrees to respond promptly to the former client’s questions 
concerning that protocol, (iv) informs the former client that judicial review may be available, and 
(v) apportions the personally disqualified lawyer no portion of the fee from the matter adverse to 
the lawyer’s former client.  Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.10, by contrast, permits non-consensual screening 
only if the lateral had no substantial involvement in the matter for the former client and no 
substantial information material to that information.  The majority of the Committee has 
recommended maintaining the approach of the current Massachusetts rule. 23 
1. Identifying the Risk 
At the outset we think it is helpful to frame the non-consensual screening issue in 
practical terms.  Screening issues involving lateral attorneys arise when the lateral attorney has 
worked on a particular matter for a client that is substantially related to a matter in which the new 
firm is representing the adversary of the lateral attorney’s former client.  In those circumstances, 
the lateral is personally disqualified under Rule 1.9 because the lateral has (or is presumed to 
have) confidential information that would give the new firm an unfair advantage in its 
representation of the adversary of the lateral’s former client.  Under Rule 1.10, the lateral’s 
inability (absent consent) to represent the former client’s adversary is imputed to the rest of the 
firm unless some exception applies.   
In the vast majority of the situations to which Rule 1.10 would apply, the lateral will not 
bring files (paper or electronic) pertaining to the representation of the former client to the new 
firm.  This is because the former client will generally be unable to follow the lateral to the new 
firm.  The conflict between the lateral’s former client and the new firm’s client would prevent 
the new firm from establishing an attorney-client relationship with the lateral’s former client (its 
current client’s adversary).  So, in the absence of client consent (which will usually involve 
establishing a screen), the former client’s files will either remain with the lateral’s old firm or 
move somewhere other than the lateral’s new firm.   
Accordingly, the screening problem concerns maintaining the confidentiality of 
information “in the head” of the lateral.  So long as the lateral attorney does not perform services 
at the new firm for the adversary of the former client in the substantially related matter and is 
                                                 
23 The majority of the Committee proposes to modify the language of the current Massachusetts rule to permit 
screening where the lateral attorney has “neither involvement nor information relating to the matter sufficient to 
provide a substantial benefit to the new firm’s client.”  While we think this is an improvement over current 
Massachusetts Rule 1.10(d)(2), it would not significantly ameliorate the concerns raised in this statement. 
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careful not to disclose information learned during her former representation with her new 
colleagues, the confidences of the lateral’s former client will not be disclosed or misused.  While 
there is certainly a risk — a risk that screening is intended to minimize as a secondary goal — 
that the lateral inadvertently will learn confidential information concerning the new firm’s 
representation of her former client’s adversary, no harm can result unless the lateral passes the 
information on to the former client.  But there is no reason for a lateral to make such a disclosure 
to a person or entity that the lateral no longer represents and cannot now represent, particularly 
where such disclosure would harm a client of the lateral’s new firm.  Such an action would 
expose the lateral to both dismissal and professional discipline without any significant personal 
benefit. 
Rules 1.6 and 1.8(b) prohibit the lateral from disclosing the former client’s confidences 
and Rule 8.4(a) prohibits the lawyers at the lateral’s new firm from knowingly assisting or 
inducing the lateral to do so.  If the lateral and the new firm follow these rules, the confidences 
of the lateral’s former client will not be used by the new firm for the benefit of the former 
client’s adversary.  No one has proposed any alteration in these obligations. 
By contrast, the imputed disqualification imposed by current Rule 1.10 is a prophylactic 
rule that precludes the new firm from continuing the representation of the adversary of the 
lateral’s former client at all without the former client’s consent, consent which is often withheld 
for tactical reasons rather than any genuine concern about the use of confidential information.  
The imputed disqualification rule would be unnecessary if lateral attorneys always complied with 
their obligation not to disclose confidences of their former clients to their new colleagues.  The 
rule thus assumes that in some cases lateral attorneys and their new firms will be unable to resist 
the temptation to take advantage of the information possessed by the lateral to benefit the former 
client’s adversary and that a prophylactic rule is necessary.  
2. Reasons for Adopting the Model Rule’s Screening Provisions 
There are several reasons that have persuaded us that the approach to screening in Model 
Rule 1.10 should be adopted by the Court.  First, the current rules cause real hardships both to 
lawyers and to many clients without evidence that they achieve any commensurate increase in 
protection for the former clients of lateral attorneys.  Second, the current rules draw distinctions 
among situations in which non-consensual screening is permitted and those in which it is 
forbidden that are very difficult to justify.  Third, the Model Rule better reflects the principles 
applied by judges in resolving motions to disqualify and avoids the risk that professional 
discipline will be imposed where a judge has found a screen sufficient to protect a former client’s 
interests.  We discuss each of these reasons below. 
A. The broad prohibition on non-consensual screening imposes significant 
hardships based on implausible assumptions concerning the risks to former 
clients. 
There is no question that the imputed disqualification rule imposes hardships, hardships 
that are more significant now than they have been in the past because of developments in the 
legal profession.  With many established law firms dissolving or laying off staff, the number of 
lawyers looking for a job has never been higher.  The Wall Street Journal reported in 2011 that 
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“unemployed lawyers now find themselves in the country’s most cutthroat race for a job, with 
less than one opening for every 100 working attorneys.”24  This employment situation is not 
greatly improved in 2013.  The imputed disqualification rule reduces the employability of 
lawyers looking for a job by creating a risk that the law firms that hire them will be disqualified 
in ongoing matters, even if they screen the lateral attorneys from those matters.  These burdens 
are felt primarily by junior lawyers and lawyers who are not blessed with an established portable 
client base.  Rainmakers will rarely lack employment options, but most other lawyers face bleak 
employment prospects that show no signs of improvement any time soon.   
But lawyers are not the only ones who suffer hardship from the imputed disqualification 
rule.  Imputed disqualification also hurts the clients who lose the services of attorneys with 
whom they have reposed confidence and invested resources.  The Association of Corporate 
Counsel, the world’s largest organization of in-house counsel, supported the adoption of Model 
Rule 1.10(a).  The ACC articulated the reasons for its support as follows: 
ACC wishes to ensure that clients’ rights are preserved; this 
requires lawyers to respect the need to avoid conflicts. And it is for 
that very reason that we endorse this rule. It is a reality of practice 
that lawyers will change firms. It is also a reality that modern 
practice creates an ever-increasing certainty that lawyers from one 
firm will carry a backpack of potential conflicts into a new firm to 
which they wish to move. Rather than suggest that such moves can 
be prohibited wholesale; rather than create unreasonable burdens 
on those who wish to change jobs; and rather than create a 
regulatory environment that — through its lack of guidance or 
unclear guidance — abandons lawyers and firms to a professional 
no-man’s land where the incentive is to simply bury or ignore 
conflicts they cannot resolve, ACC prefers to establish a rule that 
balances the interests of the lawyer who moves and the client who 
deserves the profession’s and the firm’s protection. ABA House 
Report 109 [which proposed Model Rule 1.10] offers a rule that 
provides that balance, is carefully tailored to address the needs of 
both lawyers and clients, and is appropriately limited in its scope to 
create a reasonable accommodation for a carefully defined 
problem. 
http://www.acc.com/advocacy/upload/acc-Statement-aba-house-res-109.pdf.  The ACC speaks 
for a significant group of clients who believe that Model Rule 1.10 strikes a reasonable balance 
between the rights of former clients, the rights of clients of the firms that former lawyers join, 
and the rights of lawyers themselves.   
Proponents of the current Massachusetts limitations on screening seek to justify their 
position as protective of the interests of the former clients of lateral attorneys in protecting the 
                                                 





confidentiality of information “in the heads” of those attorneys.  As noted above, the application 
of the imputed disqualification rule in situations involving lateral attorneys turns on the 
assumption that many of those attorneys cannot be trusted to preserve the confidences of their 
former clients when disclosure of those confidences would benefit current clients of their new 
firms and that it is necessary to impose a broad prophylactic rule to deny the opportunity to use 
such information, and, secondarily, to provide peace of mind to those former clients.   
We consider this assumption to be unproven and unwarranted.  We think most lawyers 
are honorable and will not violate the professional obligations imposed on them.   
We find the assumption that lawyers in general are not to be trusted to be particularly 
offensive because the law does not make comparable assumptions in any other fields.  Agents 
(who generally owe fiduciary obligations to their principals) do not violate their fiduciary 
obligations by terminating their relationship with the principal and becoming employed by a 
competitor or other adversary of the former principal.  To be sure, the agent owes a “duty … not 
to use or communicate confidential information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes or 
those of a third party.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §8.05.  That duty survives the 
termination of the principal/agent relationship.  But that duty is only compromised by using or 
communicating the confidential information, without regard to the subjective fear of the former 
principal about what might happen. 
That this is generally true can also be seen in the law of trade secrets.  It is well 
established that, absent an enforceable non-competition agreement, an employee of a company 
who has learned the company’s most valuable trade secrets is free to accept employment at a 
competitor of the company.  The former employee has a common law obligation to refrain from 
using or disclosing the trade secrets of his former employer, but, in the absence of proof that the 
former employee has in fact misappropriated the trade secrets by using them for the new 
employer or disclosing them to his new colleagues, the former employee violates no fiduciary 
obligation.  There is a very narrow exception where the new employer assigns the former 
employee to a position where it is “inevitable” that the former employee will use the former 
employer’s trade secrets.  See generally 1 R. Milgrim & E. Bensen, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS 
§5.02[3][d] (2009).   
Thus, at common law, an agent is free to provide services for a competitor of the former 
principal without violating his fiduciary obligations so long as he preserves the confidentiality of 
the former principal’s confidential information and is screened from any position where 
improper use of such information is unavoidable.  This is true even though the former principal 
fears, reasonably or otherwise, that its confidences may be revealed either intentionally or 
inadvertently.  The common law places great value on the mobility of labor and on the ability of 
individuals to seek new employment without prior employment limiting their prospects.  We 
have heard no persuasive explanation from the opponents of Model Rule 1.10 why lawyers, 
alone among common law fiduciaries, must be subject to a prophylactic rule that to our 
knowledge applies in no other context.   
We have seen no evidence to support the assumption that lateral attorneys generally 
cannot be trusted to follow the screening protocols of their new firms.  If that assumption were 
true, one would expect to see a number of disciplinary proceedings brought against such 
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attorneys in those states where non-consensual screening is permitted.  Illinois, for example, only 
requires imputed disqualification where the personally disqualified lawyer has not been screened.  
Ill. R. Prof. C. 1.10(e) (“When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in 
the firm shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer is disqualified under 
Rule 1.9 unless the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in 
the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.”)  One looks in vain for signs that the 
clients of Illinois lawyers have been significantly harmed by that State’s widespread approval of 
screening as an alternative to imputed disqualification.  See R. Creamer, Lateral Screening after 
Ethics 2000, 2006 PROF. LAW. SYMPOSIUM ISSUE 85, 87 (2006) (“As the [ABA] Commission 
[that recommended Model Rule 1.10] learned, actual cases of lateral lawyers disclosing 
confidential information about former clients to their new firms are nonexistent.”)  Moreover, as 
discussed below, many courts have denied disqualification motions where firms have screened 
lateral lawyers even in jurisdictions that do not make provision for screening in their ethical 
rules.  One would expect to see renewed motions to disqualify in those cases had there been any 
evidence of cheating by lateral attorneys.  There are few, if any, such cases published.   
Accordingly, in our view, the issue for the Court is whether to continue to protect one 
group of clients against harms that apparently rarely materialize by imposing the very real harms 
that the current rule imposes on lawyers (who have fewer options when they lose their jobs or 
their firms fold), on firms (who lose opportunities to bring in new lawyers), and on other clients 
of the new firm (who may be forced to seek new counsel if the new firm considers bringing on 
the lateral to be more important than continuing the attorney-client relationship or if the new firm 
is blindsided by information that the lateral did not disclose).  We believe that the approach of 
Model Rule 1.10 makes more sense than the current rule. 
B. The current Massachusetts rules draw distinctions in applying the imputed 
disqualification rule that make no sense.   
The Committee members who propose no material change in the provisions of the current 
Massachusetts rules on screening suggest that those rules strike the right balance.  We disagree.  
We believe that the current rules draw distinctions that make no sense.  They permit screening in 
circumstances that present at least as much of a risk to the former clients of lateral attorneys than 
presented in situations in which screening is unavailable.  
First, consider a common situation where the former client’s confidences are placed at 
theoretical risk, but the ethics rules provide no protection to the former client beyond the 
confidentiality obligations imposed on all lawyers by Rules 1.6 and 1.8.  If the lateral’s new firm 
is representing the adversary of the lateral’s former client, but not in a matter that is substantially 
related to the subject of the lateral’s representation of the former client, then the current rules 
impose no obligation on the firm either to obtain consent or even to establish a screen.  That is 
because Rule 1.9 does not preclude the lateral herself from taking on the matter adverse to the 
former client at the new firm.  An illustrative hypothetical may make this clearer.   
Assume the lateral attorney, a patent lawyer, represented the former client in obtaining a 
patent and that during the course of the representation of the former client (but after the patent 
was obtained) the lateral learned vital, non-public information that would support a strong 
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argument that the patent is invalid. 25  Assume further that the new firm’s biggest client is being 
sued by the lateral’s former client for infringing that patent and that a judgment for the patentee 
will put the new firm’s biggest client out of business.   
If the lateral’s new firm were defending that patent case, then the firm could not continue 
the representation once the lateral arrives without the former client’s consent under the current 
Massachusetts rules, even with screening.  However, if the firm “merely” does millions of 
dollars of products liability defense work for the defendant, but plays no part in the defense of 
the patent litigation, then there is no ethics rule that prohibits the firm from hiring the lateral and 
assigning her to work on the product liability litigation, even though both the firm and the lateral 
have a powerful incentive to get the information vital for the defense of the patent suit from the 
lateral to the new firm’s client.26  The lateral has a confidentiality obligation to the former client 
and the firm may not attempt to subvert that obligation, and both the firm and the lateral are 
simply “on their honor” not to engage in such misconduct.  In other words, the current ethics 
rules say to the former client that even though your former lawyer, in possession of critical 
material confidential information, has joined a firm whose biggest client is your adversary and 
would benefit greatly from that information, you have to trust that your former lawyer will not 
disclose to his new firm’s biggest client information that might keep that client (and possibly the 
law firm itself) from financial ruin.  If we are prepared to “trust” lateral lawyers in this situation 
(by not compelling their new firms to stop representing the former client’s adversary) — and we 
are — why are we utterly unwilling to “trust” laterals in situations where the stakes will typically 
be far lower and the lateral is screened (and denied any portion of the new firm’s fee), just 
because the new firm is actually representing the adversary in the matter in which the 
confidences possessed by the lateral are germane?   
Second, if the former client is a government agency, we allow the firm to screen the 
lateral under Rule 1.11 even if the lateral possesses vital confidential information or was in 
charge of a major matter for the government adverse to a client of the new firm.  We understand, 
and agree with, the policy determination not to make relatively low paying government service 
any less attractive for attorneys by making a government attorney into a “Typhoid Mary” when 
he later seeks private employment in firms that represent the government’s adversaries.  (Indeed, 
we do not want to make any lawyer into a “Typhoid Mary” if we can help it.)  We agree to trust 
former government lawyers not to disclose the government’s secrets for the benefits of the 
clients of the new firm if they are screened, and have concluded that the risk that some former 
government attorneys (and their law firms) will cheat is worth running.  But surely the risk of 
dishonest former government lawyers is no different from the risk of dishonest former private 
                                                 
25 For purposes of this hypothetical, assume that neither the lawyer nor anyone associated with the patent 
prosecution deliberately concealed information from the Patent Office, so there is no argument that the lawyer 
would have discretion to disclose the information under Rules 1.6 or 4.1.   For example, the lawyer might discover 
after the fact that a sales representative unconnected with the patenting process had sold an embodiment of the 
patented invention more than a year before the filing of the patent application, a potentially invalidating event under 
35 U.S.C. §102(b).   
26 Obviously, a prudent lateral attorney in this position would not participate in such litigation adverse to the former 
client, but such forbearance would not be required by the rules of professional conduct.  
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attorneys —disclosure of confidences27 — and yet the current rules for each group are very 
different.   
Third, current Mass. Rule 1.10 provides if the lateral attorney had “neither substantial 
involvement nor substantial material information relating to the” former representation, then 
screening will avoid imputed disqualification if the procedural requirements of the rules are 
satisfied.  In substance, Massachusetts allows screening where, if the lateral cheats and discloses 
all she knows about the former representation, the prejudice to the former client would not be 
significant because the quantity and quality of the information is not “substantial.”  We think 
there is no persuasive argument against this rule as far as it goes.  However, there are relatively 
few decisions applying that rule and little anecdotal evidence suggesting that in the fourteen 
years since the Court adopted Mass. Rule 1.10, many law firms have relied on this limited 
authorization for screening over the objection of former clients.  We suspect that prospective 
laterals rarely disclose during negotiations with a new firm matters as to which they neither had 
substantial involvement nor possess substantial material information.  They will often not even 
recall such matters.  Moreover, if the confidential information possessed by a lateral is not 
significant, former clients will often consent, if asked, to the firm’s continuing to represent the 
adversary.  Mass Rule 1.10 thus primarily permits involuntary screening in that small subset of 
situations where the availability of involuntary screening is unimportant.   
Moreover, the meaning of “substantial” in this context is far from clear and we believe 
there are very few situations in which the “insubstantiality” of a lateral’s involvement or 
information will provide a predictable basis for relying on the rule.  As the Magistrate’s Order 
disqualifying the law firm in O’Donnell v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 84  (D. Mass. 
2009), demonstrates, it often does not take very much involvement or information for Mass. Rule 
1.10(d)(2) to be inapplicable.  As that decision suggests, under Mass. Rule 1.10 it is entirely 
possible for a party seeking the new law firm’s disqualification to present evidence of exposure 
to confidential information sufficient to require disqualification even where the lateral 
remembers nothing and even where the lateral did not work on the matter in question. 
In sum, we consider the current treatment of screening under the current rules to be 
inconsistent and largely incoherent.  Maintaining the status quo will not breed respect for the rule 
of law in legal ethics. 
C. Model Rule 1.10 provides reasonable protections for former clients 
commensurate with the approach taken by many courts in resolving motions 
to disqualify counsel. 
In our view, the advantage of ABA Model Rule 1.10 is that it does not turn on answering 
the question “Who do you trust,” but rather follows the admonition, “Trust but verify.”  It 
protects former clients, not by the blunt instrument of blanket prohibition, but rather by requiring 
a significant measure of transparency by the new firm.   
                                                 
27 Some have argued that the values of openness and transparency in government make the risk of disclosing the 
confidences of government clients less problematic than risking the disclosure of the confidences of private clients.  
That argument ignores that there is a range of confidential government information that may be even more important 
to maintain in confidence than private sector confidences, information pertaining to national security, criminal 
investigations, and the like. 
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Model Rule 1.10 gives former clients a say in what procedures will be implemented and 
an incentive to negotiate them with an opportunity to be creative in ways that no rule can 
address.  For example, one of us negotiated a screen on behalf of our firm with a former firm 
client under which the firm agreed that a new matter would be staffed entirely by non-Boston 
lawyers where the former matter had been handled entirely out of the firm’s Boston office.  The 
Model Rules recognize that former clients have the right to argue (if necessary to a judge) that 
the information possessed by the lateral is so sensitive that the lateral should be physically 
isolated (e.g. in another office), or, in extreme cases, that no screening procedures can provide 
adequate assurance that information will be protected (e.g. lead counsel for the former client 
possessing highly sensitive information joining a solo practitioner to practice law out of a single 
office with shared support staff, where the other partner represents the former client’s adversary 
in high stakes litigation in which the highly sensitive information is critical).    
Of course, reliance on procedures and transparency alone cannot prevent lawyers from 
cheating and lying about it.  By the same token, however, the current rules cannot prevent a firm 
from giving a satchel of cash to a lawyer for confidential information and lying about that either.  
We believe that most lawyers are honorable and will not disclose the confidences of former 
clients when they change jobs.  But even if one is very cynical about the honesty of lawyers, 
dishonest people will generally follow the rules if there is an unacceptably high chance of getting 
caught and the consequences of getting caught are sufficiently awful.  It is particularly hard these 
days not to leave digital fingerprints of one’s misdeeds.  In most firms, emails are backed up 
regularly, often daily, and sometimes voice mails are as well.  To make effective misuse of 
confidential information often requires the cooperation of many people.  It is hard to corrupt a lot 
of people even in firms with some unscrupulous lawyers.   
Importantly, the ABA Model Rule requires that former clients be notified when a firm 
relies on a screen and gives those clients the right to require verification.  One should not 
underestimate the deterrent effect of such procedures.  Under the Model Rule, even a dishonest 
lateral attorney will understand that if confidential information appears in a filing of the new 
firm, the former client will sound the alarm and initiate an investigation.  The court will take the 
investigation very seriously, and will not accept the lawyer’s protestations of innocence if the 
circumstantial evidence of disclosure is strong.  How many lawyers in the new firm are going to 
lie (and thereby risk their own licenses) to protect the lateral?   
The Model Rule also acknowledges the right of former clients to challenge the adequacy 
of screens in court if they cannot negotiate a screening protocol that reasonably assures them.28  
This means that the adequacy of screens will be determined on the basis of the particular 
circumstances and the development of common law principles and not on the basis of general 
ethics rules that are inevitably too imprecise to reliably guide a lawyer’s decision making.   
A further advantage of the Model Rule over the alternatives is that, as a practical matter, 
it reflects the reality that in many instances screening has been blessed by courts deciding 
disqualification motions.  The propriety of a firm screening a lateral attorney as an alternative to 
                                                 
28 Former clients have such a right even as to transactional matters.  A number of decisions have recognized the 
equitable right of former clients to obtain an injunction against the improper representation of current adversaries by 
their former attorneys.  See http://www.freivogel.com/enjoiningconflicts.html.  
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withdrawal is rarely addressed by the disciplinary process.  Rather, there is a substantial body of 
federal and state case law addressing motions to disqualify the law firm for one litigant because 
of that firm’s bringing on a lawyer who formerly represented the party seeking disqualification.   
Adopting the Model Rule would largely eliminate what strikes us as a troubling anomaly 
under the current rules.  Many courts have denied disqualification motions even where the 
pertinent ethics rules make no provision for screening,29 concluding that the screen put in place 
by the firm in question sufficiently eliminates the risk that the firm will take advantage of the 
confidences of the lateral attorney’s former client.  Notwithstanding such conclusions, however, 
the lawyers in the firm that implemented the screen approved by the court still face the risk of 
professional discipline if the pertinent ethics rules did not expressly authorize the screen.   
We do not argue that the denial of a disqualification motion should automatically insulate 
lawyers from professional discipline under Rule 1.10.  Sometimes disqualification motions are 
denied for reasons unrelated to the adequacy of the firm’s screening procedures, as when the 
judge concludes that the former client unreasonably delayed filing its disqualification motion.  
However, if the judge does find that a screen adequately protects the former client, then we see 
no point to punishing lawyers for failing to comply with an unduly prophylactic rule intended to 
ensure such protection.  In the real world, bar officials rarely pursue discipline in such 
circumstances.  The Model Rule would effectively eliminate this anomaly by countenancing 
screens unless a court disapproves them.30   
D. Other objections to the Model Rule are without merit.  
The proponents of the status quo say that the Model Rule would permit “lead counsel” to 
“switch sides” in the “middle of litigation.”  This hyperbole has no relation to reality.  First, the 
Model Rule would not permit lead or any other counsel to “switch sides,” i.e. to stop 
representing the plaintiff and to start representing the defendant in the same case.  The Model 
Rule would only allow the lead counsel to leave the game and go to the sidelines.  But even that 
is unrealistic because of the difficulties that both the lateral lawyer and the law firm representing 
the adversary of the lateral lawyer’s client would face in negotiating the lateral move while the 
litigation was ongoing.  Both clients (and therefore the prospective lateral’s current firm) would 
need to be told, and that will typically be an insuperable obstacle. 
                                                 
29 This is the case, for example, in New York where the New York rules do not recognize screening, but courts have 
declined to disqualify where the law firm has timely implemented a screen that the judge finds adequately protects 
the former client.  See Nordwind v. Rowland, 584 F.3d 420, 435 (2d Cir. 2009) (“not every violation of a 
disciplinary rule will require disqualification”); Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Village of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127 (2d 
Cir. 2005); Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17434 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2011).  For a 
state-by-state summary of the status of screening under rules and court decisions see 
http://www.freivogel.com/changingfirmsscreeningparti.html.  
30 The California Bar’s Board of Governors recently proposed a similar approach to screening.  Their proposed rule 
makes no provision for screening, but adds the following comment:  “[10] Rule 1.10 leaves open the issue of 
whether, in a particular matter, use of a timely screen will avoid the imputation of a conflict of interest under 
paragraph (a) or (b). Whether timely implementation of a screen will avoid imputation of a conflict of interest in 
litigation, transactional, or other contexts is a matter of case law." (The text of the proposed rule can be found at  
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=J2Mhg5NSNdk%3d&tabid=2669. In our view the Model Rule 
is preferable because it provides for notice and other procedural protections for the former client. 
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Others may object that countenancing “wide open” screening simply exempts “big firms” 
from the rules that all other lawyers need to follow.  The implicit assumption is that screening is 
impractical for all but the “biggest” firms.  But this assumption is highly questionable.  While 
screening may not always be practical for two- or three-person firms in which all the lawyers 
tend to work on the same matters, screening is often practical for many firms of modest size, 
especially firms where the screened lawyer’s practice is distinct from the practices of the lawyers 
on the other side of the screen.  Many modest firms have multiple offices between which 
effective screens are easy to envision.  See generally Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Village of Valley 
Stream, 409 F.3d 127, 137-38 (2d Cir. 2005). 
The proponents of the status quo insist that the current rule simply addresses the 
“reasonable fear” of former clients “that their confidences may be revealed either intentionally or 
unintentionally.”  But the current rule goes well beyond addressing “reasonable” fears.  If the 
lateral lawyer had substantial involvement on a matter that is substantially related to a matter the 
new firm is handling for the former client’s adversary, then the current rule disqualifies the firm 
even if there is a screen.  It does not matter whether the former client actually fears that the 
screen will not be observed, much less whether such a fear is reasonable.  It is the Model Rule, 
not the current law, that is addressed to the former client’s reasonable fears, by disqualifying the 
firm if, but only if, it is unreasonable to conclude that the screen will be effective.   
3. Proposed Form of Rule 1.10 and Comments 
We have attached to this Statement a version of Rule 1.10 with comments that we propose as 
an alternative to the version proposed by the Committee majority.  As to the provisions of the 
Model Rule authorizing screening that the Committee majority rejected, we have largely adopted 
the Model Rule’s comments.  However, both our version and that of the Committee majority 
include certain non-standard provisions of current Mass. Rule 1.10 that do not appear in the 
Model Rule.  These include: 
• Clarification that the public counsel and private counsel divisions of CPCS are different 
“firms” for purposes of the imputation rule. 
• The current Massachusetts rule’s non-standard definition of screening. 
• Current Massachusetts comments 1-4 which provide more extensive guidance concerning 
the definition of “firm.”   
• The additional guidance in current Massachusetts comments 9 and 12 to assist in the 
determination whether screening is required and whether effective screening is feasible. 
4. Conclusion 
The fundamental ethical principle at stake here is the preservation of the confidences of 
former clients.  Ethics rules other than Rule 1.10 unambiguously impose on every lawyer the 
obligation to preserve such confidences, and no member of the Committee seeks any change to 
that obligation.  By contrast, the requirement of imputed disqualification in Rule 1.10 is not an 
ethical principle; it is, rather, a prophylactic rule — a blunt instrument — meant to eliminate any 
incentive to violate the confidentiality obligation.  We think it is too imprecise an instrument for 
the legal profession in 2013.  Many courts have taken a more nuanced and fact-dependent 
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approach to the question of screening in resolving disqualification motions.  ABA Model Rule 
1.10 takes a similar approach.  We urge this Court to do so as well. 
Dissenters Proposed RULE 1.10  IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client 
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, 
unless 
(1) the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the disqualified lawyer and does 
not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the 
remaining lawyers in the firm; or 
(2) the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and arises out of the disqualified 
lawyer’s association with a prior firm, and 
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; 
(ii) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable the 
former client to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule, which shall 
include a description of the screening procedures employed; a statement of the 
firm's and of the screened lawyer's compliance with these Rules; a statement that 
review may be available before a tribunal; and an agreement by the firm to 
respond promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the former client about 
the screening procedures; and 
(iii) certifications of compliance with these Rules and with the screening 
procedures are provided to the former client by the screened lawyer and by a 
partner of the firm, at reasonable intervals upon the former client's written request 
and upon termination of the screening procedures. 
For purposes of this Rule a lawyer employed by the Public Counsel Division of the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services and a lawyer assigned to represent clients by the Private 
Counsel Division of that Committee are not considered to be associated. Lawyers are not 
considered to be associated merely because they have each individually been assigned to 
represent clients by the Committee for Public Counsel Services through its Private Counsel 
Division. 
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm (“former firm”), the former firm is 
not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of 
a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the 
former firm, unless: 
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated 
lawyer represented the client; and 
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(2) any lawyer remaining in the former firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 and 
1.9(c) that is material to the matter. 
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client under the 
conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
(d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government 
lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11. 
(e) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of this Rule and of Rules 1.11 and 1.12, a personally 
disqualified lawyer in a firm will be deemed to have been screened from any participation in a 
matter if: 
(1) all material information possessed by the personally disqualified lawyer has been 
isolated from the firm; 
(2) the personally disqualified lawyer has been isolated from all contact with the new 
firm’s client relating to the matter, and any witness for or against the new firm’s client; 
(3) the personally disqualified lawyer and the new firm have been precluded from 
discussing the matter with each other; 
(4) the former client of the personally disqualified lawyer or of the former firm 
receives notice of the conflict and an affidavit of the personally disqualified lawyer and 
the new firm describing the procedures being used effectively to screen the personally 
disqualified lawyer, and attesting that (i) the personally disqualified lawyer will not 
participate in the matter and will not discuss the matter or the representation with any 
other lawyer or employee of the new firm, (ii) no material information was transmitted by 
the personally disqualified lawyer before implementation of the screening procedures and 
notice to the former client; and (iii) during the period of the lawyer's personal 
disqualification those lawyers or employees who do participate in the matter will be 
apprised that the personally disqualified lawyer is screened from participating in or 
discussing the matter; and 
(5) the personally disqualified lawyer and the new firm reasonably believe that the 
steps taken to accomplish the screening of material information are likely to be effective 
in preventing material information from being disclosed to the new firm and its client. 
In any matter in which the former client and the new firm’s client are not before a 
tribunal, the firm, the personally disqualified lawyer, or the former client may seek judicial 
review in a court of general jurisdiction of the screening procedures used, or may seek court 
supervision to ensure that implementation of the screening procedures has occurred and that 




Definition of ‘‘Firm’’ 
[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term ‘‘firm’’ includes lawyers in a 
private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a 
legal services organization.  See Rule 1.0(d).  Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm 
within this definition can depend on the specific facts.  For example, two practitioners who share 
office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as 
constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that 
they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the 
purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are 
relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to 
information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to 
consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be 
regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing 
parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information 
acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. 
 
[1A] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that 
the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may 
not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated 
corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly 
employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local 
affiliates. 
 
[1B] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in 
the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed 
in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be 
treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on 
the specific facts of the situation. 
 
[1C] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the 
situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (a) and (b); where a lawyer represents the government after 
having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1). The individual lawyer 
involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7 and 1.9. 
Principles of Imputed Disqualification 
[2] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of 
loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be 
considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the 
rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound 
by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph 
(a)(1) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves 
from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(a)(2) and 1.10 (b). 
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[3] The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of client 
loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a firm 
could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for example, but 
that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will not materially 
limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified.  
[4] The rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm 
where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or 
legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from 
acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person 
did while a law student. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal 
participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential 
information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(k) 
and 5.3. 
[5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a person 
with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly was 
associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated lawyer 
represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests adverse 
to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm may not 
represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the 
formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the firm has 
material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). 
[5A] If the lawyer has no information protected by Rule 1.6 or Rule 1.9 about the representation 
of the former client, no screening procedures are required. This would ordinarily be the case if 
the lawyer did no work on the matter and the matter was not the subject of discussion with the 
lawyer generally, for example at firm or working group meetings. The lawyer must search his or 
her files and recollections carefully to determine whether he or she has confidential information. 
The fact that the lawyer does not immediately remember any details of the former client's 
representation does not mean that he or she does not in fact possess confidential information 
material to the matter. 
[6] Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or former 
client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require the 
lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each affected 
client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in writing. In 
some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client consent. For a 
discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the future, see 
Rule 1.7, Comment 22. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(f). 
[7] Rule 1.10(a)(2) similarly removes the imputation otherwise required by Rule 1.10(a), but 
unlike section (c), it does so without requiring that there be informed consent by the former 
client. Instead, it requires that the procedures laid out in sections (a)(2)(i)-(iii) be followed. A 
description of effective screening mechanisms appears in Rule 1.0(e). Lawyers should be aware, 
however, that, even where screening mechanisms have been adopted, tribunals may consider 
additional factors in ruling upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation. 
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[8] Paragraph (a)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or 
partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive 
compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. 
[9] The notice required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii) generally should include a description of the 
screened lawyer’s prior representation and be given as soon as practicable after the need for 
screening becomes apparent. It also should include a statement by the screened lawyer and the 
firm that the client’s material confidential information has not been disclosed or used in violation 
of the Rules. The notice is intended to enable the former client to evaluate and comment upon the 
effectiveness of the screening procedures. 
[10] The certifications required by paragraph (a)(2)(iii) give the former client assurance that the 
client’s material confidential information has not been disclosed or used inappropriately, either 
prior to timely implementation of a screen or thereafter. If compliance cannot be certified, the 
certificate must describe the failure to comply. 
[10A] The former client is entitled to review of the screening procedures if the former client 
believes that the procedures will not be or have not been effective. For example, in a very small 
firm, it may be difficult to keep information screened. On the other hand, screening procedures 
are more likely to be successful if the personally disqualified lawyer practices in a different 
office of the firm from those handling the matter from which the personally disqualified lawyer 
is screened. If the matter involves litigation, the court before which the litigation is pending 
would be able to decide motions to disqualify or to enter appropriate orders relating to the 
screening, taking cognizance of whether the former client is seeking the disqualification of the 
firm upon a reasonable basis or without a reasonable basis for tactical advantage or otherwise. If 
the matter does not involve litigation, the former client can seek judicial review of the screening 
procedures from a trial court. 
[11] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, 
imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a 
lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, 
nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former client conflicts are not 
imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer. 
[12] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, 
paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to 
other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. 
Dissent of Michael Cassidy and Andrew Perlman to both 
Mass. Rule 1.10 and ABA Model Rule 1.10 
The subject of screening has generated considerable controversy, both within 
Massachusetts and nationally.31  One reason for the controversy is that advocates on both sides of 
the debate typically, and incorrectly, assume that Rule 1.10 supplies the relevant standard for 
                                                 
31 For an overview of the contentious legislative history of Rule 1.10, see STEPHEN GILLERS, ROY D. SIMON & 
ANDREW M. PERLMAN, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 244-251 (2013 ed.).  
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resolving disqualification motions.  Although the conflict of interest rules were originally 
intended to supply that standard,32 the reality is that courts sometimes disqualify law firms that 
have complied with the screening provisions in Rule 1.10,33 and decline to disqualify law firms 
that have failed to comply with the screening provisions in Rule 1.10.34 
In light of this reality, and to avoid giving lawyers a misleading impression about the 
significance of complying with (or not complying with) Rule 1.10, we recommend that the Rule 
focus solely on matters that are relevant to bar counsel (i.e., matters that could constitute a 
disciplinary offense).  The primary concerns of bar counsel relate to the inappropriate disclosure 
of confidential information within a firm, appropriate notice to affected clients, and the sharing 
of fees with disqualified lawyers.  The proposed approach would ensure that bar counsel retains 
authority to discipline lawyers who fail to comply with these requirements, while at the same 
time delegating the screening-related disqualification standard to judges, as they are in the best 
position to consider and apply the various factors that are relevant to the decision.   
This approach addresses a related problem with the current Massachusetts Rule: it 
incorrectly implies that lawyers are subject to discipline for using a screen in the wrong type of 
case.  For example, a Massachusetts law firm might hire and screen a lawyer who has a conflict 
of interest as a result of work performed for a former client at a prior firm.  Massachusetts Rule 
1.10 currently says that the screen is permissible only if the lawyer did not learn any “substantial 
material information”35 related to the matter the current firm is handling.  This provision implies 
that, if a court concludes that the lawyer did, in fact, have “substantial material information,” a 
lawyer might be disciplined for violating Rule 1.10.  The reality is that, even if a court may want 
to make the distinction between “material” and “immaterial” information for purposes of a 
disqualification decision, this distinction is not (and should not be) a matter of concern to bar 
counsel.  Because Rule 1.10 is supposed to be a professional conduct rule the violation of which 
can subject a lawyer to discipline, the Rule should be limited to those matters that are of 
disciplinary concern.  The proposal addresses this issue by removing from the black letter of the 
Rule any reference to the “substantial material information” standard, but recognizes (in the new 
comment) that materiality may be a factor when resolving disqualification motions. 
The majority of the Committee asserts that our analysis fails to appreciate that the Rules 
are sometimes used only to supply guidance.  We do not disagree that the Rules are sometimes 
useful primarily for guidance.   But we respectfully assert that our approach actually 
accomplishes this goal more effectively than the majority’s approach.  In particular, our proposal 
                                                 
32 See generally Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial Role, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 96-
97 (1996). 
33 See, e.g., Burgess-Lester v. Ford Motor Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815–16 (N.D. W. Va. 2008); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 
v. Reading Blue Mountain & N. R.R. Co., 397 F. Supp. 2d 551, 553–57 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Crudele v. N.Y. City 
Police Dep’t, No. 97 Civ. 6687 (RCC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13779 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001); James v. Teleflex, 
Inc., No. CIV. A. 97–1206, 1999 WL 98559, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 1999).   
34 See, e.g., Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI Technologies, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107057 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 5, 
2010); Kirk v. The First Am. Title Ins. Co., 183 Cal.App.4th 776 (Cal. App. Ct. 2010); Silicon Graphics, Inc. v. ATI 
Technologies, Inc., 741 F.Supp.2d 970 (W.D. Wis. 2010); In re Data Treasury Corp, 2010 WL 3074395 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Hempstead Video, Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Valley Stream, 409 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2005); Laprise v. 
Paul, 2007 WL 4636533 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); Milne v. Ryea, 2004 WL 423117 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004); Intelli-
Check, Inc. v. Tricom Card Tech., Inc., 2008 WL 4682433 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).    
35 See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Robert Half Intern., Inc., 641 F.Supp.2d 84 (D. Mass. 2009). 
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supplies lawyers with substantial and important additional guidance in the form of new comment 
language, which identifies factors that may be relevant to resolving disqualification motions.  
This language not only informs lawyers about the relevant factors that courts sometimes use to 
resolve screening-related disqualification motions, but it also avoids giving lawyers the 
misleading impression that the Rule supplies the applicable disqualification standard.  We 
believe that, by locating this guidance in a comment and by emphasizing that the disqualification 
decision is a matter beyond the scope of the Rules, there will be less confusion about the role 
Rule 1.10 plays in disqualification decisions while ensuring that lawyers receive the guidance 
that they need to act appropriately in a screening situation. 
The approach recommended here is not without precedent.  The California Bar recently 
concluded that the issue of screening is an unsettled area of law and should be left to the courts 
to resolve on a case-by-case.36   For this reason, the California Bar recommended that the 
California Rules remain silent on the question of screening.37   (The California Supreme Court 
has not yet decided whether to accept this recommendation.)  Our proposed approach reflects a 
similar sentiment – that screening-related disqualification decisions should be left to judges to 
resolve on a case-by-case basis – but recognizes that certain aspects of the screening procedure 
should be expressly regulated and subject to disciplinary oversight and that comment-based 
guidance may be useful to lawyers, clients, and judges.   
In sum, the proposed approach recognizes that disqualification decisions often turn on 
factual details that are best left to the discretion of judges to resolve on a case-by-case basis.  
Although an existing comment to Model Rule 1.10 observes that courts sometimes resolve 
disqualification motions on grounds unrelated to Rule 1.10,38  the proposal would elaborate on 
the point through additional comment language.  At the same time, the approach ensures that 
Rule 1.10 continues to address matters that are of legitimate concern to bar counsel (i.e., the 
procedures for employing a screen, but not the materiality of the information that the screened 
lawyer happened to have).  The proposed approach also ensures that lawyers, clients, and judges 
receive clearer guidance as to the factors that might be relevant to the disqualification decision, 
but makes clear that the disqualification decision is ultimately a matter of law beyond the scope 
of the Rules. 
The following version of Rule 1.10 incorporates our views. 
Dissenters’ Proposed RULE 1.10  IMPUTED DISQUALIFICATION: GENERAL RULE 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client 
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, 
unless 
                                                 
36 See COMM’N FOR THE REVISION OF THE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PROPOSED RULE 1.10 IMPUTATION OF 
CONFLICTS:  GENERAL RULE (April 2010), at 4 
http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=qKcQ8vAQg2E%3d&tabid=2161. 
37 Green, supra note 2, at 99 (making a similar point and arguing the conflict rules should not supply the standard for 
resolving disqualification motions). 
38 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10, cmt. [7]. 
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(1) the prohibition is based on a personal interest of the disqualified lawyer and does 
not present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of the client by the 
remaining lawyers in the firm; or 
(2) the prohibition is based upon Rule 1.9(a) or (b) and arises out of the disqualified 
lawyer’s association with a prior firm, and 
(i) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the 
matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom; 
(ii) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable the 
former client to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule, which shall 
include a description of the screening procedures employed; a statement of the 
firm's and of the screened lawyer's compliance with these Rules; a statement that 
review may be available before a tribunal; and an agreement by the firm to 
respond promptly to any written inquiries or objections by the former client about 
the screening procedures; and 
(iii) certifications of compliance with these Rules and with the screening 
procedures are provided to the former client by the screened lawyer and by a 
partner of the firm, at reasonable intervals upon the former client's written request 
and upon termination of the screening procedures. 
For purposes of this Rule a lawyer employed by the Public Counsel Division of the Committee 
for Public Counsel Services and a lawyer assigned to represent clients by the Private Counsel 
Division of that Committee are not considered to be associated. Lawyers are not considered to be 
associated merely because they have each individually been assigned to represent clients by the 
Committee for Public Counsel Services through its Private Counsel Division. 
(b) When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm (“former firm”), the former firm is 
not prohibited from thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of 
a client represented by the formerly associated lawyer and not currently represented by the 
former firm, unless: 
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly 
associated lawyer represented the client; and 
(2) any lawyer remaining in the former firm has information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter. 
(c) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may be waived by the affected client under the 
conditions stated in Rule 1.7. 
(d) The disqualification of lawyers associated in a firm with former or current government 
lawyers is governed by Rule 1.11. 
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(e) For the purposes of paragraph (a) of this Rule and of Rules 1.11 and 1.12, a personally 
disqualified lawyer in a firm will be deemed to have been screened from any participation in a 
matter if: 
(1) all material information possessed by the personally disqualified lawyer has been 
isolated from the firm; 
(2) the personally disqualified lawyer has been isolated from all contact with the new 
firm’s client relating to the matter, and any witness for or against the new firm’s client; 
(3) the personally disqualified lawyer and the new firm have been precluded from 
discussing the matter with each other; 
(4) the former client of the personally disqualified lawyer or of the former firm 
receives notice of the conflict and an affidavit of the personally disqualified lawyer and 
the new firm describing the procedures being used effectively to screen the personally 
disqualified lawyer, and attesting that (i) the personally disqualified lawyer will not 
participate in the matter and will not discuss the matter or the representation with any 
other lawyer or employee of the new firm, (ii) no material information was transmitted by 
the personally disqualified lawyer before implementation of the screening procedures and 
notice to the former client; and (iii) during the period of the lawyer's personal 
disqualification those lawyers or employees who do participate in the matter will be 
apprised that the personally disqualified lawyer is screened from participating in or 
discussing the matter; and 
(5) the personally disqualified lawyer and the new firm reasonably believe that the 
steps taken to accomplish the screening of material information are likely to be effective 
in preventing material information from being disclosed to the new firm and its client. 
In any matter in which the former client and the new firm’s client are not before a tribunal, the 
firm, the personally disqualified lawyer, or the former client may seek judicial review in a court 
of general jurisdiction of the screening procedures used, or may seek court supervision to ensure 
that implementation of the screening procedures has occurred and that effective actual 
compliance has been achieved. 
Comment 
Definition of ‘‘Firm’’ 
[1] For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the term ‘‘firm’’ includes lawyers in a 
private firm, and lawyers in the legal department of a corporation or other organization, or in a 
legal services organization.  See Rule 1.0(d).  Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm 
within this definition can depend on the specific facts.  For example, two practitioners who share 
office space and occasionally consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be regarded as 
constituting a firm. However, if they present themselves to the public in a way suggesting that 
they are a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be regarded as a firm for the 
purposes of the Rules. The terms of any formal agreement between associated lawyers are 
relevant in determining whether they are a firm, as is the fact that they have mutual access to 
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information concerning the clients they serve. Furthermore, it is relevant in doubtful cases to 
consider the underlying purpose of the Rule that is involved. A group of lawyers could be 
regarded as a firm for purposes of the rule that the same lawyer should not represent opposing 
parties in litigation, while it might not be so regarded for purposes of the rule that information 
acquired by one lawyer is attributed to the other. 
[1A] With respect to the law department of an organization, there is ordinarily no question that 
the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct. However, there can be uncertainty as to the identity of the client. For example, it may 
not be clear whether the law department of a corporation represents a subsidiary or an affiliated 
corporation, as well as the corporation by which the members of the department are directly 
employed. A similar question can arise concerning an unincorporated association and its local 
affiliates. 
[1B] Similar questions can also arise with respect to lawyers in legal aid. Lawyers employed in 
the same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those employed 
in separate units. As in the case of independent practitioners, whether the lawyers should be 
treated as associated with each other can depend on the particular rule that is involved, and on 
the specific facts of the situation. 
[1C] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, the 
situation is governed by Rule 1.11 (a) and (b); where a lawyer represents the government after 
having served private clients, the situation is governed by Rule 1.11(c)(1). The individual lawyer 
involved is bound by the Rules generally, including Rules 1.6, 1.7 and 1.9. 
Principles of Imputed Disqualification 
[2] The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of 
loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be 
considered from the premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the 
rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound 
by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated. Paragraph 
(a)(1) operates only among the lawyers currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves 
from one firm to another, the situation is governed by Rules 1.9(b) and 1.10(a)(2) and 1.10 (b). 
[3] The rule in paragraph (a) does not prohibit representation where neither questions of 
client loyalty nor protection of confidential information are presented. Where one lawyer in a 
firm could not effectively represent a given client because of strong political beliefs, for 
example, but that lawyer will do no work on the case and the personal beliefs of the lawyer will 
not materially limit the representation by others in the firm, the firm should not be disqualified.  
[4] The rule in paragraph (a) also does not prohibit representation by others in the law firm 
where the person prohibited from involvement in a matter is a nonlawyer, such as a paralegal or 
legal secretary. Nor does paragraph (a) prohibit representation if the lawyer is prohibited from 
acting because of events before the person became a lawyer, for example, work that the person 
did while a law student. Such persons, however, ordinarily must be screened from any personal 
participation in the matter to avoid communication to others in the firm of confidential 
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information that both the nonlawyers and the firm have a legal duty to protect. See Rules 1.0(k) 
and 5.3. 
[5] Rule 1.10(b) operates to permit a law firm, under certain circumstances, to represent a 
person with interests directly adverse to those of a client represented by a lawyer who formerly 
was associated with the firm. The Rule applies regardless of when the formerly associated 
lawyer represented the client. However, the law firm may not represent a person with interests 
adverse to those of a present client of the firm, which would violate Rule 1.7. Moreover, the firm 
may not represent the person where the matter is the same or substantially related to that in 
which the formerly associated lawyer represented the client and any other lawyer currently in the 
firm has material information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(c). 
[5A] If the lawyer has no information protected by Rule 1.6 or Rule 1.9 about the 
representation of the former client, no screening procedures are required. This would ordinarily 
be the case if the lawyer did no work on the matter and the matter was not the subject of 
discussion with the lawyer generally, for example at firm or working group meetings. The lawyer 
must search his or her files and recollections carefully to determine whether he or she has 
confidential information. The fact that the lawyer does not immediately remember any details of 
the former client's representation does not mean that he or she does not in fact possess 
confidential information material to the matter. 
[6] Rule 1.10(c) removes imputation with the informed consent of the affected client or 
former client under the conditions stated in Rule 1.7. The conditions stated in Rule 1.7 require 
the lawyer to determine that the representation is not prohibited by Rule 1.7(b) and that each 
affected client or former client has given informed consent to the representation, confirmed in 
writing. In some cases, the risk may be so severe that the conflict may not be cured by client 
consent. For a discussion of the effectiveness of client waivers of conflicts that might arise in the 
future, see Rule 1.7, Comment 22. For a definition of informed consent, see Rule 1.0(f). 
[7] Rule 1.10(a)(2) similarly removes the imputation otherwise required by Rule 1.10(a), but 
unlike section (c), it does so without requiring that there be informed consent by the former 
client. Instead, it requires that the procedures laid out in sections (a)(2)(i)-(iii) be followed. A 
description of effective screening mechanisms appears in Rule 1.0(e). Lawyers should be aware, 
however, that, even where screening mechanisms have been adopted, tribunals may consider 
additional factors in ruling upon motions to disqualify a lawyer from pending litigation.  For 
example, courts may decide to consider the likelihood that the screen will be effective, the size of 
the law firm, and the extent to which the disqualified lawyer’s information is material to the 
firm’s representation of another client.   The question of whether a court will rely on these or 
other factors when ruling on disqualification motions is a matter beyond the scope of these rules. 
[8] Paragraph (a)(2)(i) does not prohibit the screened lawyer from receiving a salary or 
partnership share established by prior independent agreement, but that lawyer may not receive 
compensation directly related to the matter in which the lawyer is disqualified. 
[9] The notice required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii) generally should include a description of the 
screened lawyer’s prior representation and be given as soon as practicable after the need for 
screening becomes apparent. It also should include a statement by the screened lawyer and the 
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firm that the client’s material confidential information has not been disclosed or used in violation 
of the Rules. The notice is intended to enable the former client to evaluate and comment upon the 
effectiveness of the screening procedures. 
[10] The certifications required by paragraph (a)(2)(iii) give the former client assurance that 
the client’s material confidential information has not been disclosed or used inappropriately, 
either prior to timely implementation of a screen or thereafter. If compliance cannot be certified, 
the certificate must describe the failure to comply. 
[10A] The former client is entitled to review of the screening procedures if the former client 
believes that the procedures will not be or have not been effective. For example, in a very small 
firm, it may be difficult to keep information screened. On the other hand, screening procedures 
are more likely to be successful if the personally disqualified lawyer practices in a different 
office of the firm from those handling the matter from which the personally disqualified lawyer 
is screened. If the matter involves litigation, the court before which the litigation is pending 
would be able to decide motions to disqualify or to enter appropriate orders relating to the 
screening, taking cognizance of whether the former client is seeking the disqualification of the 
firm upon a reasonable basis or without a reasonable basis for tactical advantage or otherwise. If 
the matter does not involve litigation, the former client can seek judicial review of the screening 
procedures from a trial court. 
[11] Where a lawyer has joined a private firm after having represented the government, 
imputation is governed by Rule 1.11(b) and (c), not this Rule. Under Rule 1.11(d), where a 
lawyer represents the government after having served clients in private practice, 
nongovernmental employment or in another government agency, former client conflicts are not 
imputed to government lawyers associated with the individually disqualified lawyer. 
[12] Where a lawyer is prohibited from engaging in certain transactions under Rule 1.8, 
paragraph (k) of that Rule, and not this Rule, determines whether that prohibition also applies to 
other lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. 
RULE 1.18 
Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposal 
For the most part, the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct do not address a 
lawyer’s obligations to prospective clients. Case law, however, establishes that a lawyer may be 
prohibited from using or revealing information furnished by a prospective client, even if no 
attorney-client relationship is formed.  Those confidentiality obligations, in turn, can materially 
limit a lawyer’s ability to represent other clients and may lead to the disqualification of both the 
lawyer and the lawyer’s firm.  A majority of the Committee believe that it would be helpful to 
the bar to provide specific guidance about a lawyer’s obligations to prospective clients in the text 
of the Rules.  Accordingly, we recommend the adoption of Model Rule 1.18.  
Under Rule 1.18(c), a lawyer is prohibited from opposing a prospective client in a 
substantially related matter if the lawyer had received information that would be “significantly 
harmful” to the prospective client in the matter.  That is the same standard recommended by the 
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Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers, §15(2).  Two members of the Committee 
recommend that “significantly harmful” be replaced by “used to the disadvantage of.”   A 
majority of the Committee believe that “used to the disadvantage of” is too stringent a standard.  
Lawyers and prospective clients must be given some leeway to share information in order to 
make an informed decision about whether to enter an attorney-client relationship, without 
running the risk that the lawyer and lawyer’s firm will be disqualified from representing anyone 
else in a substantially related matter.  Other provisions of the proposed Rule, including the 
requirement that lawyers take reasonable measures to avoid exposure to disqualifying 
information and the requirement that a lawyer who learns significantly harmful information be 
timely screened, are sufficient to protect the legitimate interests of prospective clients.  See Rule 
1.18(d). 
______________________ 
Dissent of Constance Vecchione to the Adoption of Rule 1.18, 
joined by Elizabeth Mulvey with respect to alternate Rule 1.18(c) 
Model Rule 1.18 concerns duties to prospective clients.  Prospective clients are currently 
protected in Massachusetts by case law such as Mailer v. Mailer, 390 Mass. 371, 374-375(1979, 
as well as by Mass. R. Prof. C.  1.6 and 1.9.  Massachusetts rejected Model Rule 1.18 when it 
was adopted by the American Bar Association in 2002.  
The committee has now reconsidered that decision and is recommending that Model Rule 
1.18 be adopted.  Given the existing protections, I do not think that Rule 1.18 is necessary.  If the 
Court is inclined to adopt it, however, the formulation that appears in Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct 4-1.18(c) is preferable to that in Model Rule 1.18(c) and I recommend that 
it be substituted for the Model Rule standard.  Elizabeth Mulvey joins me in supporting this 
alternative version of paragraph (c). 
The Florida rule replaces “significantly harmful to” with “used to the disadvantage of” 
and thus does not attempt to parse whether the information acquired from the prospective client 
is merely “harmful,” as opposed to “significantly harmful.”   
The proposed change is shown below: 
(c) Subsequent Representation. A lawyer subject to subdivision (b) shall not 
represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the 
same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the 
prospective client that could be significantly harmful to  used to the disadvantage of that 
person in the matter, except as provided in subdivision (d). If a lawyer is disqualified 
from representation under this rule, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is 
associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except 




Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposal 
The Committee recommends retaining the requirement that a prosecutor seek prior 
judicial approval before issuing a subpoena to a lawyer to obtain evidence about the lawyer’s 
client.  That requirement now appears in Mass.R.Prof.C. 3.8(f).  In the Committee’s 
recommendations, the identical requirement appears in Rule 3.8(e). 
A subpoena from a prosecutor to a lawyer can have profoundly disruptive effects on the 
relationship between lawyer and client.  A lawyer who receives such a subpoena runs the risk of 
disclosing privileged and confidential information that could affect the client’s liberty.  Such 
subpoenas can create distrust between lawyer and client, create conflicts of interest, discourage 
vigorous advocacy, and place an onerous burden on a client’s right under the Sixth Amendment 
to be represented by counsel in criminal proceedings.  Whitehouse v. United States District 
Court, 53 F.3d 1349, 1353 (1st Cir. 1995)(summarizing adverse effects of attorney subpoenas).  
Our current Rules safeguard against these risks in two ways.  First, Rule 3.8(f)(1) requires that, 
before issuing a subpoena to a lawyer, a prosecutor must reasonably believe that the information 
sought by the subpoena is not privileged, that the information is essential to the investigation or 
prosecution, and that there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.  Second, 
Rule 3.8(f)(2) requires the prosecutor to obtain prior judicial approval before issuing the 
subpoena to the lawyer.  These two requirements have been in effect for more than twenty years 
without, as far as the Committee knows, causing any significant disruption in criminal 
prosecutions in the courts of the Commonwealth. 
The dissent argues that we should retain the prerequisites that a prosecutor must satisfy 
under Rule 3.8(f)(1) but abolish the requirement of prior judicial approval in Rule 3.8(f)(2).  As 
the dissent notes, the ABA amended Model Rule 3.8 in 1995 to remove the requirement of prior 
judicial approval.  The sole reason that the ABA advanced for this change, however, was that the 
requirement of prior approval was a procedural rather than an ethical rule. The report 
recommending the change was careful to express no opinion on whether additional procedures 
were necessary or desirable to implement the ethical standards expressed in Rule 3.8(f).  120 No. 
2 Annual Reports A.B.A. 487 (1994).39  The objection that the rule is procedural rather than 
ethical has some force in the federal arena, where authority for rule making is divided among 
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the District Courts.  See e.g. Stern v. United States District 
Court, 214 F.3rd 4, 16-19 (1st Cir. 2000)(holding that District Court exceeded its limited rule-
making power by adopting Rule 3.8(f)(2)).  The Supreme Judicial Court, however, has authority 
to promulgate both ethical and procedural rules.  The critical question, in our view, is not 
whether the rule is classified as ethical or procedural, but how best to insure that prosecutors 
fulfill the ethical responsibilities that all members of the Committee believe they should have.  
We believe that the current rule strikes the right balance and should be retained. 
                                                 
39 On the merits, the ABA’s official position as late as 2011 was that prosecutors should be required to obtain prior 
judicial approval of subpoenas to attorneys. See Amicus Brief for the American Bar Association in Support of 




The dissent also advances two arguments of substance. First, the dissent contends that 
Rule 3.8(f)(1) is “in conflict with” Mass.R.Crim.P. 5(d), which provides that persons performing 
official functions before the grand jury must keep the jury’s proceedings secret.  We see no 
practical conflict with grand jury secrecy.  The dissent argues that an attorney who receives 
notice of a hearing under Rule 3.8(f)(2) is not a person performing an official function within the 
meaning of Mass.R.Crim.P. 5(d) and is not bound by grand jury secrecy.  We believe that 
exactly the same argument applies to a lawyer who receives a grand jury subpoena.  Indeed, a 
lawyer who receives a subpoena, just like a lawyer who receives a notice of a hearing, may have 
an obligation to inform the client and seek the client’s guidance concerning whether to assert any 
applicable privileges.  See Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.4; Mass.R.Prof.C. 1.6, comment [20].  And once the 
subpoena is in hand, the client may move to quash under Mass.R.Crim.P. 17(a)(2).  Whether a 
prosecutor moves for prior approval of a subpoena or a client moves to quash after the subpoena 
has been served, the practical effect on grand jury secrecy is the same.  Timing does, however, 
make a difference for the relationship between the subpoenaed lawyer and the lawyer’s client.  
Permitting the prosecutor to serve the subpoena without some prior ethical control can drive a 
“chilling wedge” of suspicion and distrust between lawyer and client.  United States v. Klubock, 
832 F.2d 649, 653 (1st Cir. 1987), aff’d by an equally divided court, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 
1987).  The Committee believes, therefore, that requiring prior judicial approval is a more 
effective means of discouraging overzealous prosecutors from mounting unnecessary attacks on 
the attorney-client relationship. 
The dissent also argues that the requirements of Rule 3.8(f)(2) are somehow inconsistent 
with the provisions of Mass.R.Crim.C. 17(a)(2) permitting a judge to quash a subpoena if it is 
“unreasonable and oppressive.”  We fail to see the inconsistency.  When a prosecutor subpoenas 
an attorney, current law permits a court to take the impact of the subpoena on the attorney-client 
relationship into account in judging whether the subpoena is unreasonable and oppressive.`  See 
e.g. In re Grand Jury, 194 F.R.D. 384 (D.Mass. 2000)(Ponsor, J.)(quashing grand jury subpoena 
to attorney as unreasonable and oppressive.)  Moreover, the dissenting members of the 
Committee agree that we should retain the prerequisites that a prosecutor must satisfy under  
Rule 3.8(f)(1) before issuing a subpoena to a lawyer.  The practical effect of the dissent’s 
position, it seems to us, is that there will be cases in which a prosecutor will not be able to  
satisfy the requirements of Rule 3.8(f)(1) but will nevertheless be allowed an opportunity to 
obtain evidence under the arguably more open-ended language of Mass.R.Crim.P. 17.  That 
possibility, we believe, would encourage prosecutors to take a chance on subpoenaing attorneys, 
even when they cannot satisfy their ethical obligations, and would undermine compliance with 
the Rule. 
_____________________ 
Dissent of Michael Cassidy and Andrew Perlman to the Committee’s Proposed Rule 3.8(e) 
We respectfully dissent from the Committee’s recommendation that Massachusetts 
continue its remarkable and pronounced divergence from the majority of states in defining the 
circumstances under which a prosecutor may subpoena an attorney to provide information about 
a past or present client at a judicial proceeding.  The Massachusetts “attorney subpoena rule” has 
a long and storied history, which is adequately summarized in two First Circuit decisions 
involving actions brought by the Department of Justice challenging the application of the rule to 
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federal prosecutors.  See Stern v. U.S. District Court for the District of Mass. 214 F.3d 4 (2000); 
United States v. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. 117 (D. Mass 1986), aff’d, 832 F. 2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(equally divided en banc).  We will not recount that complicated history or the resulting 
litigation.  For the reasons discussed below, however, we believe that ABA Model Rule 3.8(e) 
and Comment 4 more appropriately balance the interests of law enforcement and protections for 
the attorney-client relationship.  
Massachusetts was one of the first states to enact a prophylactic provision curtailing a 
prosecutor’s discretion to subpoena an attorney to give information about his client.  SJC R. 3:07 
PF 15 was enacted in 1985—it prohibited a prosecutor from subpoenaing an attorney to the 
grand jury to provide information about his client without prior judicial approval.  Notably, the 
1985 rule did not require an adversarial hearing to test the propriety of the order, and it did not 
set forth any standards to guide either the prosecutor’s discretion in seeking the subpoena or the 
judge’s discretion in allowing it.  In 1990, the ABA enacted Model Rule 3.8(f), which at that 
time extended the prohibition beyond the grand jury to other criminal proceedings (i.e., trials),  
contained a provision for an adversarial hearing before issuance of the subpoena, and limited the 
prosecutor’s discretion to seek a subpoena to situations in which the information was essential to 
completion of an ongoing investigation or prosecution, there were no other feasible avenues for 
obtaining the information, and the information was not protected by any privilege.  Notably, the 
second sentence to comment 4 to ABA Model Rule 3.8(f) purported to curtail the judge’s 
discretion to allow the subpoena, by calling for an adversarial hearing “in order to assure an 
independent determination that the applicable standards are met.” See Stern, 214 F. 3d at 9-10.  
The present Massachusetts rule (now renumbered 3.8 (e)) mirrors the 1990 ABA Rule, without 
the second sentence of Comment 4.  A majority of the Committee recommends that the Court 
retain Rule 3.8(e) in its present form.   
However, in 1995 the ABA amended Model Rule 3.8 (f) (now 3.8 (e)) in response to 
widespread concerns that the Rule conflicted with rules of criminal procedure regarding the 
standards for grand jury secrecy and the standards for motions to quash.  After extensive 
briefing, consideration, and debate the ABA removed the judicial approval and adversarial 
hearing requirements from the Rule and its pertinent comment. In their joint report 
recommending this amendment, the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility, Criminal Justice Section and Litigation Section stated as follows: 
Subparagraph (2) of Model Rule 3.8(f) is an anomaly in the Model Rules.  Rather than 
stating a substantive ethical precept, it sets forth a form of implementing requirement that 
is properly established as a rule of criminal procedure rather than as an ethical norm.  
Moreover, while nominally addressed to the conduct of prosecutors, subparagraph (2) 
affects the operations of courts and grand juries by “requiring the erection of novel court 
procedures and interject[ing] an additional layer of judicial supervision over the grand 
jury subpoena process.”  Baylson v. Disciplinary Board, 764 F. Supp. 328, 337 (E.D. Pa 
1991).  The procedural protections it imposes as matter of professional ethics have no 
parallel in any other enforceable provision of the Model Rules. 
REPORT 101, STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION AND LITIGATION SECTION (on file 
with authors).  The Model Rule as amended now constrains the circumstances under which a 
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prosecutor may issue an attorney subpoena, but it does not require an adversarial hearing or 
judicial approval prior to doing so. 
Our reason for recommending that the Court adopt the ABA form of the “attorney 
subpoena rule” is that Massachusetts Rule 3.8(e) is in conflict with two important rules of 
Criminal Procedure in this state.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 5(d) provides that persons performing an 
official function before the grand jury must keep those proceedings secret.  Grand jury secrecy 
helps prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, the intimidation of witnesses and grand jurors, 
and the flight of potential suspects. An attorney receiving notice of an order to appear at an 
adversarial hearing about a grand jury matter is not a party performing an “official function” 
before the grand jury, and therefore has no obligation to keep whatever he learns about the grand 
jury’s inquiry upon receipt of that motion secret. In fact, absent a judicial gag order imposed at 
the adversarial hearing itself, that attorney may have a duty to inform his client about the nature 
of the motion he has received.  See Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.4(a)(2) (requiring an attorney to 
reasonably consult with the client about the client’s objectives and the means by which those 
objectives will be pursued).  This consultation could undermine the protections afforded by 
Mass. R. Crim. P. 5, because timing and secrecy are often imperative to a successful grand jury 
investigation, especially of organized and covert criminal activity.   Second, Mass. R. Crim. P. 
17(a)(2) allows a judge to modify or quash a subpoena if it is “unreasonable or oppressive.” To 
the extent that the three conditions listed in Rule 3.8 (e) are interpreted as prerequisites to the 
issuance of an attorney subpoena following an adversarial hearing, see Stern, 214 F. 3d at 14 
(“the most sensible way to construe Local Rule 3.8(f) is as a unified whole”), such conditions 
may conflict with extensive case law interpreting the motion to quash standard under Mass. R. 
Crim. P. 17, particularly as it relates to the production of records and physical evidence.  For 
both of these reasons, if there are special judicial procedures or evidentiary standards that should 
guide the issuance of a subpoena to an attorney, they should be carefully debated, vetted and 
crafted by the Standing Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal Procedure after due 
consideration of their precise relationship to other criminal procedure rules.  
Massachusetts’ adherence to its minority position on attorney subpoenas presents a 
number of surprising anomalies.  First and foremost, Massachusetts took the lead in enacting PF 
15, and by its bold initiative encouraged other states and the ABA to follow suit.  But after years 
of experience with the rule and after considering substantial input from a number of interested 
parties, the Department of Justice, and several ABA sections committees, the ABA has now 
retreated from its original position.  Massachusetts is now farther out on a limb than any other 
state with regard to attorney subpoenas; the Rhode Island rule is similar to PF 15 in that it 
requires judicial approval, but it allows for this approval to be obtained ex parte rather than after 
an adversarial hearing. See R.I. Sup. Ct. Rules, Art V. R. Prof. Conduct 3.8 (f) and Whitehouse v. 
United States District Court, 53 F.3d 1349 (1st Cir. 1995). 
A second anomaly is that Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 3.8(e) and its predecessor PF 15 were 
implemented to curtail conduct that is no longer regulated by the Rule.  Massachusetts enacted 
the “attorney-subpoena rule” in 1985 (effective January 1, 1986) at the urging of the criminal 
defense bar in response to a growing practice by federal prosecutors in narcotics and organized 
crime cases of subpoenaing attorneys to determine the source of their fees in order to facilitate 
aggressive forfeiture actions. Stern, 214 F. 3d at 7-8.  See also Max Stern and David Hoffman, 
The Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA L. REV. 1783, 1787-89 
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and n. 19  (1988).  Yet federal prosecutors are no longer regulated by Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 
3.8(e), because in the Stern litigation Bar Counsel submitted an affidavit to the United States 
District Court in which he “vouchsafed that he would not wield State Rule 3.8(f) against federal 
prosecutors, but, rather, would refer any alleged violations to the federal district court for 
discipline under Local Rule 3.8(f).”  Stern, 214 F. 3d at 9.  Because the local federal rule was 
struck down in Stern as beyond the court’s rulemaking authority, federal prosecutors in 
Massachusetts now face no curtailment of their discretion in subpoenaing attorneys to give 
evidence against their clients, other than internal guidelines of the Department of Justice (see 
United States Attorneys’ Manual § 9-13.410) and the motion to quash standards of Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 17.  State prosecutors in Massachusetts are bound by the rule, but there has been no evidence 
or suggestion either before or after the enactment of PF 15 that they were a source of the problem 
that the rule was designed to address.  
Finally, the adversarial hearing/judicial approval provisions of Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 
3.8(e) might actually impede rather than protect the attorney client relationship in certain 
contexts.  One salutary effect of a grand jury subpoena on counsel is that it serves as official 
notice that counsel may be called upon to be a witness against his client at trial; it therefore will 
prompt counsel to find substitute representation in accordance with his professional obligations 
under Mass Rule Prof. Conduct 3.7.  But if prosecutors forego seeking evidence from attorneys 
due to fear of delay or compromising grand jury secrecy, counsel might continue to represent 
their client even in situations where other ethical rules might suggest that there would be a 
conflict of interest in doing so.  See Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing 
Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 939 (1992)(arguing that the 
original ABA provision represented an attempt by the defense bar to insulate unprivileged 
information from discovery, and to protect defense lawyers from having to withdraw from 
cases).  
The very explicit and precise prerequisites embodied in Model Rule 3.8(e) and Mass. R. 
Prof. Conduct 3.8(e)(1) already prevent a prosecutor from engaging in a fishing expedition, or 
issuing a subpoena simply to drive a wedge between counsel and his client.  In short, they 
adequately assure that attorney-subpoenas will be issued by prosecutors only in the rarest of 
circumstances. If a prosecutor issues a subpoena that calls for the production of privileged 
documents, or asks a question during oral testimony that calls for privileged information, the 
defense attorney is duty-bound under Mass. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(c) to refuse to answer, which 
assures that the matter will be brought before a court via a motion to compel or motion to quash 
if the prosecutor decides to delay the grand jury proceedings and pursue production of the 
evidence.  Any further protection for the attorney-client relationship via rules of criminal 
procedure implemented under the guise of ethical rules is simply unnecessary. 
RULE 4.4, COMMENT 3 
Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposal 
The dissenters contend that Comment 3 should be deleted because it appears to advise 
lawyers to follow a course of action that is inconsistent with Rule 1.2 and Rule 1.4.  The 
Committee believes that the dissenters misread the import of those two Rules in this context. 
 A-49 
 
The dissenters quote the following portion of Rule 1.2(a): “A lawyer does not violate this 
Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice 
the rights of his or her client….”  The dissenters argue that the decision not to look at 
inadvertently disclosed information could prejudice the rights of the client, because the lawyer’s 
decision may prevent the client from getting access to information that could materially benefit 
the client’s case.  Thus, the dissenters conclude that Rule 1.2 appears to prohibit a lawyer from 
acceding to an opposing counsel’s request to return or destroy inadvertently disclosed 
information and that Comment 3’s language to the contrary should be stricken. 
The problem with the dissenters’ analysis is that it quotes only a portion of the relevant 
language from Rule 1.2(a).  Here is the entire sentence: “A lawyer does not violate this Rule, 
however, by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the 
rights of his or her client, by being punctual in fulfilling all professional commitments, by 
avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in 
the legal process.” Mass. R. Prof. 1.2(a).  Many lawyers consider the review of an opposing 
counsel’s mistakenly sent information to be an “offensive tactic.”  For this reason, the suggestion 
in Rule 4.4, Comment 3 that a lawyer may decide to accede to opposing counsel’s request to 
return or destroy inadvertently sent information is entirely consistent with Rule 1.2(a).  Namely, 
if a lawyer concludes that the review of inadvertently sent information is an “offensive tactic,” 
the decision whether to return or destroy that information should be “a matter of professional 
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer,” just as Comment 3 suggests. 
The dissenters also point to Rule 1.4(a)(2), which requires a lawyer to “reasonably 
consult with the client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.”  
Notably, this provision does not require a lawyer to abide by all of the client’s instructions 
regarding the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.  The Rule merely 
instructs lawyers to consult with the client.  There is no inconsistency between telling lawyers 
that, on the one hand, they must consult with a client about a particular strategic decision (here, 
alerting the client about the receipt of inadvertently sent information) and, on the other hand, 
telling lawyers that they ultimately have the discretion whether to abide by the client’s wishes 
regarding that decision. 
We note that in complex litigation, parties frequently address the inadvertent production 
of documents by means of a negotiated protective order that permits lawyers to “claw back” 
documents produced by mistake.  This reflects the reality that when millions of pages are being 
reviewed and produced by large teams, there will inevitably be some mistakes made.   To be 
sure, when such an agreement is approved by a court, “applicable law” will require the return of 
inadvertently produced documents and agreement to such protective orders is not inconsistent 
with comment 3.  The point, however, is the recognition by the bar that it is not inconsistent with 
professionalism to agree not to take advantage of mistakes that will inevitably occur. 
For these reasons, a majority of the Committee believes that Comment 3 to Rule 4.4 is 
consistent with Rules 1.2 and 1.4 and that the Comment (which is also found in the Model Rules) 




Dissent of Timothy Dacey, Andrew Kaufman and John Whitlock to the Committee’s 
Proposed Rule 4.4, Comment 3 
The lawyer’s responsibility when receiving a document inadvertently from an opposing 
party or its counsel has provoked a good deal of recent controversy, especially since modern 
technology has made it considerably easier for lawyers and clients to send material to the wrong 
recipient. Model Rule 4.4(b), which the committee recommends for adoption, takes a cautious 
and modest position in this debate, requiring only that the lawyer-recipient promptly notify the 
sender of its mistake. It does not go further to state a substantive solution to the problem, leaving 
the parties and ultimately a court, if need be, to resolve the consequences of the error.  
Comment 3 to the Rule, however, does go further than the text of the Rule. It states, in its 
entirety: 
Some lawyers may choose to return a document or delete electronically stored 
information unread, for example, when the lawyer learns before receiving it that it was 
inadvertently sent. Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law to do so, the 
decision to voluntarily return such a document or delete electronically stored information 
is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer. See Rules 1.2 and 
1.4. 
Comment 3 states that “ordinarily,” a lawyer in the exercise of his or her own 
professional judgment (presumably without even telling the client) may decide to return a 
document to the other side or delete electronic information unread as “a matter of professional 
judgment ordinarily reserved to the lawyer,” citing Rules 1.2 and 1.4 as authority. But the 
relevant language in Rule 1.2 states the obligation of a lawyer to “seek the lawful objectives of 
his or her client through reasonably available means permitted by law and these Rules.” It goes 
on to provide that “A lawyer does not violate this Rule, however, by acceding to reasonable 
requests of opposing counsel which do not prejudice the rights of his or her client.” The last 
phrase constitutes the rub. How is a lawyer to know whether the rights of a client are prejudiced 
by deletion or return of an unread message? The message may, for example, contain crucial, and 
hitherto concealed, evidence that a court would have permitted the lawyer to use. 
The majority report relies on language in Comment 3 that states that a lawyer does not 
violate Rule 1.2 by avoiding “offensive tactics.” It states that “Many lawyers consider the review 
of an opposing counsel’s mistakenly sent information ‘an offensive tactic.’” There is no citation 
of support for the “many lawyers” evidence. One may be pardoned for thinking that the group is 
heavily made up of people who have sent emails inadvertently. We think of an offensive tactic as 
something initiated by a person, not something like reading a document that the other side has 
sent to us. The latter does not seem like a “tactic.”  
And Rule 1.4 does not advance Comment 3’s position. If anything, it rejects it. Rule 1.4 
provides in relevant part that “A lawyer shall . . .  (2) reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished . . . .”  
We do not understand the response of the majority to our view that there is inconsistency 
between Comment 3 to Rule 4.4 and Rule 1.4(2)(a).  The majority argues that the Comment 
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leaves the final decision about returning a document to its sender to the lawyer but of course the 
lawyer may consult with the client. The Comment, however, suggests that some lawyers may 
choose to return the document unread. We do not see how the lawyer is to consult with the client 
in that situation. We continue to think that what is meant by the Comment is that the lawyer may 
return the document unread without telling the client (or at least without telling the client before 
returning the document). 
Once the decision is made to adopt the text of the Rule 4.4(b), mandating only that a 
lawyer who receives a document or message inadvertently sent must notify the sender, it seems 
inappropriate for the Comment to suggest that any particular further action is or isn’t appropriate. 
Indeed, the thrust of the Rules cited in the Comment would seem to be just the opposite of the 
suggestion in the Comment that it would not violate the lawyer’s duty to communicate with the 
client and to provide competent representation if the lawyer returned or deleted the message 
unread. In any event, given the text of the Rule that the committee recommends, it seems to us 
much more appropriate to delete Comment 3 entirely in accord with the decision to provide in 
the Rule itself only that the recipient must notify the sender. The reference to Rule 1.2 and 1.4 
can only produce future mischief with respect to defining the duties of the lawyer to 
communicate and to provide competent representation.   
RULE 7.2(b) 
Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposal 
As stated in the Report, the majority recommends adopting the Model Rules’ deletion of 
the requirement in current Rule 7.2(b) that copies of advertisements be retained for two years, 
and agrees with the observation in the ABA’s reporter’s notes that the obligation was 
burdensome and seldom used for disciplinary purposes. 
_____________________ 
Dissent of Carol Beck, Andrew Kaufman, Regina Roman, 
Constance Rudnick, and Constance Vecchione 
Mass. R. Prof. C.  7.2(b) currently provides that “[a] copy or recording of an 
advertisement or written communication shall be kept for two years after its last dissemination 
along with a record of when and where it was used.”  Consistent with the amendments to the 
Model Rule in 2002, the committee is recommending that this provision be deleted.  According 
to the committee’s Executive Summary, the committee concurs with the ABA reporter’s notes 
indicating that “the obligation was burdensome and seldom used for disciplinary purposes.” 
The undersigned respectfully dissent from this recommendation as this provision permits 
enforcement of the rule.  Comment 5 to Massachusetts Rule 7.2 specifically notes that the rule 
“requires that a record of the content and use of advertising be kept in order to facilitate 
enforcement of this Rule.”  The committee’s draft provides no alternative means of enforcement, 
leaving potential prosecution of the core obligation of honesty in advertising to the happenstance 
of copies being available to bar counsel.  The ability to obtain copies of advertisements on radio 
or from websites has been critical in recent disciplinary investigations involving loan 
modifications and unauthorized practice of law where low-income clients were targeted.  
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Requiring that lawyers maintain copies of advertisements also encourages the use of care in 
finalizing content.  Such encouragement should not be left to the possibility that an 
advertisement, especially in the form of a radio or television ad or an online entry, might be 
copied or recorded by a member of the public or retained by the station.  Compare proposed 
comment [4] to Rule 7.3, which, in distinguishing advertising from solicitation, notes that “[t]he 
contents of advertisements and communications permitted under Rule 7.2 can be permanently 
recorded so that they cannot be disputed….”  The distinction will evaporate if there is no 
requirement that copies of advertisements be retained. 
According to the ABA, a majority of U.S. jurisdictions still require that lawyers retain 
copies of advertisements and solicitations for periods of time ranging from six years (Alabama) 
to one year (Virginia, for electronic media advertisements), with two to three years being the 
norm.  In addition, seven jurisdictions have even stricter standards, requiring filing copies of 
some or all advertisements and solicitations with the disciplinary authority prior to or 
contemporaneous with the first dissemination.  A simple provision requiring that advertisements 
be retained for two years is more than reasonable. 
To the extent that the concern driving the committee’s recommended revision is the 
difficulty in retaining copies of frequent changes to websites, the dissenters suggest adding to the 
current rule a sentence, such as the one in italics below that we have modeled on the New York 
rule.  If the proposal is accepted, an additional explanatory comment concerning the added 
language would likely be needed, and certain other related changes recommended by the 
majority of the committee (the deletion of current comment 5 of Rule 7.2, as well as the deletion 
of current Rule 7.3(c) and comment 3 of Rule 7.3) would need to be revisited. 
(b) A copy or recording of an advertisement or written communication shall be kept for 
two years after its last dissemination along with a record of when and where it was 
used.  Any advertisement contained in a computer-accessed communication, including 
but not limited to a website, shall be preserved upon the initial publication of the 
website or other computer-accessed communication, any major redesign of the website 
or communication, or any meaningful and extensive content change, but in no event less 
frequently than once every six months. 
RULE 8.4(h) 
Statement in Support of the Committee’s Proposal 
As stated in the report, the majority agrees with the ABA position in deleting paragraph 
(h) from Rule 8.4 on the grounds that it is too vague to serve as an independent basis for 
discipline.  No limiting construction of this paragraph has emerged from the case law, and none 
has been proposed by the dissenters.  Compare Matter of the Discipline of Two Attorneys, 421 




Dissent of Andrew Kaufman and Constance Vecchione 
Rule 8.4(h), which states that “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in any 
other conduct that adversely reflects on his or her fitness to practice law,” reflects the decision by 
the Supreme Judicial Court in 1998 to continue a provision of its former Rules (based on the 
ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct) despite the fact that it had been eliminated in the 
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The issue that the court faced then is identical to 
the issue it faces today. Is the provision too broad, too vague to give the necessary notice to serve 
as a basis for discipline? Or, on the contrary, since it is impossible to conjure up all potential 
misconduct warranting discipline when drawing up a code of disciplinary conduct, is a provision 
like this needed to cover action that any reasonable lawyer would understand constitutes 
misconduct?  
We believe that the provision serves a useful purpose when understood as limited to 
conduct that any reasonable lawyer would understand as constituting misconduct. The current 
provision has been cited many times by the Supreme Judicial Court in imposing discipline, 
generally but not always in connection with violation of other, more specific Rules. The 
challenge is to name situations when the provision might be used by itself. That is a difficult 
proposition since by definition the provision was originally placed in Rule 8.4(h) and its 
predecessor Rule to cover unusual situations that are sufficiently uncommon that they have not 
been covered by more specific Rules. We think it useful to have a provision to cover situations 
like the following: a lawyer misstates earnings on the annual report of earnings forms required of 
persons receiving disability pensions, without intent to defraud but also without any effort to 
ascertain what was required and resulting in substantial overpayment of disability pension 
benefits for two years (the facts of In re Kelly, 19 Mass. Atty. Disc. Reports 220 (2003), public 
reprimand imposed by the Board of Bar Overseers solely on the basis of the predecessor of Rule 
8.4(h)); and a lawyer is found by a federal administrative tribunal to have willfully failed to file 
his federal tax return, although no criminal charges were instituted (the facts of In re Kilduff, 
public reprimand no. 2011-13 in which the court relied solely on Rule 8.4(h), rejecting a Rule 
8.4(b) charge). Examples from other jurisdictions of freestanding violations (at least as to the 
charge at issue) of an equivalent rule include: Courtney v. Alabama State Bar, 492 So. 2d 1002 
(Ala. 1986) (unwanted sexual advances toward client's guardian); People v. Stillman, 42 P.3d 88 
(Colo. O.P.D.J. 2002) (intentional destruction of roommate’s personal property); People v. 
Jaramillo, 35 P.3d 723 (Colo. O.P.D.J. 2001) (harassment of girlfriend’s husband and his 
children with divorce pending in which she was represented by other counsel; additional counts 
with other misconduct); In re Gershater, 17 P.3d 929 (Kan. 2001) (lawyer sent “vicious, 
offensive” letter containing “unprintable epithets” to her  former counsel; additional counts with 
other misconduct). 
In the absence of a provision like Rule 8.4(h), the temptation would be to stretch some 
other, more specific Rule to cover the conduct, with the danger of distorting the other provision 
because the Rule drafters simply couldn’t imagine all forms of potential lawyer misconduct. 
Massachusetts would not be alone in continuing to retain a provision like our current Rule 8.4(h). 
Seven other states, including New York and Ohio, have continued to do so. We therefore 
recommend that the court retain our current Rule 8.4(h). 
AM 20788870.3  
